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ABSTRACTS

Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management

By BENJAMIN MILLER

This essay presents a theoretical model for explaining great power cooperation in conflict management. The model refines recent cooperation theory by distinguishing between types and degrees of international cooperation. It also challenges the dominance of decision-making analysis in the crisis literature and supplements it with structural factors. In brief, the model suggests that whereas crisis cooperation (crisis management) is conditioned by structural elements, cooperation in normal diplomacy (conflict resolution) depends on state attributes and cognitive factors. Such a model can account for the fact that unintended wars can break out between relatively moderate and similar actors whereas immoderate and dissimilar states can manage crises effectively. At the same time the model explains why some states are able to cooperate in normal diplomacy better than others, even when more actors are cooperating.

The Strategy of Political Liberalization: A Comparative View of Gorbachev's Reforms

By CHRISTOPHER YOUNG

This article examines three Western European cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and shows that political liberalization does not necessarily require a reformer's commitment to democracy. Under the right circumstances, even conservative politicians may find liberalization to be a rational and acceptable means to secure their power and to defeat powerful opponents, despite the risk of future upheavals. Such circumstances were present in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev and his supporters used the strategy of political liberalization to remove the threat posed by their rivals in the party apparatus.

Soviet Politics and After: Old and New Concepts

By WILLIAM E. ODOM

The totalitarian model remained the best analytic concept for studying Soviet politics because it offered clear empirical referents, provided a yardstick for measuring change, and could be adapted to explain the nature of change. Alternative models emphasizing pluralism encouraged the impression that "political development" was occurring rather than the "political decay" that led to the Soviet Union's collapse. The study of the successor states must now be brought within a more general approach to comparative political analysis. Yet the totalitarian model retains utility for understanding the legacies those states still confront.

Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China

By JEAN C. OI

In the 1980s fiscal reform in China provided localities with strong incentives and a heightened capacity to pursue industrial growth. As a result, local governments have responded vigorously to economic reform, managing rural collective-owned enterprises as diversified corporations, with local officials performing the role of a board of directors. This article analyzes the incentives that have led to the development of this form of local state corporatism and rapid rural industrialization, and it describes the ways in which local governments coordinate economic activity and reallocate revenues from industrial production. These developments are important for two reasons: they show that local government involvement in

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the economy does not necessarily decline with the expansion of market coordination; and they offer a successful model of reform that serves as a counterpoint to privatization proposals.

Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition

By WILLIAM R. THOMPSON

Leadership long-cycle analyses emphasize the global political economy, sea power, and the cyclical rise and fall of maritime powers. Ludwig Dehio's interpretation of European international politics stressed regional politics, land power, and the cyclical rise and fall of continental powers. Since neither framework totally ignores what the other accentuates, a merger of the two perspectives is quite feasible and results in improved explanatory power. As an illustration, several of Dehio's generalizations about the nature and timing of regional power concentration are tested for the period 1494-1945. The outcome suggests that peaks of regional and global power concentration alternate. Global reconcentration is stimulated, at least in part, by the threat posed by a rising regional challenger.

Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo

By WOOSANG KIM

This study extends recent research on the power transition and hegemonic stability theory to the preindustrial era. It improves on the original power transition theory by relaxing an assumption and by extending the empirical domain. Unlike the original power transition theory, the revised version is not restricted to the period after the industrial revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era. This study examines the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period. The data for 1648 to 1815 indicate strong support for the power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war. That is, when the challenging great power, with its allies' support, catches up with the dominant power, great power war is most likely.

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EXPLAINING GREAT POWER COOPERATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

By BENJAMIN MILLER*

Introduction

AFTER more than four decades of continuity, recent years have seen far-reaching changes in international politics. The changes have appeared at both the unit level and the international system level. In the former instance, they occurred within the political and socioeconomic systems of states, taking the form of democratization and transition to market economies, notably in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and, most recently, the former Soviet Union. Changes at the international system level include the decline of bipolarity due to the weakening of Soviet power and its disengagement from Eastern Europe and other parts of the globe and the potential for an integrated Europe or a united Germany and for Japan to become a major world power. In many ways these changes have been the most dramatic since the end of World War II and the onset of the cold war in the late 1940s.

What does international relations theory lead us to expect concerning the effects of these changes on world stability and international conflict management? On the one hand, it raises concerns about the expected changes at the systems level: the classic debate on the relative merits of bipolarity and multipolarity notwithstanding, many analysts have recently come to accept the Waltzian argument about the greater basic stability of bipolar systems.[1] Indeed, pessimists in the realist camp antic-

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[1] On deductive reasoning for the stability of bipolar systems, see Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93 (1964); idem, *Theory of International Politics* (Read-

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ipate greater instability in post–cold war Europe because of the structural transition from bipolarity to multipolarity.[2] On the other hand, optimists in the liberal camp would find the unit-level changes reassuring,[3] because of the anticipated pacifying effects of the democratization process (the Kantian argument that democracies never fight each other having been expressed most recently by Doyle) and of economic liberalism as expressed by the rise of the trading state, the transition to free-market economies, and the related growing economic interdependence.[4]

Indeed, contemporary international relations theory fails to provide an adequate and parsimonious answer to this question of what we should expect, though it is so important for issues of war and peace. Broadly speaking, international relations theory can be divided into two main families: inside-out, or unit-level, theories (which focus on state attributes and on cognitive factors)[5] and structural/systemic theories (which

ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chap. 8; and Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. 6. For empirical evidence that bipolar systems are more stable, see Jack Levy, "The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis," in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., *Polarity and War* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 54–58, 66. For a game-theoretical perspective, see Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). For an application to the 1930s, see Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); for the postwar period, see John Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). For a similar rationale in different international contexts, see Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986); idem, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade," *American Political Science Review* 83 (December 1989); and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[2] See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990).

[3] The most extreme representative is Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989). On realist, or "Hobbesian," pessimists versus liberal optimists in post–cold war Europe, see Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990).

[4] On democracies and war, see Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986). On the trading state, see Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For a brief recent review of the economic-liberal argument concerning the connection between a market economy and peace, see Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 89–90.

[5] Such inside-out theories expect high correlation between internal attributes, states' foreign policies, and international outcomes. These theories include second-image theories (such as the Wilsonian, the liberal economic, and Marxist schools); see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), chaps. 4, 5; Doyle (fn. 4); Stanley Hoffmann, "Liberalism and International Affairs," in Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987); and Grotian perspectives, which argue that common norms and beliefs facilitate cooperation, most recently in the regime literature, e.g., John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). For criticism of inside-out theories, see Waltz, *Man, State and War*; and idem (fn. 1, 1979).

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stress the effects of the international system on state behavior).[6] This essay assumes that both approaches have some explanatory power with respect to international outcomes and seeks to reconcile their competing claims, at least in the area of conflict management. I will argue that (1) tacit regulation of the use of force (manifested most dramatically by crisis cooperation, that is, *crisis management*) is conditioned by *structural* elements (most specifically, the distribution of capabilities in the international system), whereas (2) cooperation in *conflict resolution* (cooperation that extends beyond the time of a certain crisis) depends on *state/cognitive* factors (domestic regimes and leaders' beliefs).[7] Such a theoretical model can provide a parsimonious explanation for some major puzzles for international relations theory, as well as some suggestive ideas for future conflict management.[8] This essay presents the model and its rationale and applies it to U.S.-Soviet conflict management in the postwar era; it also includes a brief comparison with the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe.

This model challenges the domination of the crisis literature by decision-making analysis[9] and the more general disregard of systemic factors

[6] The most influential structural theory is Waltz (fn. 1, 1979). For criticism and Waltz's response, see Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). A recent development related to structural theory is the emergence of the literature on cooperation under anarchy. See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Oye (fn. 1); and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978). See also Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Cooperation theory uses game theory, especially the Prisoners' Dilemma.

[7] The critical element that characterizes a crisis and that differentiates it from a normal period is the dangerously high probability of resort to military force; see Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (March 1977); and Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 6–7. Conflict resolution refers to settlement of the fundamental issues in conflict.

[8] More specifically, the recent systemic changes might lead to greater problems in crisis management than in the postwar era, but the unit-level changes, if they persist and spread further, should lead to greater successes at conflict resolution. Thus, they should lead to more effective crisis prevention and should lessen the likelihood that crises will occur in the first place, especially in regions that have seen the most far-reaching domestic changes—Europe and Latin America. In other regions (notably the Middle East, some parts of Asia and Africa, and the former Soviet empire and the Balkans) the combination of the decline of bipolarity and the severe limits to the unit-level changes suggests that there might be growing problems in crisis prevention and in crisis management and less stability than in the last forty-five years unless the great powers in cooperation with the local parties make a concerted attempt to resolve conflicts and maintain stable balances of forces.

[9] See Ole Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972); Irving Janis, *Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Ole Holsti and Alexander George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers," *Political Science Annual* 6 (1975); Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 47–49; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace*

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by inside-out theories. Crisis analysis is supplemented with structural factors. At the same time, however, this study addresses the failure of structural and game theories to specify the types of outcome they best explain.[10] It highlights outcomes best explained by structural factors such as inadvertent wars and tacit rules for regulation of the use of force—outcomes that are closely related to the question of the success or failure of crisis management.

Also considered are important phenomena that structural theory fails to explain; these include high-level explicit cooperation in international regimes and especially their normative content and related learning.[11] To account for such outcomes, the analysis departs from an exclusive focus on system-level factors to consider unit-level elements as well. Indeed, inside-out theories are most useful for explaining great power concerts and cooperation in conflict resolution, that is, cooperation that takes place mostly in noncrisis periods.

The following section illustrates the usefulness of the model by considering four puzzles drawn from a comparison of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe and the postwar era. The second section introduces the dependent variables of this study: modes and types of cooperation (spontaneous versus deliberate and crisis management versus concerted diplomacy in conflict resolution). This is followed by a discussion of the rationale for linking crisis management with structural factors and unit-level elements with normal (noncrisis) diplomacy, especially conflict resolution. Finally, the model is used to explain the contrast during the postwar era between the persistent tacit cooperation of the

and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); idem, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

[10] In the Prisoners' Dilemma the players have only two choices: defection or cooperation. By contrast, cooperation might more appropriately be conceived of as a continuum. On this point, see Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40 (April 1988); Alexander George et al., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 5 n. 4, 11 n. 31, 14; and Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987), 504. Despite the importance that structural theory attaches to the international effects of the number of players on outcomes such as stability and order, it is not clear from that literature whether one should expect more cooperation in a bipolar or a multipolar system and what kind of cooperation, if any, is expected in each of the systems. Cf. Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 882–83; idem (fn. 1, 1979), 171, 175; and Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 446; versus Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), chaps. 8, 9; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 506–7; Oye (fn. 1), 4; and Gowa (fn. 1, 1986), 172. Moreover, in Waltz's work on bipolar stability (fn. 1, 1964 and 1979) it is not completely clear whether system stability means durability or peacefulness or both. See John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Keohane (fn. 6, 1986), 153–54.

[11] See George et al. (fn. 10), 6; Jervis (fn. 10); Haggard and Simmons (fn. 10), 500–506.

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superpowers in times of crisis and the fluctuations in their relations in normal times.

The Four Puzzles: Anomalies for International Relations Theory

For almost forty years five great European powers managed international affairs together, yet the Concert of Europe collapsed in violence as a result of unintended wars. For over forty years the two superpowers failed to cooperate in the management of international affairs, yet no world war, planned or unintended, broke out. Why?

Not only has international relations theory in general failed to formulate a parsimonious answer to this critical question, but four puzzles deriving from it present serious anomalies for specific, leading international relations theories. To begin with the first two:

> 1. Great powers that are relatively moderate (in their attitude toward the status quo) and similar (culturally and ideologically) fail to manage crises and indeed find themselves fighting inadvertent wars. The best examples[12] are the Crimean War and, to a lesser extent, World War I. Both (especially the first one) broke out after an era of intensive cooperation between the powers, namely, the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe, and despite the initial reluctance of the parties to go to war with each other, or at least at the magnitude in which they eventually found themselves.[13]

[12] Obviously, there is not total correlation between the theoretical element of the puzzles and the historical cases that illustrate them. Yet there are critical elements in the historical cases that correspond to the essence of these puzzles, especially when considered in comparison with other periods. For example, the nineteenth-century powers were moderate and similar in comparison with the postwar U.S. and Soviet Union. Moreover, the focus here is on explaining not a specific historical case but rather certain types of international phenomena such as inadvertent wars, tacit rules, or concerts.

[13] As the literature on these two wars is vast, it is noteworthy that a recent major volume on crisis management, which provides a comprehensive treatment of inadvertent wars, includes case studies of the Crimean War and World War I. See Richard Smoke, "The Crimean War," and Jack Levy, "The Role of Crisis Management in the Outbreak of World War I," both in Alexander George, ed., *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). Although the precise dates of the Concert are disputed, most scholars agree that the Concert lasted until the Crimean War. This war was thus clearly a case of failed crisis management under the Concert. See the references in Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991), 122 n. 23. Even World War I can be seen, at least to some extent, as a failed crisis management under the Concert. Not only did the Concert endure in name until World War I, but as late as 1913 the great powers convened a conference in London to address the Balkan conflict. Moreover, Britain and Germany experienced a détente in their relations in the three years preceding World War I. See Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 55; and Sean Lynn-Jones, "Detente and Deterrence," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986). On World War I as an inadvertent war, see also the fairly comprehensive list of references in Lynn-Jones, 121–23 nn. 1–5. It is true that this characterization of World War I contrasts with the argument of the Fischer school of historians concerning the German aggression that led to the war (cited in Lynn-Jones, 123 n. 6), but there is a widespread view that the cultural

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2. Relatively immoderate and dissimilar powers cooperate. A remarkable illustration is the postwar U.S.-Soviet crisis management and joint termination of regional wars.[14] This tacit cooperation can be described in terms of patterns of restraint or even tacit rules for regulating the use of force.

These two puzzles are paradoxical both on commonsense grounds and in terms of a number of inside-out theoretical approaches that expect a correlation between similar internal attributes and the likelihood of cooperative outcomes. Why did a security regime such as the Concert collapse in violence? And why did ideologically antagonistic powers cooperate more effectively in crisis management than more similar and usually friendlier powers? Indeed, inside-out theories do not adequately explain unintended outcomes, that is, outcomes that cannot be deduced from actors' intentions and attributes. This is a major flaw, because such outcomes occur quite frequently in international politics.[15]

The most parsimonious answer links systems theory with crisis management. Following the realist tradition, this approach highlights the difficulties of sustaining high-level cooperation under anarchy of *all* the great powers of the day (no matter which), especially in the sensitive area of security.[16] At the same time two system-level causes—the transformation of the international system from a multipolar to a bipolar one

similarity of the nineteenth-century powers underlined the Concert of Europe (see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1977], 226, 316–17), as did also the relative moderation of these powers' foreign policies, even including Germany's, on the eve of World War I. Robert Jervis writes: "If we were to add up each state's expansionism in this period, we would expect a moderate international system"; see Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 213. Indeed, even Fischer's supporters accept that Germany did not want a world war but stumbled into it as a result of misguided attempts to ensure German security. See Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990), 148 n. 25.

[14] The postwar era will be defined here as the period from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. During that time the structure of the international system was bipolar: the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the most powerful states in overall capabilities and the leading actors in influencing patterns of conflict and cooperation in the global system.

[15] On unintended consequences in international politics, see Waltz (fn. 1, 1979); Jervis (fn. 13), 216–19; and Gaddis (fn. 1), 217–18. For more general discussions of unintended consequences, see William Summer, "War," in *War and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911); and Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 358.

[16] Classical realist writers include E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); and Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1967). On the difficulties of security cooperation, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Krasner (fn. 5); and Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* 37 (October 1984). For a recent presentation of the realists' views on the limits of cooperation, see Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988).

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and the emergence of nuclear weapons—made it easier for competing great powers to manage crises.[17] Specifically, the nuclear revolution provided major incentives for cautious behavior concerning the use of force in times of crisis, whereas bipolarity facilitated the emergence of tacit rules for regulating the use of force.[18] In a bipolar situation the relative clarity of the balances of capabilities, commitments, and interests minimizes the chances of misjudging the rival's capability and resolve to defend its vital stakes—even in the absence of formal agreements and explicit negotiations between antagonists. Once each coalition has a single leader who is responsible for responding promptly to threats to the status quo, accurate mutual expectations about the other's reactions are more likely to evolve.

The proposition that a two-power world is conducive to the emergence of spontaneous cooperation manifested by tacit rules is supported by both the theory of the firm in microeconomics and findings in social psychology.[19] The explanatory power of structural theory regarding postwar crisis management is reinforced by the fact that according to an inside-out perspective, subsystemic changes following World War II, as we will see below, should have made it especially difficult to regulate the use of force. By contrast, in past multipolar systems uncertainties derived from intense security dilemmas and a collective goods problem made it

[17] Although Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 180–81, considers nuclear arms as a unit-level element, they are qualitatively different from such internal factors as ideology and domestic politics. Rather, nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of the overall distribution of capabilities. Moreover, MAD as an objective situational constraint (irrespective of whether it is also a strategy or even if the dominant doctrine is flexible response—war fighting) fits well with the structural idea of objective factors that exercise restraining pressures on the actors regardless of their intentions, that is, their planned policies and strategic doctrines. On such a conception of nuclear deterrence, see Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[18] As we know from the history of unintended wars, such as the Crimean War and World War I, willingness to avoid war has not always been sufficient to prevent a major war, let alone to foster the emergence of such rules.

[19] In general, the more concentrated the power within a certain industry, the easier is cooperation between the leading firms to maintain their price above the equilibrium level. This is based on Mancur Olson's collective goods theory; see Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), chaps. 1–2; and Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 4–42. More specifically, Frederic M. Scherer, an economist, has argued that when only two firms dominate an industry, they will spontaneously coordinate their conduct to secure a higher price (namely, the oligopoly price). The larger the number of oligopolists, the more explicit their cooperation must be. See Scherer, *Industrial Pricing: Theory and Evidence* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), 7–8, cited in Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 35 n. 26. In several experimental studies in social psychology, Thibaut and his associates have shown that two parties are more likely to devise norms of behavior to regulate their behavior and avoid conflict when both have the power and willingness to affect the welfare of the other. See, e.g., Thibaut and Faucheux 1965, Thibaut 1968, Thibaut and Gruder 1969, which are cited in Martin Patchen, *Disputes between Nations* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 40. This kind of interdependence is especially high between the superpowers in a bipolar world.

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difficult to manage crises, even for members of a security regime or a diplomatic concert.[20]

But if systemic causes are especially powerful with respect to regulating the use of force in times of crisis, this is not so in the context of normal diplomacy and conflict resolution. Indeed, unit-level analysis best explains the following two puzzles:

3. Five competing great powers establish a diplomatic concert and jointly manage the international system. The outstanding example is the Concert of Europe, especially during the period 1815–54.[21]

4. The only two great powers in the system fail to coordinate their normal diplomacy even when their interests converge. This applies to the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the postwar era (until the significant changes in their relations in the late 1980s following the major cognitive and domestic changes in the Soviet Union), notably regarding some regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli dispute.[22]

These puzzles present two anomalies for structural theory. First, despite the anarchic, self-help nature of the international system, the great powers of the nineteenth century managed to transcend for about forty years the normal balancing behavior of states, especially of big powers, against each other by forming a concert in which all the great powers collaborated.[23] Second, both structural and game theory would expect

[20] Major examples of the destabilizing effects of unclarity in the balance of interests and of related commitments to intervene include the Russian miscalculation of the British commitment to Turkey in 1853–54 and the German misjudgment of the British commitment to the Triple Entente in summer 1914. The first misperception led to escalation of the Crimean War. See, e.g., Smoke (fn. 13), 44. He highlights the destabilizing effects of the multipolar structure on the management of the Crimean crisis (p. 56). The second miscalculation was a major factor in the escalation of World War I. See, e.g., Levy (fn. 13), 88; and Lynn-Jones (fn. 13), 144. On the security dilemma, see Jervis (fn. 6). The terms *buck-passing* and *free ridership*, derived from the collective goods problem in Olson (fn. 19), are applied to multipolar systems by Posen (fn. 1), 63–64. For a recent refinement of Waltz's argument concerning the instability of multipolar systems, see Christensen and Snyder (fn. 13), 137–68.

[21] For recent conceptualizations of the Concert of Europe as a mechanism for conflict resolution and system management, see Mandelbaum (fn. 1), chap. 1; and Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 6. On the Concert as a security regime in contrast to the absence of such a regime in the postwar era, see Jervis "Security Regimes," in Krasner (fn. 5). For a distinction between a concert and other mechanisms for conflict management and for the theoretical underpinnings of these mechanisms and their application to the postwar and the post–cold war eras, see Benjamin Miller, "A 'New World Order': From Balancing to Hegemony, Concert or Collective Security," *International Interactions* 18 (Fall 1992).

[22] See, e.g., Benjamin Miller, "Perspectives on Superpower Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in George Breslauer, ed., *Soviet Strategy in the Middle East* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

[23] On the structural expectation that great powers will balance each other because of the dominance of security considerations in an anarchic system, see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 122–24; Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 123–28; and Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

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greater cooperation and joint management when there are fewer actors,[24] yet the superpowers, despite their low number, were less capable than earlier powers (such as the Concert members) of coordinating their normal diplomacy, even when they had converging interests.

To answer these questions, one must bring in subsystemic analysis. Structural theory alone cannot account for the differences in the attempts at establishing great power collective diplomacy following the three general wars of the last two hundred years.[25] Clearly, something fundamental must have differentiated the nineteenth-century Concert from the short-lived and ill-fated ones (if they were concerts at all) that arose after the two world wars. The formation of a true concert in the first case was made possible by the common (conservative) ideology of the elites of all the great powers after 1815 and the shared internal-ideological threat they faced—of revolution and its concomitant dangers of war. Such common ideology and type of shared threats were missing following the two general wars of the twentieth century, and thus no enduring concert could have emerged after 1918 and 1945. Only with the onset of the internal reforms in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the narrowing of the ideological polarization between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could cognitive and domestic constraints on concerted diplomacy lessen considerably. And only then could such cooperation emerge as has recently in Southern Africa, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East.[26]

Unlike the multitude of previous attempts at explaining the four puzzles, then, this study offers a theoretical model that explains all of them simultaneously.[27] The core of the argument is that unit-level factors accounted for the joint diplomatic management of the Concert but could not completely forestall the mismanagement of certain crises and the

[24] Waltz (fn. 1), chap. 9, suggests that it should be easier to manage the international system when there are only two superpowers. For related points, see Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 506–7; Oye (fn. 1), 4; Gowa (fn. 1, 1986), 172; and Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 35 n. 26.

[25] Jervis, "From Balance of Power to Concert," in Oye (fn. 1), offers an interesting structural explanation of the formation of concerts following general wars. But a real concert arose in only one of the three historical instances in which a concert should, according to the theory, have been created.

[26] Such a cognitive-domestic account of the most recent superpower concert differs from Steve Weber's structural explanation of superpower joint custodianship; see Weber, "Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons," *International Organization* 44 (Winter 1990). My model can explain why a concert could emerge only after Gorbachev's reforms and not earlier, although Weber's structural change of the emergence of nuclear deterrence took place much earlier. Moreover, the model presented here is much more skeptical than Weber's about the endurance and effectiveness of such a concert in the event of a conservative/nationalist backlash in Russia, which would again deepen the ideological gulf between the two powers regardless of the endurance of MAD (mutual assured destruction).

[27] I am following Waltz's conception of a model of a theory (fn. 1, 1979), 7.

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resultant outbreak of some inadvertent wars; conversely, system-level factors explain the evolution in the postwar era of tacit rules of crisis management that have helped to prevent World War III. Overwhelmed by bipolarity (and reinforced by another system-level factor, nuclear deterrence), unit-level factors could not jeopardize crisis management. And in reverse, systemic-level factors were insufficient for establishing a concert of the great powers in the face of powerful unit-level elements that constrained the superpowers' ability to collaborate in conflict resolution.

The two variables—system polarity and unit-level elements—can be combined to yield four possible worlds with respect to great power conflict management. (See Figure 1).

The first ideal world (multipolar with considerable ideological convergence and cultural similarity of the great powers) produces a great power concert that jointly resolves international conflicts. It thus reduces the likelihood of the onset of crises among the great powers themselves in the first place, but there is some danger of breakdown of the multiple, complex security regime in times of crisis. This world is approximated by the Concert of Europe.

The second world (multipolar in the distribution of capabilities and



FIGURE 1
FOUR WORLDS

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polarized along ideological and cultural lines) generates competition and conflict in normal times as well as high probability of failure of crisis management. Furthermore, crises are more likely to occur in this world because preventive diplomacy is much less effective than in the world of concerted diplomacy. The second world is approximated by the era of the 1930s. In the interwar period the increased ideological and cultural differences between the powers and the mounting influence of internal politics on foreign policy made joint diplomacy still less feasible than before World War I. And indeed, the world on the eve of World War I is located somewhere between the first and second worlds. Changes in the character of unit-level elements since the first half of the nineteenth century (the rise of nationalism—resulting in less similarity and moderation—and the greater influence of domestic politics) made crisis prevention in the early twentieth century less effective than it had been in the Concert era, although some degree of concerted diplomacy survived almost until the outbreak of World War I. Unlike World War II, then, this war can be seen as unintended. On the eve of both world wars, however, the multipolar structure made crisis management difficult: in 1914 the structure made it more likely that the powers would overreact, whereas in the 1930s the structure provided incentives for the Western powers to underreact to German aggression.

In contrast, the bipolar structure encourages a delicate balance between resolve and caution and thus produces more effective crisis management in both world 3 and world 4. When the ideological gulf between the superpowers is great, however, as in world 3, they do not succeed in cooperating in conflict resolution. The likelihood of crises is thus high, and the competition remains keen. This world is approximated by the cold war of the 1950s, the early 1960s, and the early 1980s.

In world 4 the ideological polarization is weakened or at least decision makers' perceptions of key international issues converge, which fosters a greater willingness to cooperate in settling disputes. This world is approximated by the U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s and the late 1980s. Indeed, these periods saw attempts at joint diplomacy with respect to both arms control and regional conflicts. Although these attempts failed on the whole in the 1970s, they achieved some success in the late 1980s, as the cognitive and domestic convergence became considerably more meaningful (that is, even before the collapse of Soviet power and the end of bipolarity in the early 1990s).

Let us now define the dependent and independent variables of this model and the rationale for the linkages between them.

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Contrasting Two Ideal Types of Collaborative Arrangement

Spontaneous-Negative and Deliberate-Affirmative

Despite the theoretical attention recently directed toward the issue of international cooperation,[28] cooperation theory has failed to distinguish between levels, degrees, and types of cooperation.[29] I will distinguish between two ideal types[30] of forms of cooperation (*spontaneous* and *deliberate*) and between two substantive types of conflict management (cooperation during *crises* [crisis management] and cooperation in conflict resolution, which extends beyond the time of a particular crisis and thus occurs mostly during more *normal* periods of diplomacy). Moreover, I will link these two distinctions by arguing that cooperation in crisis management tends to take the spontaneous form, whereas cooperation in conflict resolution tends to fit the explicit, deliberate type. The major dependent variables of this study, then, are (1) tacit rules for crisis management and regulation of the use of force and (2) concerted diplomacy in conflict resolution.

Cooperation often results from a conscious design of one or more of the parties. Yet cooperation can also emerge spontaneously in the absence of such a design and at least initially may even be unintended by the interacting actors.[31] Such self-generating cooperation is likely to emerge internationally if the adversaries have converging interests in addition to their conflicting ones.[32] Whereas deliberate cooperation tends to be explicit and reached by negotiations, spontaneous cooperation is closely associated with tacit arrangements that are reached even in the absence of direct, verbal communication between the parties.

Conscious cooperation in an international regime tends to rest on a common cognitive, and/or normative framework—in the terminology of the regime literature it is said to be based on shared *principles* and

[28] See, e.g., the sources cited in fn. 6 in relation to the literature on cooperation under anarchy.

[29] See, e.g., the sources (Jervis, George, and Haggard and Simmons) cited in fn. 10.

[30] According to Max Weber, an ideal type is an arrangement of selected attributes detached from their contingent circumstances. See Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), 89–110; and idem, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 20–22, 57–58. According to this definition, we could expect that some elements in each ideal type might be missing or appear in a different form in the real world.

[31] The distinction here draws primarily on Friedrich Hayek's distinction between two sources of order. See Hayek, *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*, vol. 1, *Rules and Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). I also draw on the categorizations in Oran Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Krasner (fn. 5), 98–101; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985); and George et al. (fn. 10), esp. chaps. 26, 27, 29.

[32] I draw here on Thomas Schelling's theory of interdependent decisions. See Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chaps. 1–3.

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norms.[33] Conversely, a spontaneous arrangement might consist only of rules and procedures and not necessarily include principles and norms. Although such rules and procedures might suffice for effective coordination, the arrangement would lack the cognitive consensus of a full-blown regime and its attendant high level of cooperation. It would more likely be "situationally determined" rather than a product of shared beliefs and values.[34] Such cooperation could be achieved by unilateral moves of the parties that follow what Lindblom called "partisan mutual adjustment."[35] Such cooperation is frequently negative: while not all the parties prefer the same outcome, they agree that there is at least one outcome that all want to avoid. By contrast, collaboration in an explicit regime tends to be affirmative: the actors share an interest in ensuring a particular outcome.[36]

Although the contrast between spontaneous and deliberate cooperation could apply in principle to a number of disciplines in the social sciences (psychology, labor-management relations, sociology), it has a special relevance for international relations and cooperation theory, since international cooperation is so important yet so difficult to achieve in the domain of conflict management.

Crisis Management versus Conflict Resolution

Indeed, in an hour of crisis the intensity of the rivalry and the time constraints preclude simple resolution of the fundamental conflict. Nevertheless, tacit understandings and self-generating rules can be sufficient for avoiding war even if the fundamental conflict was not settled and the parties could not agree explicitly on the rules and on the situation-related outcome. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid war in the Berlin crisis of 1961 through the West's tacit, de facto acquiescence to the establishment of the Berlin Wall and Moscow's dropping its deadline for resolving the conflict. Not until ten years later were

[33] Krasner (fn. 5) defines regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (p. 2). I rely here especially on the work of Ruggie (fn. 5), who suggests that norms and principles constitute a regime's normative framework (p. 200). Rules and procedures are, by contrast, the instruments of a regime and are strongly affected by the power relations between the participants.

[34] On the term "situationally determined," see Spiro Lastis, cited in Keohane (fn. 6, 1984), 27–28. While discussing spontaneous cooperation, both Schelling (fn. 32), chaps. 3, 4 (esp. pp. 71, 75) and Axelrod (fn. 4) highlight the influence of situational factors.

[35] Charles Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 28–29; Lindblom defines a "partisan decisionmaker" on pp. 3, 9.

[36] On the distinction between collaboration out of common interests and coordination due to common aversion, see Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in Krasner (fn. 5). He also provides references to scholars who distinguish between positive and negative kinds of cooperation (p. 130 n. 27).

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the powers able to reach an explicit agreement on the status of Berlin, and only in 1975 did they conclude the Helsinki Accords on a general settlement in Europe. Even then the U.S. maintained its explicit rejection of the division of Europe and its support for taking down the Berlin Wall and for the eventual unification of Germany.

Even at the moment of confrontation, of course, explicit negotiations may be going on as well. Thus, Kennedy and Khrushchev communicated quite often during the Cuban missile crisis and eventually reached an agreement on withdrawing the Soviet missiles in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. Schelling points out that bargaining occurs even while wars are in progress, as has been seen especially in the limited wars of the post-World War II period.[37] Indeed, not only threats but also promises are signaled during crises;[38] Snyder and Diesing, for example, provide evidence of attempts at accommodation and settlement in the hour of crisis.[39] Nevertheless, following the logic of the above-suggested definition, the dominant elements in a crisis, at least in its initial stage, include threats to use force, shows of force, manipulation of the risk of war, measures short of war, coercive diplomacy, and fear of escalation;[40] and the main cooperative component is the negative nature of war avoidance or at best tacit, ad hoc arrangements, as in the Cuban missile crisis.

By contrast, when parties attempt to resolve a conflict in noncrises settings, they go beyond a negative type of arrangement in order to "formalize a settlement of the underlying issue in conflict."[41] Not only is there an avoidance of a certain outcome, but the parties also seek to achieve a set of common goals.[42] This focus on affirmative cooperation is especially relevant for a concert or a regime, although competition and conflict will continue even in such high-level collaborative arrangements.

This distinction between crisis cooperation and joint diplomacy in noncrisis periods corresponds to the above differentiation between the two ideal types of collaborative arrangement. Crisis management parallels the tacit, common-aversion, self-generating type of collaboration;

[37] See Schelling (fn. 32), 53–81.

[38] On promises, see Schelling (fn. 32), 43–46, 131–37, 175–77.

[39] On the accommodative element in crisis bargaining, see Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 243–80.

[40] For an extended discussion, see Schelling (fn. 32), 35–125; Phil Williams, *Crisis Management* (London: Martin Robertson, 1976); and Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 211–51.

[41] See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 10, 18. See also Fen Hampson and Brian Mandell, "Managing Regional Conflict: Security Co-operation and Third Party Mediators," *International Journal* 45 (Spring 1990), 192–93 n. 2.

[42] A somewhat related argument is advanced by Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 248. Their impression is that the pattern of many more backdowns than compromises is more characteristic of crisis interaction than of noncrisis bargaining.

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conflict resolution fits the explicit, affirmative, and deliberate sort of arrangement. Table 1 contrasts the two arrangements.

In crisis management states try to advance or protect their interests by coercive threats and maneuvers—which necessarily poses the prospect of war—without actually raising the risk of war to an intolerable level.[43] The more specific dependent variable here is the emergence of tacit rules that address the two dimensions of crisis management through the regulation of the threat and the use of force by the powers, their military intervention, and the nature of "legitimate" response to other powers' threats to use force. The tacit rules establish the range of conduct each state will tolerate from the other in the absence of a world authority. It is the recurrence of similar situations that can turn unilateral actions and parallel behavior into tacit rules, even if this had not been the intention of the actors and even, in fact, if they are not aware of these rules.[44] Nonetheless, evidence for the existence of these rules can be gleaned from regularities in the actors' behavior. These tacit codes of conduct are in a sense heuristic constructs to the extent that they only approximate reality and are not an explicit set of norms that guides decision makers;[45] they are, rather, something more apparent to the outside analyst. Neither do these conventions come from the realms of international law, morality, diplomacy, or public rhetoric. Precedents, emerging traditions, recurring patterns of behavior, and lessons of the past all help to create expectations about the limits of permissible behavior and, concomitantly, to define what is intolerable and destabilizing.[46]

Unspoken understandings about the regulation of force are particularly helpful when adversaries have intense conflicts of interests and are affected by the security dilemma but would still prefer to avoid war. Here, termination of the rivalry, settlement of disputes, shared beliefs, and common morality or even converging perceptions are not essential. By contrast, such factors are necessary for the emergence of the other dependent variable: cooperation in conflict resolution. When states concert their diplomacy for that purpose, they move beyond the management of the use of force to deliberate negotiations for settling the fundamental issues in dispute. One major application in international

[43] See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 451. On the definition of crisis management, see also George (fn. 13, 1991), 3–27; and Williams (fn. 40), 27–32.

[44] See Bull (fn. 13), 211.

[45] See Yair Evron, "Great Power Military Intervention in the Middle East," in Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer, eds., *Great Power Intervention in the Middle East* (New York: Pergamon, 1979), 22.

[46] See Paul Keal, *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 2–3; John Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10 (Spring 1986), 132–33; and Williams (fn. 40), 200.

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TABLE 1
COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO MODES OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT

	Self-Generating	*Deliberate*
Components	rules and procedures	principles, norms, rules, and procedures
Communication	tacit	explicit
Origins	spontaneous (might be initially unintended)	negotiated or imposed agreements
Nature	negative-avoidance	positive-affirmative
Objectives	avoid an unwanted outcome	achieve a set of goals
Scope	limited	broad
Institutionalization	unnecessary, ad hoc	necessary
Interdependence between parties	objective-structural	subjective-cognitive
Interdependence with other issue-areas	low	high
Normal behavior	competitive, unilateral, and parallel moves, mutual adjustments	joint consultations and decision making; collective actions (elements of competitive-balancing can also persist)
Effects on behavior and outcomes	depend on patterns of power and interests but have some restraining influence	can modify behavior, interests, and power but limited by the anarchic structure of the international system
Application to conflict management	crisis management; regulation of use of force	regimes, concerts, conflict resolution, crisis prevention
Explanation of origins	situational factors; balance of interests; distribution of capabilities	a shared cognitive-normative framework
Relations among the great powers	tacit recognition of spheres of influence, of the status quo and equality	explicit acceptance of a coequal status; multilateral approach; collective diplomacy; joint management of the international system

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politics is a great power concert that attempts to resolve major conflicts both among the great powers themselves and among third parties.

Such concerted diplomacy is not essential for successful crisis management, but it can be very helpful in preventing crises among the concert members themselves in the first place, and thus it minimizes the probability of crises and the danger of failures of crisis management.[47] But concerted diplomacy by itself cannot guarantee effective crisis management. Once some or all of the concert members are drawn into a war-threatening confrontation, the effectiveness of their crisis management under anarchy will also depend at least in part on the structure of the situation; indeed, this dependence creates the possibility (obviously, not the certainty) of "inadvertent wars" under certain structural conditions.

The next section addresses the linkages between the dependent and independent variables by discussing why structural factors should be especially influential with respect to the emergence of tacit rules for crisis management, whereas unit-level elements are critical for cooperation in conflict resolution.

Structural Factors and Crisis Management

What are the expectations of structural theory about states' international behavior[48] and why should these expectations most likely be met in times of crisis?

Security Interests

Security interests, however defined and however difficult to operationalize, are expected to dominate state behavior.[49] By contrast, ideological aspirations and idiosyncratic worldviews of certain statesmen and polit-

[47] On the distinction between crisis management and crisis prevention, see Alexander George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 365–69; and George et al. (fn. 10), esp. chap. 23. In crisis management the cooperation starts after the parties have already been drawn into a war-threatening confrontation. The collaboration is reflected in an effort to prevent the outbreak of a major war. By contrast, in crisis prevention the collaboration should begin before the participants find themselves in a crisis situation, that is, they head off crises by controlling the escalation of their competition into dangerous confrontations.

[48] In presenting the ideal type conditions under which systemic or structural explanation will be most useful, I draw mainly on the works of Waltz (fn. 1, 1979); and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 1. They do not, however, make explicit some of these conditions in the same way as is done here.

[49] Structural theory does not expect, however, that states will necessarily be interested in power maximization. This is one of the key differences between old realists, e.g., Morgenthau (fn. 16), 215, and neorealists or structural theorists such as Waltz. On this point, see Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 118, 126; idem (fn. 5), 334; Posen (fn. 1), 68.

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ical parties or particularistic interests of certain groups and politicians do not play a central role.

It is reasonable to expect that national rather than parochial interests will tend to dominate the policy-making process of a cohesive state more in times of severe external threat than in noncrisis settings.[50] Reflecting on his experience in crisis management, Henry Kissinger remarks that "personality clashes were reduced; too much is usually at stake for normal jealousies to operate."[51] And as Sidney Verba suggests:

> The greater the sense of stress, the greater will be the legitimacy of the over-all norms of the system and the greater the illegitimacy of parochial norms. Furthermore, the greater the emergency, the more likely is decision-making to be concentrated among high officials whose commitments are to the over-all system. Thus it may be, paradoxically, that the model of means-ends rationality will be more closely approximated in an emergency when the time for careful deliberation is limited. Though fewer alternatives will be considered, the values invoked during the decision period will tend to be fewer and more consistent, and the decision will less likely be the result of bargaining within a coalition.[52]

And Patrick Morgan argues that in times of crisis more than at other times, we can expect leaders to put aside personal differences, career concerns, and bureaucratic and domestic interests, thus permitting a dispassionate analysis of possible courses of action on their merits.[53] As for ideology, even during the height of the cold war "the Soviet Union in crisis became Russian, and American policy, liberal rhetoric aside, came to be realistically and cautiously constructed. By the force of events, they and we were impelled to behave in ways belied both by their words and by ours."[54]

Especially in the nuclear age, the avoidance of a major war has become a critical interest of the superpowers (although great powers in the past

[50] This is the expectation not only of realists and many deterrence theorists but also of some students of organizational behavior. See Ole Holsti, "Crisis Decision Making," in Philip Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 15–18.

[51] *Time*, October 15, 1979, p. 71.

[52] Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics* 14 (October 1961), 115.

[53] Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 2d ed. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983), 180. For supportive evidence, see Glenn Paige, "Comparative Case Analysis of Crisis Decisions: Korea and Cuba," in Charles Hermann, ed., *International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York: Free Press, 1972); Williams (fn. 40), 68–69; and Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 48–49.

[54] Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 173. More specifically, while explicitly disavowing division into spheres of influence on ideological grounds, Moscow and Washington have recognized de facto the other's sphere of influence during periods of crisis. See Keal (fn. 46).

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also occasionally attempted to avoid general wars because of their extremely high costs).[55] According to the conception of crisis management presented above, decision makers will be concerned during crisis periods not only with defending vital security interests but also with war avoidance. Indeed, Snyder and Diesing have found that during a crisis decision makers pay more attention to avoiding war than to maximizing the benefits to be gained from the use of force.[56]

Similar Patterns of Conduct

We should expect similar patterns of conduct from states that are located similarly in the system (namely, that share the same category of power capabilities) and that face similar types of external pressures, even if these states have different ideologies or domestic regimes. The structural explanation of such similarity is international socialization and competition; that is, "competition spurs the actors to accommodate their ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices."[57]

Such similarity is more typical of crisis situations. As Wolfers asserts, the greater the external compulsion, the greater the similarity in the actors' behavior:

> Imagine a number of individuals, varying widely in their predispositions, who find themselves inside a house on fire. It would be perfectly realistic to expect that these individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel compelled to run toward the exits. General fears of losing the cherished possession of life, coupled with the stark external threat to life, would produce the same reaction, whatever the psychological peculiarities of the actors. Surely, therefore, for an explanation of the rush for the exits, there is no need to analyze the individual decisions that produced it.[58]

Although psychologists generally tend to underline the effects of personality traits, some of them agree with the logic of situational determinism. Mark Snyder and William Ickes suggest that the more powerful the situation, the greater the uniformity of actors' behavior: "Because strong situations should shift the cause of behavior from a dispositional locus to a situational one, measures of traits and dispositions should typically predict behavior better in weak situations than in strong ones."[59]

[55] See Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 121.

[56] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 280.

[57] See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 77. For an example of Soviet emulation of American roles as a superpower, see Christer Jonsson, *Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 22–23.

[58] See Wolfers (fn. 23), 13.

[59] Snyder and Ickes, "Personality and Social Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1985), 2:904. For empirical support in military psychology for the proposition that as conditions

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It follows from this that the greater the level of the external threat, the more important will be the effect of the international environment on the behavior of states in comparison with those effects during more normal periods. Thus, in the hour of crisis, when external pressures on the state are unusually powerful, international factors (such as the distribution of capabilities in the international system) should exercise greater influence than usual on states' actions. As Wolfers puts it: "The closer nations are drawn to the pole of complete compulsion, the more they can be expected to conform in their behavior and to act in a way that corresponds to the deductions made from the states-as-actor model."[60]

The Unitary Actor

The state is expected to behave as a unitary actor; that is, a single preference function governs decision making.[61] A structural analysis would be especially useful where there is a high degree of consensus among the state's foreign policy elite. Such a consensus, where it exists, shows that neither domestic and bureaucratic politics nor individual-level factors necessarily explain outcomes and behavior.[62] Rather, the state reacts to external threats and stimuli as a cohesive unit, carrying out coherent policies made by its top leadership.

Theoretically, the unitary actor model is most legitimate in studies of a state's most critical decisions—those that deal with war and peace[63]—which are most notably made in times of crisis. Indeed, crises are pivotal situations seen by analysts as either preludes to war[64] or, under certain conditions, surrogates for war.[65] According to Snyder and Diesing: "It is useful to conceive of a crisis as an intermediate zone between peace and

become more threatening and stressful, situational variables will explain the observed behavior better than an analysis of personality dispositions, see especially the studies of Reuven Gal, "Courage under Stress," in Shlomo Breznitz, ed., *Stress in Israel* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983); and idem, "Combat Stress as an Opportunity: The Case of Heroism" (Paper presented at the Northeast Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Albany, N.Y., 1985). Gal concludes that situational and circumstantial characteristics are more important than the individual's personal qualities in explaining acts of combat bravery, notably, in some of the battles of the Yom Kippur War.

[60] See Wolfers (fn. 23), 16.

[61] On the maxims of a state-as-actor (or a unitary actor) model, see Wolfers (fn. 23), 3–24.

[62] See Jervis (fn. 48), 23–24.

[63] See Verba (fn. 52), 115; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 16, 27–29; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984), 498–99; and Patchen (fn. 19), 19–22.

[64] See Lewis Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960); and Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 1272.

[65] See Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 883–84; and Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 115–16. Indeed, in the postwar era crises became a surrogate for war because of bipolarity and the nuclear revolution.

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war. Almost all wars are preceded by a crisis of some sort, although of course not all crises eventuate in war."[66]

It is a widely held and well-researched empirical supposition that in periods of crisis, decision making tends to be centralized in the hands of top leaders.[67] The rallying around the flag that typically occurs in times of crisis both in democracies[68] and in centralized regimes[69] makes it possible for decision makers to pursue policies that are more dovish or more hawkish than what the public or their advisers advocate. Statesmen can instead respond to the external situation more freely than is normally the case. Because crisis situations are times of threat, high stakes, the likelihood of war, and often severe time constraints, the bureaucracy is consigned to a lesser role than it plays in routine matters.[70] Furthermore, high-level policymakers tend to reach a greater degree of consensus in crisis settings than in normal times. One observer points out that the "strain towards agreement" is strongest during times of crisis.[71] Although most of the research has been done on the American decision-making process, Adomeit reports:

> One of the surprising realizations after studying a number of international crises is the degree to which Soviet behavior seems to follow engrained

[66] See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 10.

[67] See Verba (fn. 52), 115; Williams (fn. 40), 66; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 511; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 377; and Adomeit (fn. 53), 48. More precisely, crisis decisions tend to be reached by ad hoc decisional units, composed of the chief executive and a selected group of advisers rather than the formal organizational machinery normally used to conduct foreign policy. See Glenn Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 281; and Williams (fn. 40), 66–67.

[68] See Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 274–75. See also Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), chaps. 2, 3.

[69] See Adomeit (fn. 53), 38.

[70] See Harold Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence* (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Holsti and George (fn. 9), 297; Williams (fn. 40), 66–67; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 512, conclude that the degree of lower-level involvement does vary across cases, in general, in inverse ratio to the brevity and severity of the crisis. Both Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Science* 4 (December 1973), 477–79, and Jervis (fn. 48), 28, underline the centrality of the president in all major postwar U.S. foreign policy decisions. Evidence on the Soviet side is sketchy but on the whole indicates a similarly high degree of control by the highest-level decision makers. See especially Adomeit (fn. 53), 38. Recent revelations about the Cuban missile crisis underline the critical role of the two top decision makers, Kennedy and Khruschev, in the management of the crisis. See James Blight et al., "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Fall 1987).

[71] See Schilling (1962), 23, cited in Williams (fn. 40), 69. See also the literature surveys in Holsti and George (fn. 9), 285–93; and Arthur Stein, "Conflict and Cohesion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20 (1976), 143–72. This conclusion is consistent with the insight of George Simmel and Lewis Coser about the cohesive effects of an external threat. See Simmel, *Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955); and Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1956).

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> patterns of action—as if there existed a broad consensus about operational principles in foreign policy. This realization is even more surprising given important differences at all levels of Soviet domestic politics since World War II. . . . [W]hereas Soviet foreign policy in general is almost invariably affected by domestic controversy and conflict, Soviet decision-making in international crises will typically demonstrate a "rallying around the flag," the concentration of decisions in the hands of a select executive committee, the restoration of important elements of centralization, and a return to traditional reflexes and responses.[72]

The greater consensus among officials can be explained in part by Holsti's findings that differences in perceptions among decision makers decrease as tensions increase.[73] Growing consensus is also related to the above-mentioned predominance of security interests in times of crisis.

External Stimuli

The state should be responsive to external stimuli, taking into account its essential security interests and its sensitivity to new information from the international environment. It is sufficient here to assume that in responding to minimal state interests,[74] leaders act according to modest definitions of rationality rather than according to the comprehensive rationality and expected utility models.[75] (Such modest definitions refer to Waltz's assumption about the desire of states to survive in a competitive, self-help system, Snyder and Diesing's "bounded rationality," and Feldman's "sensitivity to costs.")[76] A minimalist conception of rationality is defined here as the extent of a state's sensible reaction to threats and opportunities in the external environment in order to protect its security interests, as opposed to a concern about bureaucratic needs, political as-

[72] Adomeit (fn. 53), 49.

[73] Ole Holsti, "Individual Differences in 'Definition of the Situation,' " *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14 (September 1970), 303–10.

[74] On the concept of national interest and the problems in defining and operationalizing it, see the useful discussions in Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), chap. 8; and Alexander George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in George (fn. 9).

[75] A representation of comprehensive rationality is Allison's Model I (fn. 9), 10–38. For a more recent definition of rationality, consult Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 63), 29–33, who sees leaders as strong rational calculators of expected utility. See also Huth and Russett (fn. 63), 499.

[76] See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 118; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 342–48, 507; and Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 145. The tradition of bounded rationality goes back to James March and Herbert Simon's "satisficing"; see March and Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958). For a recent discussion of rational-choice and bounded rationality, see Keohane (fn. 6). Recent studies that support the logic of the "sensitivity to costs" thesis include John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Posen's study of military doctrine (fn. 1).

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pirations, and ideological beliefs that are irrelevant to the situation at hand.[77]

Under frequently ambiguous, uncertain, and complex international circumstances, however, some degree of misperception and misjudgment arising from human fallibility is assumed.[78] A major influence on the level and intensity of misperceptions, as well as on their consequences regarding state behavior in foreign affairs, is the clarity and simplicity of the international environment. Indeed, there are great variations in this respect among different international environments, according to their structure: some international structures foster misperceptions, whereas others minimize the likelihood, or at least the effects, of misperceptions. In other words, the international structure *conditions* the level and influence of misperceptions and miscalculations.

This proposition can reconcile the competing claims in the debate on rationality in crises. Indeed, there are both theoretical and empirical disagreements on the impact of crises on performance. Theoretically, realists, many students of deterrence,[79] and also some organizational theorists suggest that decision making in times of crisis tends to be more rational than decision making in noncrisis settings. By contrast, theories that focus on the individual and small-group levels are much less optimistic about the quality of crisis decision making and suggest that it deteriorates in ways that it does not in normal settings.[80] There are also contradictory empirical findings on the effects of crises on rationality.[81] By link-

[77] See also Snyder and Diesing's definition of rationality in the sense of information processing (fn. 1), 332–39.

[78] The classic study of misperceptions in international politics is Jervis (fn. 48). See also idem, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 132; and Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in Robert Axelrod, ed., *The Structure of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[79] Such as Schelling (fn. 32).

[80] For a very useful overview of crisis decision making from the theoretical perspective of four levels of analysis, see Holsti (fn. 50). For the adverse effects of causes at the level of the decision makers and of the bureaucracy, see the citations in fn. 9. James Blight, a psychologist who specializes in nuclear crisis management, criticizes the overemphasis on psychological factors in the work of Lebow and his associates (fn. 9); see Blight, "The New Psychology of War and Peace," *International Security* 11 (Winter 1986–87).

[81] Compare the findings of the studies cited in fn. 9 with the evidence of, among others, Bruce Russett, "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1967), 89–105; Paige (fn. 67), 81–93, 292; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 492; Brecher (fn. 67); Janice Stein and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948–1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Alan Dowty, *Middle East Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and also a number of crisis simulations (see Morgan [fn. 53] 181). Some major historical studies of the causes of war argue that even when the crisis escalates to war, it does not mean that decision makers behave irrationally. See Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 14, 15; Blainey (fn. 55), 127, chap. 9; and Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), chap. 5.

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ing international structures with crisis behavior, however, one can address these conflicts among both theories and empirical findings.

On the whole, structural analysis should have especially great explanatory power in times of crisis because of the greater pressures exerted by the international environment.[82] More specifically, since the potential costs of overlooking international factors are greater in times of crisis than in normal times, high-level officials should pay more than usual attention to the international environment. Not only does the uncertainty accompanying crises stimulate a search for more information, notes Williams, but it ensures that

> existing information is thoroughly and critically assessed. Indeed, the available data are usually subjected to the most detailed scrutiny in an attempt to uncover every subtlety and nuance of the adversary's position. Although the information is partial and incomplete, therefore, maximum benefit is likely to be gained from it. In short, the task of processing and evaluating intelligence may be carried out more efficiently during crises than in non-crisis situations.[83]

Yet this attempt at gathering and evaluating information in no way assures that decision makers will meet the expectations of the comprehensive rationality model or will not suffer from misperceptions or miscalculations in times of crisis. It does imply, however, that the international structure mediates the intensity of misperceptions and affects their consequences in crisis periods more than in normal times. Thus, under the constraints of one type of structure (a bipolar world), states will behave more cautiously and moderately in times of crisis than in normal times, as the postwar record demonstrates. Yet in another sort of world—multipolarity—states might show less restraint and be less prudent in crisis than in noncrisis situations, as suggested by the cases of the Crimean War and World War I.[84]

[82] While explaining the sources of military doctrine, Posen (fn. 1) suggests that "in times of relative international calm we should expect a high degree of organizational determinism. In times of threat we should see greater accommodation of doctrine to the international system—integration should be more pronounced, innovation more likely" (p. 80; see also pp. 40, 59).

[83] Williams (fn. 40), 67–68. This view is shared by a number of organizational theorists such as Wilensky (fn. 70), 78, who argues that decision makers are more likely to search past the first "satisficing" alternative, and Verba (fn. 52), and to a lesser extent March and Simon (fn. 76), 116, who argue that the search for information under crisis conditions may be more extensive, if less productive.

[84] Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer point out that information overloading is more likely in a multipolar world than in one that is bipolar. See Deutsch and Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics* 16 (April 1964). The case of World War I contradicts their argument, however, showing that rather than prompting policymakers to withdraw from confrontation, overloading can generate greater hostility and result in escalation and war. See Holsti (fn. 9), 81. At the same time, when multiple interpretations are

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Indeed, according to the logic of balance-of-power theory, one might expect great powers to behave cautiously in those crisis situations where the potential costs of miscalculation or reckless behavior are very high and also patently clear to all parties.[85] In the face of countervailing force and resolve, states will behave not as power maximizers but as security and survival maximizers. Because of the relative clarity of the balances of interests and capabilities and of threats and responsibilities in two-power (bipolar) systems, the behavior of states will be particularly restrained under those circumstances. When these conditions are not met, however, states are more likely either to overreact to external threats, as was the case on the eve of World War I, or to underreact, as was the case in the late 1930s.[86]

The basic linkage between structural theory and crisis settings just discussed can benefit from two refinements. These refinements will draw on two general conditions for the usefulness of the structural level.

First, structures are expected to condition actors' behavior and constrain the processes in the system.[87] Therefore, according to structural theory, the outcomes of states' interactions (results) will often not correspond to the actors' desires and characteristics (purposes). Structural analysis should therefore be best at explaining the occurrence of unintended outcomes in international politics if it can be plausibly shown that the international structure is the cause of the low correlation between the intentions and attributes of the actors and international outcomes. Two types of unintended consequences should be distinguished: (1) the destabilizing effects of the security dilemma, which raise the level of conflict in the international system beyond the initial intentions of the actors; and (2) cooperative arrangements between rivals. At least initially these arrangements are spontaneous, unintended, and tacit and are explained by

possible and plausible, according to Jervis, no criterion of rationality can dictate a single conclusion. See Jervis (fn. 78), 132; and idem (fn. 48), 119. In comparison, bipolarity reduces both the overloading of policymakers and the ambiguity of the situation. Hence, to the extent that the two leading powers in bipolarity have strong incentives to avoid a general war (and these incentives are reinforced by the presence of nuclear weapons), the international structure facilitates tacit cooperation in crisis settings.

[85] For somewhat similar reasoning in the context of conventional deterrence, see the theory and case studies of Mearsheimer (fn. 76). For an argument related to the thesis developed here in the context of the nuclear age, see George Quester, "Some Thoughts on 'Deterrence Failures,' " in Paul Stern et al., eds., *Perspectives on Deterrence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 52–65. See also Howard (fn. 81), 22.

[86] On the unclarity of balances before the two world wars, see Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," in Rotberg and Rabb (fn. 4). Thus, many of the misperceptions of the rivals' intentions and capabilities before the two world wars, suggested by Jervis, or at least the prevalence of the misperceptions in these crises, can be attributed to the multipolar structure of the pre-1945 era.

[87] See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), chaps. 5–6.

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the structure of the situation rather than by the goals and characteristics of the actors. Thus, unintended consequences can either stabilize or destabilize international systems irrespective of what states initially desire.

Indeed, the system level is especially useful for explaining unintended outcomes of crisis interactions, in particular, when ideologically moderate or status quo powers find themselves unintentionally at war with each other (all other things being equal, a multipolar world might make such an outcome more likely). And a bipolar system is critical when adversaries cooperate tacitly in managing global crises and terminating local wars.

Second, structural theory should be especially useful for explaining persistent outcomes and long-term modes of behavior—including patterns of wars, arms races, alliances, balancing behavior, equilibriums, conflict, and competition—rather than specific events and decisions. Indeed, structural constraints are especially powerful (1) in explaining crisis interactions rather than the decision making of a single state during a crisis and (2) more broadly, in accounting for general patterns of crisis behavior and outcomes rather than for variations in crisis behavior of specific leaders.

More specifically, the number of the great powers can provide a parsimonious explanation for the emergence or nonemergence of tacit rules for regulating the use of force. Furthermore, because certain types of crisis situation are less ambiguous than settings of normal diplomacy, they also make possible tacit, unintended cooperation among rivals even if these antagonists are unable and unwilling to collaborate in normal diplomacy.[88] The conditions of this less ambiguous kind of crisis situation are best met in a bipolar world (reinforced by the situation of MAD). Thus, the potentially destabilizing effect of postwar domestic changes (the growing influence of bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and competing ideologies in Washington and Moscow) was negated by the transformation of the international system from one of multipolarity to one of bipolarity (reinforced by the emergence of nuclear deterrence). These international changes enabled superpower cooperation in crisis management; but they could not bring about explicit cooperation in normal diplomacy, a type of cooperation dependent on factors at the individual and state levels.

[88] More precisely, the *implications* of such crisis cooperation are unintended. These implications could include acceptance of the status quo and recognition of the rival's interests, equal status, and spheres of influence, even if all these elements are undesired and unacceptable in normal times because of ideology or domestic politics or both. On application of these elements to the postwar era, see the last section of this article.

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Unit-Level Explanation of Cooperation in Normal Diplomacy

The connection between unit-level elements and normal cooperation, especially in conflict resolution, is reinforced by four factors.[89]

Constraints and Incentives

In normal diplomacy the structure provides both constraints against and incentives for cooperation. To begin with the constraints, because states are worried that cooperation for mutual gains may favor present partners, who may become potential opponents in the future, they are more concerned about relative gains than about absolute ones.[90] Hence, given the slightest suspicion that others might gain relatively more, major states would prefer to deny benefits to their competitors, even if that might entail self-denial, rather than have all win in absolute terms.

In some important ways a two-power world would appear especially inhospitable to joint action. The intensity of superpower competition in such a tight system reduces the probability of collaboration;[91] it also enables smaller powers to play off the world powers against each other in order to extract as much assistance as possible from both of them.

Nevertheless, a bipolar structure also produces powerful incentives and opportunities for great power cooperation. According to game theorists, the Prisoners' Dilemma and the collective goods problem are lessened as the number of players decreases.[92] Moreover, Waltz suggests that in comparison with powers in multipolar systems, the superpowers in the bipolar system are concerned less with scoring relative gains and more with making absolute ones;[93] thus, the Big Two are able to lead or support collective efforts, even though other states may gain disproportionately from them.

Nevertheless, although the small number of great powers and also the other structural factors are critical to crisis management and for reaching spontaneous, de facto understandings concerning the use of force, these

[89] In the first three factors, the setting and timing of the cooperation is normal periods (as opposed to crisis situations). The last point addresses the level and nature of cooperation—explicit joint actions of a concert of all the great powers. In principle, these can occur either in periods of crisis or in periods of noncrisis. Yet in this case the crisis would not be between the great powers themselves (as is the case regarding the linkage between the structure and tacit management) but between all the powers and third actors (as was the case in the Concert and in the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf).

[90] See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 105; and Grieco (fn. 16), 498–500.

[91] Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 882–83; and idem (fn. 1, 1979), 171, 175.

[92] Oye (fn. 1), esp. 18–20, in his survey of the literature on game theory, considers the effect of the number of players. Olson (fn. 19), chaps. 1–2, argues that the more concentrated the distribution of capabilities within a group, the more likely that public goods will be provided. See also Hardin (fn. 19), chap. 3.

[93] Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 195.

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factors are *insufficient* by themselves to induce cooperation in conflict resolution. Thus, it is instructive that purely structural analyses that focus on the relations between the number of actors and cooperation tend to highlight those kinds of collaborative arrangements that are limited either to crisis management[94] or to a de facto, tacit division into spheres of influence.[95] In short, the structure by itself cannot determine the feasibility of diplomatic cooperation. A related point involves the apparently ambiguous stance of structuralists and game theorists regarding the relationship between the structure of the international system and cooperation.[96] This ambiguity can be resolved, however, by differentiating between degrees and types of cooperation. Although the feasibility of spontaneous-tacit collaboration is closely related to the number of actors, explicit-conscious collaboration depends mainly on factors below the system level.

Subjective Factors

In normal diplomatic bargaining there is greater subjectivity and sometimes even ambiguity as compared with the relative clarity of interests, alignments, capabilities, commitments, and risks in major military crises, especially in a bipolar system. To be sure, in a crisis it is very difficult to gauge a rival's military capabilities and especially his real objectives; but in normal times it is even harder to estimate his overall capabilities (including nonmilitary and nonquantifiable elements such as diplomatic skills, ideological appeal, alliance cohesion, allies' domestic stability, leverage over allies, and domestic support of international engagements), let alone his long-run intentions. Not only are objectives relatively narrow and specific in a crisis,[97] but the whole intelligence community is focused on understanding the rival under such conditions.[98] Moreover, in a crisis there is usually a phase of intense bargaining that, based even on minimal rationality or sensibility of the decision makers,[99] may clarify relative bar-

[94] Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 884; and idem (fn. 1, 1979), chap. 8; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), chap. 6; Oye (fn. 1), 18–20. See also the examples of situation-related cooperation, introduced in Schelling (fn. 32); and Axelrod (fn. 6).

[95] See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), chap. 9.

[96] For references on this point, see fn. 10 above.

[97] See Morgan (fn. 53), 180.

[98] There are, however, many obstacles to the effectiveness of such intelligence efforts, as Kurt Gottfried and Bruce Blair note. See Gottfried and Blair, *Crisis Stability and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 270–73.

[99] Snyder and Diesing have found that decision makers behave in crises according to bounded rationality or even according to some combination of utility maximization and bounded rationality. See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 405–8; and Patchen (fn. 19), 103–8. On "sensible decision making," see Morgan (fn. 53), chap. 5.

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gaining power.[100] Normal bargaining is, by contrast, less intensive and dramatic and thereby more likely to be influenced by bureaucratic politics and cognitive biases.[101]

Range of Values

Noncrisis settings involve a wider range of values than crisis situations. During crises the focus is on security; in normal periods states are also interested in other goals such as economic prosperity, social welfare, diplomatic prestige, and ideological imperatives. It is easier to achieve consensus when the objective is preservation of the state's security, although, of course, there are often intensive debates on the best means of achieving this end. On the whole, it makes sense and is relatively easy to structure actors' preferences in crisis settings according to game-theoretical payoffs such as the Prisoners' Dilemma.[102] But in normal times there is a much greater variation of needs and preferences both within and between states that is influenced by beliefs and ideologies and is not easily captured by the framework of cooperation under anarchy.

Converging Beliefs

For high-level cooperation in normal diplomacy, appropriate conditions at the unit level are indispensable. Although during a crisis the number of actors could decisively affect the ability of rivals to communicate tacitly and to reach situation-related agreements (because the clarity of the situation is so critical under the conditions of high tension and pressure), the structure of the situation cannot, by itself, lead to joint action in normal times if there are domestic or ideological constraints. Whereas common beliefs or, at least, converging perceptions are not essential for the relatively simple (inasmuch as the conducive structural factors are present) task of crisis coordination, they are necessary for the much more complex task of conflict resolution.[103] Indeed, high-level cooperation be-

[100] See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 248–49; and Patchen (fn. 19), 298–300.

[101] Since leaders tend to resist perceptual change, the less dramatic the external event, the less likely it is to generate such a change. On leaders' resistance to perceptual change, see Jervis (fn. 48); Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), chap. 4; and Patchen (fn. 19), 90. On bureaucratic politics, see Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).

[102] See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1); Steven Brams, *Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and Patchen (fn. 19), 46.

[103] On similarity in beliefs and values as facilitating cooperative resolution of conflicts, see Deutsch (fn. 15), 158–59, 374, 378. On the positive influence of common values on international cooperation, see also Bull (fn. 13), 16, 33, 226–27, 316–17; Ruggie (fn. 5); and Jervis's (fn. 10) recent critique of the PD literature, including some of his own previous work. Yet Jervis does not attempt to distinguish between those types of cooperation better explained by

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tween all the great powers, as in a security regime or a concert, requires a minimum degree of moderation and common values, or at least converging beliefs and perceptions.[104]

The Superpowers in the Postwar Era: Tacit Cooperation during Crises and Fluctuations in Noncrisis Settings

I will now illustrate the usefulness of the linkages between the causal factors at the different levels of analysis, on the one hand, and the crisis versus noncrisis settings, on the other, for understanding the behavioral patterns and policies of the superpowers in the postwar era. Structural theory cannot account for the variations in superpower diplomacy in the postwar era, either regarding changes in their individual policies or the interactions between them. Indeed, whereas superpower behavior and interaction in crisis settings (particularly following the tacit rules) accord well with structural expectations, the characteristics of their normal diplomacy correspond to the types of outcome that unit-level analysis is most useful at explaining.[105]

Modes of Cooperation

The most critical aspect of superpower cooperation in crisis management was that it tended to take the tacit, spontaneous, and avoidance form.

This mode of cooperation contributed not only to the avoidance of war between the superpowers but also to the termination of regional wars such as those between the Arabs and Israel.[106] Yet superpower cooperation in normal diplomacy focused on explicit agreements (most notably over arms control, but also over Berlin and European security). Moreover, to go beyond crisis management to diplomatic coordination and conflict resolution, as the superpowers attempted to do repeatedly in the Middle East,[107] required a deliberately joint action; and this proved much more difficult than the tacit cooperation that was achieved during crises.

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the PD (that is, by structural factors) and those types of cooperation better accounted for by values and morality.

[104] For a recent discussion, see Kupchan and Kupchan (fn. 13).

[105] This section is largely based on my findings in Benjamin Miller, "Can Opponents Cooperate: Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Managing Third Area Conflicts" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1988).

[106] See Benjamin Miller, "International Relations Theory and U.S.-Soviet Conflict Management in the Middle East: Surprises, Accomplishments, Limitations," in Steven Spiegel, ed., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

[107] For a recent analysis of these attempts, see Miller (fn. 22).

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Patterns of Conduct: Persistent or Varied

Superpower crisis behavior followed persistent patterns (of restraint); their normal diplomacy showed variation.

Structural theory is most useful when analysts can observe recurring dynamics and persistent outcomes. In times of crisis the U.S. and the Soviet Union repeatedly adhered to tacit rules for regulating the use of force or at least followed persistent patterns of restraint. Thus, in regional conflicts in which both superpowers had important interests and close allies but did not agree on their balance of interests, each superpower was "allowed" to intervene militarily if such intervention was deemed necessary to prevent the total collapse of its regional client. Since in terms of the global balance of power, the collapse of an allied government meant a loss to its patron, the balance of motivation—or stakes—clearly shifted at this point in favor of the patron supporting the loser. The rules of the game suggested that this asymmetry in the balance of interests made it both legitimate and credible for the patron of the loser to threaten to use force in order to prevent the collapse of its client. The patron of the winner, for its part, was expected to restrain its client while at the same time deterring the other superpower from military intervention. More credible was the threat that the loser's patron would intervene if the winner's patron was unable or unwilling to restrain its client. As long as the intervention remained defensive, it should have been acceptable to the winner's patron. The Middle East constituted the foremost example of the operation of this kind of rules.[108]

There was much greater differentiation and much less consistency, however, in superpower interaction in normal diplomacy, with ups and downs ranging from intensified hostility to détente.[109] Similarly, analysts have discerned considerable differences in the normal (noncrisis) Soviet policies of different U.S. administrations, even though all these administrations observed the rules of prudence during times of tension.[110] Such inconsistencies in normal diplomacy can be explained, in turn, by cog-

[108] See Miller (fn. 105), chap. 7.

[109] On the evolution and phases of U.S.-Soviet relations, see Joseph Nye, Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), chaps. 9–12; and A. Horelick, ed., *U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 1–3.

[110] On differences in the Soviet policies of various administrations, see John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). The inconsistency and incoherence of U.S. Soviet strategy is especially underlined in Nye (fn. 109).

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nitive factors, most notably the image of the opponent, and in the American case also the nature of the domestic system.[111]

Patterns of Interaction: Unintended or Intended

The patterns of U.S. and Soviet crisis interaction were not only persistent but also unintended, or at least unanticipated, whereas patterns of normal diplomacy reflected much more the actors' intentions and domestic attributes.

Structural analysis expects unintended consequences. The caution and tacit cooperation during periods of crisis could not be anticipated from the internal attributes of the superpowers, nor could it be anticipated from their intentions toward each other and their competing visions of the desirable international and domestic orders. There was, however, a much higher correlation between internal attributes of the superpowers, with the constraints such factors impose on cooperation, and the highly competitive nature of U.S.-Soviet relations during noncrisis settings. More specifically, the views and beliefs of the leadership in either Washington or Moscow made a great deal of difference with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations. The high-level collaboration of the Concert, for its part, was strongly correlated with the ideological similarity and moderation of nineteenth-century statesmen. Indeed, concerted diplomacy became less effective as the ideological gulf between the members increased.

Behavior: Similar or Different

Similar behavior is expected in crisis situations but not in normal situations.

Systems theory expects that great powers will behave similarly when faced with similar situations. In particular, the explanatory power of this theory will be supported if states respond similarly to external stimuli despite considerable differences in their attributes. Indeed, a delicate balance of restraint and resolve characterized the crisis conduct of both superpowers. Both Moscow and Washington tried to balance between a patron's commitments to its allies and a superpower's responsibilities to world stability. They succeeded in this balancing act by tacitly adhering

[111] On the effects of the image of the opponent on Soviet foreign policy, see, e.g., Dina Spechler, *Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978); and Franklyn Griffiths, "The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications," *International Security* 9 (Fall 1984); on its influence on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, see Alexander George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," in George et al. (fn. 10), 658–61. On the effects of the U.S. domestic system, see I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); and Nye (fn. 109).

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to the balance of interests as the major determinant of crisis resolve, behavior, and outcomes.

The considerable differences in their normal behavior, however, could at least partly be explained by divergent state attributes.

The Unitary Actor

The superpowers behaved more as unitary actors during crisis than in normal diplomacy.

Structural theory expects (1) top policymakers to make the major decisions, (2) a high level of consensus in a state's leadership, and (3) considerable continuity in important questions of national security. It is hard to substantiate this argument regarding Soviet internal debates on their crisis behavior, although this is the conclusion of one of the leading students of this subject.[112] In the context of the Middle East, however, the consistency of Soviet behavior in adhering to tacit rules from the 1956 Suez crisis to the 1982–84 Lebanon War suggests that Moscow behaved more as a unitary actor during crises than in normal diplomacy, when there were occasionally intensive debates on the direction of Soviet foreign policy.[113]

It is somewhat easier to test the thesis in the American case. We should expect that the more serious the crisis—that is, the more threatening the Soviet engagement—the greater the centralization of decision making and the degree of consensus within the decisional unit. Applied to third-area conflicts, centralization and consensus should be stronger in full-scale wars between allies of the superpowers than in lower-level conflicts such as civil wars or wars of attrition. Again in the Middle Eastern context, there were indeed more differences of opinion among U.S. officials during the 1970 Jordanian crisis and during the 1969–70 War of Attrition (when there was also less centralization of policy-making) than in the wars of 1967 and 1973. Yet as the 1969–70 and the 1970 conflicts intensified—that is, the more likely it appeared that the Soviets were (in the War of Attrition) or might be (in Jordan) involved in offensive actions against U.S. allies—the greater were centralization and consensus in the U.S. leadership.[114]

[112] See the citation of Adomeit (fn. 53), 49.

[113] On Soviet Middle East crisis behavior, see, e.g., Miller (fn. 22); and B. Dismukes and J. McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon, 1979). On Soviet debates on Third World policy, see Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986); and the review essay by George W. Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987). See also Spechler (fn. 111).

[114] On the U.S. in the War of Attrition and in the Jordanian crisis, see e.g., Steven Spiegel,

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By contrast, in the normal diplomacy of the first term of the Nixon administration there were intensive disagreements between National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers regarding conflict resolution in the Middle East. Differences of opinion and conflicts on various issues also characterized the relations between other secretaries of state and national security advisers (for example, Vance and Brzezinski)[115] or between the Pentagon and the State Department (for example, during Reagan's presidency, especially his first term). Beyond the executive branch, especially over the last two decades, Congress has clashed with different administrations on many foreign and defense policy questions such as Southeast Asia, Central America, arms control, weapons procurement, the defense budget, the arms embargo on Turkey, or arms supply to Arab countries.

Degree of Sensitivity to the External Environment

During crises, but not necessarily in normal times, the superpowers showed sensitivity to the external environment.

The adherence to the tacit rules, the delicate balance between resolve and caution, and the sensitivity to important interests of the rival superpower demonstrated repeatedly in Middle Eastern crises accord well with the minimalist conception of rationality advanced above. The focus on the other superpower during crises might have led to insufficient sensitivity to regional concerns and to some degree of overreaction in military engagement. Yet such focus also led to extreme caution, restraining pressures on "aggressive" allies, and to considerable cooperation and mutual recognition of interests. During noncrisis times such mutual sensitivity was regarded (at least by some on each side) as infeasible or undesirable or both because of domestic, regional, and ideological constraints. In general, the somewhat excessive focus on the global level was conducive to crisis management, although it was not sufficient or even helpful to conflict resolution.

Degree of Ideological Flexibility

The superpowers showed greater ideological flexibility in times of crisis than in noncrisis settings.

The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 191–203.

[115] On the disagreements inside the Nixon and Carter administrations and the discontinuity between each of them and the Reagan administration concerning cooperation with the Soviets on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Miller (fn. 105), chap. 8. See also Harold Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition and Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Arena, 1967–86," in George et al. (fn. 10).

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The ideological rivalry between communism and capitalism severely constrained U.S.-Soviet cooperation by reinforcing mutual images of the other as an enemy rather than as a limited adversary.[116] Strong commitments to their respective visions of the international order made it difficult for the two superpowers to agree about the legitimacy of the status quo,[117] to accept each other's spheres of influence, and to recognize each other's equal status.[118] This was particularly true regarding the Third World, where the Soviets were committed to support "progressive forces" and national liberation movements and the U.S. was obligated to promote democracy and free enterprise, or at least to oppose the rise of procommunist regimes. The lack of consensus on their balance of interests was particularly striking in the Middle East, where it undermined attempts at concerted diplomacy. Moreover, ideological or "moral" affiliation with at least some of their allies made their commitment to these allies stronger than if only traditional great power patronage were at issue.

Yet in times of crisis Moscow and Washington were able to agree, albeit tacitly, on the balance of stakes, de facto spheres of influence, and the need to reinforce rather than revise the status quo. Indeed, while ready to defend the survival of their allies even by military intervention, the superpowers tended to avoid participating militarily in the clients' offensive acts (that is, war operations conducted on the antagonist's soil). In this regard the superpowers ignored their own ideological preferences and instead conformed to universal norms such as the sanctioning of *every* state's territorial integrity irrespective of its political affiliation. The contradiction between ideology and practice was especially marked in the case of the more doctrinaire party, the Soviet Union. According to Soviet military doctrine, "a true 'socialist and liberating' country will always have the just cause, whether or not it initiated the war."[119] Nonetheless, in the military sphere

> the USSR was very careful to refrain from translating its verbal support of the just cause of its local client into the hard facts of actual military support. That is to say: having justice on one's side is a necessary, but not always sufficient prerequisite for receiving Soviet wartime military sup-

[116] For a recent discussion of the adverse effects of ideology on U.S.-Soviet security cooperation, see George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," in George et al. (fn. 10), 658–61. See also Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 29.

[117] See Joseph Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987).

[118] See Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).

[119] Efraim Karsh, *The Cautious Bear: Soviet Military Engagement in Middle East Wars in the Post-1967 Era* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1985), 38.

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port. Historical experience teaches that, if Soviet military support is to be expected, it is better for a local client to fight a reactive than an initiated war.[120]

As Mark Zacher observes, in conflicts between an aligned and a nonaligned state, where the nonaligned state was the victim, both superpowers, including the patron of the aggressor, tended to support the victim.[121]

Role of Domestic Politics

Although domestic politics has played a lesser role in Soviet security and foreign policy than in other areas,[122] public opinion, interest groups, the media, and Congress have played an increasingly influential role in U.S. international behavior over the last two decades. As the détente of the 1970s shows, domestic actors could constrain cooperation with the Soviet Union even when the leadership of U.S. foreign policy was desirous of it.[123] In contrast, domestic factors could not undermine crisis collaboration with the Soviets even at the height of the cold war, when the U.S. enjoyed clear-cut advantages in nuclear forces and in power projection outside of Europe. Crisis collaboration was maintained even though it could have led (against the traditional U.S. view) to implied recognition of Soviet spheres of influence (following Soviet repression in Eastern Europe in 1956 and 1968) or to joint coercion of U.S. allies (when they were seen as threatening the regional balance, as in the 1956 and the 1967 Middle East crises) or at least to indicating sensitivity to Soviet concerns (the Berlin and Cuban crises).

The joint coercive collaboration of victorious U.S. allies (especially in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Middle East crises) demonstrated most vividly the marked difference between normal diplomacy and crisis behavior. Although in normal times the U.S. rejected cooperation with the Soviets at the expense of allies, during crises Soviet threats helped Washington to restrain allies who had become unruly. Whenever global escalation loomed as a danger in any major postwar crisis, concerns originating in domestic politics had to take a back seat.[124]

[120] Ibid.

[121] Zacher, *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946–77* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 19–20, 73–79.

[122] Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Approaches to Superpower Security Relations," in George et al. (fn. 10), 612–13.

[123] At the same time Reagan's thaw with Moscow as well as Nixon's rapprochement with China and initiation of détente with the Soviets indicate that domestic politics can make cooperation with an ideological adversary easier for a conservative who is willing and able to become more flexible than for a soft-liner.

[124] On the U.S., see Williams (fn. 40); and George, "Political Crises," in Nye (fn. 109), 153–54. On the Soviet Union, see Adomeit (fn. 53).

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Yet in noncrisis settings, because of ideology, internal politics, and leaders' beliefs about Soviet intentions and capabilities, the U.S. rejected any notion of joint management of the system à la the Concert of Europe either in the form of great power condominium or imposed peace; and it frequently rejected even more restrained forms of coordinated diplomacy.

Beyond the question of cooperation with the Soviets, the contrast between U.S. behavior in crisis and noncrisis settings clearly conforms to the structural expectation about the relatively minor influence of domestic politics when diplomatic pushing becomes geostrategic shoving. As William Quandt generalizes from his comprehensive study of U.S. Middle East diplomacy:

> Crisis periods, especially, tend to isolate policy makers from domestic pressures. Decisions are often made rapidly, before public opinion can be mobilized. Information is closely held, depriving interest groups of the means for effective action. The stakes are high and the public tends to be deferential to presidential authority, even when that authority has been weakened, as Nixon's had been.[125]

Degree of Control over the Military

Some of the studies of bureaucratic politics have shown the considerable influence of bureaucracies on decision making in the postwar age of growth and specialization of bureaucracies, information, and expertise. The military especially has become influential with regard to defense budgets, arms control, superpower security cooperation, and weapons acquisition in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.[126]

Despite the potential for loss of control over the military during a crisis,[127] the postwar record shows that as crises became more intense, the control by the political level increased rather than declined.[128] Kissinger, for example, reports that during the 1973 war he insisted on determining the exact location of navy units sailing offshore in the Eastern Mediterranean.[129] Bernard Kalb and Marvin Kalb observe a similar pattern in

[125] Quandt refers here to the weakened authority of Nixon in the 1973 crisis because of Watergate. See Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 203.

[126] See George (fn. 116), 666; Barry Blechman, "Efforts to Reduce the Risk of Accidental or Inadvertent War," in George et al. (fn. 10), 466–81; Halperin (fn. 101); Dallin (fn. 122), 614.

[127] For a recent statement, see Lebow (fn. 9, 1987), chap. 3.

[128] See Peter Mangold, *Superpower Intervention in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 165.

[129] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982). Cited in Daniel Frei, *Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 144.

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Kissinger's behavior during the Jordanian crisis.[130] In his detailed study of Soviet crisis behavior, Adomeit reports a similar prerogative of the political leadership vis-à-vis the military in the Soviet decision-making structure.[131] Dowty's conclusions on U.S. crisis behavior in 1958, 1970, and 1973 directly challenge the application of the bureaucratic politics model to crisis situations: the evidence from all three Middle Eastern crises suggests that "the more intense the crisis, the less the influence of 'standard operating procedures'; the more intense the crisis, the greater the role in decision-making of officials with a general rather than a 'parochial' perspective; the more intense the crisis, the less the influence of vested interests in the bureaucracy ('bureaucratic politics')."[132]

Role of Nuclear Weapons

Not only did nuclear deterrence provide major incentives for caution during crises,[133] but it also drastically reduced the political and military impact of relative changes in the global or regional balances of forces. Thus, the growth in Soviet military capabilities did not make the world less stable, as many Western analysts in the 1970s had feared it would.

Nuclear weapons also reinforced the distinction between crisis and noncrisis situations, especially with regard to military doctrine and ideology. Although flexible response, or the logic of war fighting, was frequently the dominant strand in the military doctrine of both superpowers, MAD as a situational factor restrained their use of force. This conforms with the idea of existential deterrence, as recently developed by Lawrence Freedman.[134] The record of superpower crises bears out these points (as is also noted by Freedman), although it does not explain noncrisis doctrines, policies, and force structures.

At the same time, nuclear weapons made ideology an irrelevant guide to the use of force in crisis settings. Even the superpower widely assumed to be more doctrinaire had to become more flexible in the nuclear age,

[130] Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger* (New York: Dell, 1975), 232.

[131] See Adomeit (fn. 53), 344–45. See also Dallin (fn. 122), 614.

[132] See Dowty (fn. 81), 348. Although recent revelations about the Cuban missile crisis show that there were debates among individual executive committee members, the recent evidence also underlines the critical role that the top decision maker, President Kennedy, played in the (cautious) management of the crisis. See James Blight et al. (fn. 70).

[133] For a recent debate on whether the caution shown by the superpowers in times of crisis was caused by nuclear arms or other factors, see John E. Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988); and Robert Jervis's response in the same issue, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment." The two authors agree nonetheless that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union behaved with great restraint during superpower crises.

[134] Freedman, "I Exist; Therefore I Deter," *International Security* 13 (Summer 1988), 184–85; for an extended discussion, see Jervis (fn. 17).

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at least regarding war avoidance and crisis management. As Nikita Khrushchev remarked to the Chinese in 1963: "The atomic bomb does not observe the class principle."[135] A similar moderating effect occurred among Americans,[136] including hard-line ideologues, at least when they came to power and had to manage crises and decide on the use of force in areas such as the Middle East, where Soviet interests and capabilities were closely involved.

Effects of Crisis-induced Stress

Some students of international crisis are concerned about the adverse effects of stress on crisis management. Although much more prolonged and intense crises could presumably produce such effects, this has not been the case thus far. One of the main reasons appears to be the cautious behavior of postwar statesmen, induced by nuclear deterrence. This fact runs counter to the logic of the thesis of crisis-induced stress, which suggests that the presence of nuclear weapons should have inhibited the capacity of decision makers to manage crises in a sensible way because the rising significance of the values at stake in nuclear confrontations was expected to increase the emotional and cognitive pressures on policymakers.

But even if some individual policymakers in the postwar era could not bear the pressures of crisis, the overall behavior of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as is suggested by their observance of the tacit rules, was not affected, and indeed they were able to cooperate, even if only tacitly, better than they could under lesser pressures. This was precisely because in crises leaders paid more attention to the external environment than to bureaucratic, political, and ideological concerns,[137] and, as we will see below, the external environment in the postwar era was conducive to tacit cooperation.

In his study of U.S. behavior in three Middle Eastern crises, Dowty concludes: "It is clear that increasing stress did not lead decision-makers to become more closed to new information [, though] other aspects of cognitive performance are more complex to judge."[138] Moreover, the evidence from U.S. behavior in Middle Eastern crises regarding the search for and receptivity to information accords well with the conception of

[135] Cited in William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 5, 255–59; see also Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), 530.

[136] See Gaddis (fn. 46), 235–37.

[137] See Janice Stein, "Proxy Wars—How Superpowers End Them: The Diplomacy of War Termination in the Middle East," *International Journal* 35 (Summer 1980), 513.

[138] Dowty (fn. 81), 339.

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"minimum rationality" advanced above. In other words, fundamental values and policy goals remained rigid, but

> perceptions of the environment and immediate policy choices proved to be . . . sensitive to external change and flexible in operation. Policy-makers proved willing to accept evidence that challenged prevailing perceptions on many issues, such as . . . the likely costs of U.S. action in 1970, and the military balance during the 1973 war. . . . There was also sensitivity to negative feedback from policies carried out. . . . On the whole, then, there was no cognitive rigidity, but rather considerable adaptability, in analyzing situational factors and preferred strategies.[139]

There also prevailed a modest form of rationality concerning the search for and evaluation of alternatives. The narrowing of focus on military options and immediate concerns "was accompanied by a clear tactical rationality. . . . Policy-makers did not, at the height of crisis, reexamine their basic beliefs, but their choice of options was based on analysis of costs and gains rather than on purely affective reactions or bureaucratic bargaining and compromise."[140]

Quandt observes, in contrast, that U.S. foreign policy in noncrisis periods

> tends to be insensitive to regional developments, responding instead to strategic concepts, bureaucratic rivalries, and electoral necessity. The vacillation that so often seems to characterize American policy, especially in the Middle East, is likely to be especially intense at such times. The president is less involved than during crisis periods, and the bureaucracy therefore is left to devise policies that may ultimately fail for lack of presidential support.[141]

Control over Small Allies

Many analysts warned that the capacity of small states in the postwar era to play off the superpowers against each other might bring about escalation of regional conflicts to global hostilities, as happened in World War I (notably, through the Kaiser's blank check to Austria) and in the Crimean War (when Turkey played off Britain against Russia).[142] The

[139] Ibid., 340.

[140] Ibid., 343–44. See also Yair Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

[141] Quandt (fn. 125), 130.

[142] On the "blank check," see, e.g., John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," *International Security* 11 (Spring 1987), 106. On the Crimean case, see Smoke (fn. 13), 56. Both authors underline the destabilizing effects of these steps in a multilateral (Orme) or multipolar (Smoke) setting. Although both terms are applied to these two crises, they are not identical. Indeed, it is important to draw a distinction between the number of players and the distribution of capabilities (or polarity) and to underline the crucial effects of the latter factor during crises. Thus, the structure of those postwar Third World crises in which the

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problem could have been especially grave in the postwar era because of the combined effects of decolonization (and thus supposedly the greater autonomy of small states) and keen superpower competition.[143] But this argument applied more to noncrisis and precrisis situations than to crises themselves.[144] Great power control over allies in bipolar crisis (rather than in noncrisis diplomacy or multipolar crisis) derived from the logic of extreme patron-client asymmetry in bipolarity[145] and the application of this logic especially to crisis situations. Indeed, that realization was shared by many regional leaders and spokesmen, perhaps because they were particularly aware of the high dependence of their states on the superpowers and the considerable leeway of the latter toward their clients in bipolar crises.[146]

Stephanie Neuman's recent study of the superpowers and regional wars suggests that the dependence of Third World states on superpower arms supply and especially resupply during crises was, at least until the mid-1980s, still increasing. Such dependence made it possible for the superpowers to limit the scope of regional wars.[147] At the same time, the superpowers in a bipolar world were less dependent on their allies than past great powers had been for maintaining the global balance. If even a country the size of China could realign twice in the post-1945 era without changing the bipolar structure of the system, the realignment of a smaller Third World state would certainly not affect the global distribution of power. Although domestic and ideological elements reduced

superpowers intervened was not multipolar even if more than two players took part. Rather, once these crises escalated to the global level, their structure became bipolar in accordance with the overall distribution of capabilities in the post-1945 system. Although it was more difficult to manage such multiactor crises than to manage two-actor crises (see George [fn. 13], 562–63), bipolarity made it possible for the superpowers to exercise a restraining effect on regional crises.

[143] See, e.g., Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

[144] Although Israel has been widely seen as a particularly good example of the difficulties encountered by a patron in trying to control a small state (because support for Israel in U.S. domestic politics also played a role), this might be applicable primarily to noncrisis settings. For a recent study that stresses U.S. control over Israel in times of Arab-Israeli wars, see A. F. K. Organski, *The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 190–201.

[145] See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 443–44, 505.

[146] See Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (London: Sphere Books, 1977), 551; and Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), 225. One might argue that the decline of bipolarity since the late 1980s, and especially the related perception of superpower disengagement from the Third World, created the background for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. For an expression of his awareness of the global changes, see his speech of February 24, 1990, at the Fourth Summit of the Arab Cooperation Council, Amman, Jordan, as reported in FBIS-NES-90-039, February 27, 1990, pp. 1–5. See also Miller (fn. 21).

[147] See Neuman, "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Summer 1988), esp. 1045–46.

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the influence of this structural factor in normal times, its influence grew during times of crisis and enabled the superpowers to help terminate local wars, as the model presented here would expect. At the very least, bipolarity made it possible for the superpowers to refrain from giving blank checks and thus to avoid the danger of being dragged into local wars, in contrast to the behavior of some European powers in the Seven Years' War, the Crimean War, and World War I.[148]

Restraining and Clarifying Effects of Bipolarity

The two-power system made it easier for the superpowers to restrain allies, but because of the keen competition in the bipolar world, the superpowers also took care not to alienate Third World states and risk driving them into the rival alliance. Thus, the superpowers had an incentive to restrain aggressive allies especially if their aggression was directed against nonaligned[149] or Third World states; the U.S. and the Soviet Union did this repeatedly toward the end of Middle Eastern wars. By contrast, "in a multipolar system, it may be difficult to persuade nations to engage in regulative action. . . . [M]any nations could believe that while a given state's actions were disruptive, they did not require counter-action by any particular nation, and a regulated coalition could not be formed."[150] Such underreaction, or appeasement, could lead to major wars, as in the case of World War II. At the same time, the reduced clarity about stakes and commitments under conditions of multipolarity could lead to *overreaction* as in 1914. A bipolar world, with its greater clarity about commitments and about the balances of capabilities, interests, and threats, facilitates crisis management. During regional wars the superpowers focus on each other; and for purposes of crisis management it is easier to focus on a single source of threat (and of potential cooperation) than on a number of powers. In short, a bipolar structure produces incentives for a balance between resolve and caution. Many studies have found that such a balance is the most conducive to cooperation between adversaries.[151] Indeed, U.S.-Soviet cooperation recurred time and again in the observance of tacit rules.[152] In noncrisis

[148] On this point, see Gaddis (fn. 46).

[149] See Zacher (fn. 121), 218–19.

[150] Richard Rosecrance, *International Relations: Peace or War?* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 116; cited in Zacher (fn. 121).

[151] See the comprehensive overview in Patchen (fn. 19).

[152] The stabilizing influence of bipolarity in times of crisis, in contrast to the proneness of multipolar systems to inadvertent war, can also be observed on the regional level in the Middle East, independent of the superpowers and of nuclear weapons. Whereas the multipolar structure of the 1967 crisis contributed to the undesired escalation that resulted in the June war, the essentially bipolar structure of the Syrian-Israeli rivalry over Lebanon facilitated the evolution of certain tacit rules for crisis management, despite the intense antagonism between these two neighbors and their strong suspicions of each other. On the 1967

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situations, however, the bipolar system produced incentives both for competition and for cooperation, so that nonsystemic factors came into play.

Conclusions

Under the constraints of bipolarity and nuclear weapons, two of the most ideological powers in the modern state system became moderate, status quo powers. As a result, the postwar system was relatively stable, although its major actors were less ideologically moderate and farther apart in their values than earlier great powers such as the members of the Concert. The observed regularity of the superpowers' cautious conduct would have led us to expect the postwar peacefulness to endure, regardless of the political and ideological differences between the superpowers, at least so long as bipolarity and mutual assured destruction were in place.

In noncrisis times, however, the greater influence of factors below the system level considerably constrained the superpower diplomatic cooperation in crisis prevention and in conflict resolution. Hence, while more able than earlier great powers to cooperate tacitly in crisis management, the postwar powers were, at least until recently, less capable of embarking on a long-term, concerted, and explicit collaboration as coequal "managers" of the international system in normal periods, as the nineteenth-century Concert had been able to do.[153] In noncrisis times during the cold war the superpowers might each have tried to reach a hegemonic position and to exclude the other power from having a voice in the international politics of various parts of the Third World. Nevertheless, in crisis situations both Washington and Moscow were more sensitive than previous great powers had been to the interests of the rival power. Moreover, even during the cold war the United States and the Soviet Union tended to collaborate tacitly in controlling wars in the Third World and in maintaining the status quo in world politics.

Table 2 gives a schematic comparison of the postwar superpowers and

war, see Janice Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War through Miscalculated Escalation," in George (fn. 13). On the tacit rules for regulating the Syrian and Israeli military intervention in Lebanon, see Evron (fn. 140).

[153] But the changes in Soviet policy under Gorbachev and the reciprocal U.S. restraint have made diplomatic cooperation much more likely. Consistent with the overall argument presented here, these changes in normal diplomacy and conflict resolution can be explained by changes in subsystemic factors such as decision makers' beliefs and images (especially in the Soviet elite, but also the change in the image of the Soviets in Washington) and domestic politics (a hawkish president legitimized cooperation with Moscow following the internal political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union). At the same time this model would predict that a major retreat from these reforms would lead to the disruption of the close U.S.-Soviet (or Russian) diplomatic cooperation in conflict resolution.

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TABLE 2
GREAT POWER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE 19TH-CENTURY CONCERT OF EUROPE VS. U.S.-SOVIET UNION IN THE POSTWAR ERA

	Crisis Management		*Noncrisis Diplomacy*	
Issue	*The Concert*	*U.S.-Soviet*	*The Concert*	*U.S.-Soviet*
1. Acceptance of spheres of influence	ambiguity	tacit	explicit	rejection
2. Recognition of great power equality	yes	tacit	explicit	rejection by U.S.
3. Acceptance of the status quo	no (Russia, Germany)	tacit	explicit	rejection
4. Cooperation in conflict management	lack of tacit rules and procedures	tacit rules and procedures for crisis management	multilateralism	unilateralism
5. Shared vision of world order	not crucial for crisis management		yes	no
6. Sensitivity to balance of stakes	not very sensitive	sensitive	sensitive	lack of sensitivity
7. Balance between resolve and restraint	unrestrained	resolute restraint	dominance of restraint	dominance of resolve over restraint
8. Balance of capabilities vs. balance of interest	balance of military capabilities	balance of interests	balance of interests	balance of nonmilitary capabilities
9. Control over allies	no	yes	yes	no (esp. U.S.)

10. Control over the military	SOPs (WWI)	civilian control	control is not problematic	control is potentially problematic
11. Effects of domestic politics on foreign policy	considerable	limited	insignificant	very significant (U.S.)
12. Effects of ideology on foreign policy	limited	limited	considerable	very significant
13. Effects of stress on decision making	considerable (WWI)	limited	not applicable	

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the Concert of Europe regarding crisis management and noncrisis diplomacy. In times of crisis the superpowers reached tacit understandings about spheres of influence, coequal status, the status quo, cooperation in conflict management, and the balance of stakes. By contrast, the Concert members reached explicit agreements on these issues in noncrisis diplomacy and succeeded in heading off many potential crises. They were not as effective in developing the tacit understandings required for crisis management, however; once crises had erupted, as in the Crimea and the Balkans, the multipolar structure made it more difficult for the great powers to manage them and avoid a general war. Thus, whereas the Concert members had been more successful in establishing a crisis-prevention regime than the superpowers were during the cold war, the U.S. and the Soviet Union never failed to manage crises, in contrast to the failure of the European powers on at least two fateful occasions: 1853–54 and 1914.[154]

[154] On the Concert as a crisis-prevention regime, see Paul Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in George (fn. 47). Indeed, in accordance with the distinction drawn by George, the essence of the cooperation between the Concert members was in preventing great power crises rather than in managing them. When crises erupted during the peak period of the Concert, 1815–54, the rivals were usually third parties and not more than a single great power was directly involved. In order to prevent escalation to crisis among the great powers themselves, the Concert then acted multilaterally either through a joint intervention of the powers—as in the Ottoman crises of the 1830s and the 1840s (see Lauren, 47–48)—or through joint diplomacy in conflict resolution—as in the crisis resulting in the establishment of Belgium in the early 1830s. On the Concert's accomplishments in settling disputes and averting dangers by diplomacy, see, especially, Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics* 39 (October 1986). In contrast, many local crises in the postwar era escalated to superpower crises and only then were successfully managed while the superpowers all along acted mainly through unilateral steps. See Benjamin Miller, "From Balance of Power to Hegemonic Stability or to International Society: Competing Theoretical Models and Great Power Crisis Interaction" (Manuscript, Hebrew University, 1992). On superpower failure in crisis prevention during the cold war, see the other chapters in George (fn. 47); and also George et al. (fn. 10), chap. 23.

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THE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

A Comparative View of Gorbachev's Reforms

By CHRISTOPHER YOUNG*

IN 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev began to advocate drastic reform of the Soviet system. He called for the liberalization of the authoritarian political structure, proposed a major reform of the centralized economy, and finally demanded the transfer of power away from party bodies, including the Central Committee and its Politburo.

In response, the elite of the Communist Party did not remove him from office but rather voted to give him more power still. Nor did the Central Committee close ranks to fight against the reduction of its power and privileges. Rather, it voted to oust its oldest and most conservative members and approved the measures that removed it from the center of the Soviet political world. In fact, when state officials finally attempted to remove Gorbachev in August 1991, conservative party members could do little more than cheer from the sidelines.

The Party's approval of the reforms that constituted perestroika cannot be explained solely as a result of broadly based social pressures, since the explosion of popular demands for change came only after party leaders had already committed the Soviet Union to a new course. Even given the unworkability of the Soviet economy and the need for some kind of reform, political liberalization was certainly not the only option.[1] At the same time reform could not have been forced upon a resistant Soviet elite by a dictatorial Politburo. This was demonstrated in 1957, when the party's Central Committee overruled a Politburo majority that had demanded the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev, and again in 1964, when it finally removed him from office. Leaders in any organization cannot

* For their helpful comments and suggestions, I wish to thank Ronald Rogowski, Richard Anderson, James DeNardo, George Murphy, and Ivan Szelenyi.

[1] A good discussion of the inadequacy of deterministic "societal" models is presented by James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 8–32. George Breslauer makes this point for the Soviet case; see Breslauer, "Evaluating Gorbachev as Leader," *Soviet Economy* 5, no. 4 (1989).

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ignore the interests of groups able to act effectively against them.[2] Gorbachev must therefore have convinced a broad audience of officials that they stood to gain from liberalization.

This conclusion leads to some important questions. Why did Gorbachev choose a liberalizing reform strategy, despite the attendant risks? What could a group of oligarchs with little enthusiasm for popular participation in government hope to gain from liberalization? Is the Soviet experience with political reform unique, or is perestroika similar to other instances of reform promulgated by self-interested political elites?

Although the literature on democratic transitions provides a rich discussion of the political processes that follow liberalization, generalized explanations about the origins of political relaxation within authoritarian regimes are often less satisfying. Most scholars begin with the assumption that such regimes are divided into hard-liners and soft-liners and that their conflict over liberalization is the impetus for democratization.[3] More research is needed about the reasons politicians opt for liberalization even though they know that it may lead to social upheaval or a conservative reaction.

In this essay, I consider the experiences of three nineteenth-century Western European states in terms of the motivations that underlay the approval of political liberalizations by parties and governments that had not previously shown any affection for radical democracy. I suggest first that liberalization can be viewed as an effective strategy for politicians to defeat their opponents and consolidate their power. And I argue second that political leaders are frequently willing to accept the long-term threat of popular mobilization and antiregime agitation in exchange for the more immediate defeat of powerful opponents.

The Strategy of Liberalization

The second half of the nineteenth century was an era of turmoil for the established political parties of Western Europe. Industrialization empowered growing numbers of middle-class citizens and simultaneously

[2] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 188–93. For a discussion of the prerequisites for collective action, see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[3] See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15–21; Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 32–40; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54–66. Russell Bova applies this literature to the Soviet case in "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991).

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swelled the ranks of the discontented proletariat. More widespread literacy allowed political communication and agitation to spread rapidly across newly mobilized populations. Class consciousness acquired more than theoretical meaning. Conservative parties, whose ideologies stressed resistance to change, faced the possibility of eventual irrelevance.

Politicians in Great Britain, Prussia, and Italy found their power challenged by large-scale societal pressures and reinforced by active and vocal oppositions. One might have expected these politicians to respond with reactionary measures designed to postpone the broadening of political participation for as long as possible.

Yet the strategies actually chosen by Benjamin Disraeli, Otto von Bismarck, and Giovanni Giolitti were hardly reactionary. Each advanced a carefully considered strategy of liberalization that had as its central feature the expansion of suffrage. Previously unrepresented groups, including large numbers of the industrial proletariat, were suddenly able to vote in national elections.

The three leaders had not blundered, however. They all received tangible political benefits as a result of their reforms. Three elements characterize the reforms in each of the countries under consideration.

First, the reforms were designed to protect the political positions of the reformers in the more democratized postreform period. Disraeli used gerrymandering to guarantee his party a large piece of the newly expanded political pie. Bismarck combined an appeal to German nationalism with social programs to win the support of the masses. He also fought to maintain the independence of the government from parliamentary control. Giolitti relied on a system of regional prefects skilled in the coercion and manipulation of illiterate peasants.

Second, in none of the cases were the reforms simple exercises in haphazard democratization. The liberalizers sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of their opponents. The expansion of political liberties was designed either to split the enemy camp into mutually hostile blocs or to create new opposition groups that would be more interested in doing damage to the reformers' enemies than to the reformers themselves. The enfranchisement of large numbers of proletarians shifted the political center of gravity of the British and German opposition to the left, which sent many bourgeois voters and politicians fleeing into the arms of the conservatives. In Italy the extension of the suffrage to conservative rural citizens provided a counterweight to radical voters in the cities.

Finally, in each country the reforms empowered new groups that would later pose a potentially greater threat to the reformers than their old enemies had. The reformers were perfectly willing to trade the pos-

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sibility of future opposition for short- to medium-term gains in the political struggle. The British Labour Party, the German SPD, and the Italian Fascists experienced their great periods of growth only after their supporters were given the vote by Disraeli, Bismarck, and Giolitti, respectively.

In short, the reformers acted out of self-interest rather than out of commitment to democratic values, although none of them was above occasionally giving a populist ring to his speeches. Thus, each political leader acted as an effective representative of his group and therefore earned the grateful support of his followers. Liberalization, then, can be an effective strategy for consolidating power.

Disraeli and British Reform

By the 1860s the British Liberal Party had emerged as the dominant force in Parliament. Conservative M.P.'s found themselves a shrinking minority, able to govern only when internal divisions within the Liberal Party fractured existing governments.

The Conservatives had not recovered from the defection of Robert Peel and his followers (including William Gladstone) during the 1846 debate over the repeal of the Corn Laws, which had protected British agriculture at the expense of free trade. Peel had taken the best talent of the party with him, and his followers constituted a pillar of the alliance of Peelites, radicals, and Whigs that made up the Liberal Party.

All that was left of the once-mighty party was a disheartened, uninspiring group of country squires and reactionaries. Although the party still contained two men of notable ability, the Earl of Derby and Benjamin Disraeli, there were hardly enough others with sufficient standing and experience to form an acceptable government during the occasional periods of Liberal disunity.

Worse still, the course of British economic development assured that the future would see a growing urban bourgeoisie, and a concomitant decline in the power of rural interests. The most likely outcome seemed to be a steady decline of the Conservative Party into a corps of reactionaries, occupying ever-fewer seats in the Commons.[4]

Disraeli and his Conservative colleagues took office in 1867 after Gladstone's Liberal government was undermined by the opposition of an important segment of his party to the electoral reform bill he had proposed in 1866. Gladstone's bill, which would have allowed a modest

[4] Paul Adelman, *Gladstone, Disraeli and Later Victorian Politics* (Essex, England: Longman Group, 1983), 11; Robert Blake, *Disraeli* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 242–43.

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increase in the number of British voters, was roundly defeated when Conservatives voted with Whig members of the "Adullamite Cave," who opposed further suffrage reform.

The fall of Gladstone's government and the defeat of his bill were direct results of a central contradiction that plagued the Liberal Party in this period. Although the Liberals held themselves to be the party of reform and democratization, there was considerable fear among the Liberal M.P.'s and cabinet members that any real reform would spell disaster for Liberal politicians and their traditional supporters—the Liberal Party was very much the representative of the British industrialists. Any significant expansion of the franchise would flood the party with British workers, who were likely to demand a far more radical orientation than that acceptable to most party leaders.[5]

Hence the dilemma: Liberal leaders had to support the general idea of reform, yet it was very difficult for them to support the kind of reform that would meet the demands of the unenfranchised population. The split in the party that killed the 1866 bill was practically inevitable.

The Conservatives faced no such dilemma. Although the new government was expected to offer some kind of reform bill, Disraeli was able to adopt a much more opportunistic approach than his opponents could. The question remained: what kind of bill should the Conservatives put forth?

Disraeli was very much aware of the Liberal dilemma, and in a stroke of political genius he recognized the best way to take advantage of it: the Conservatives should propose a reform bill that would extend the franchise to a large percentage of the British working class. And, indeed, Disraeli introduced a bill that would give the vote to every household in urban Britain and would lower the income level required to vote in the rural counties. Over the course of the debate, he showed great willingness to tolerate radical amendments that would expand the franchise still further.[6]

Disraeli recognized that the combination of the voice vote and the ability of conservative landowners to manipulate their tenants would guarantee Conservative control over the British countryside. He took no

[5] Maurice Cowling, *1867: Disraeli, Gladstone, and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 48–49.

[6] Blake (fn. 4) and F. B. Smith argue that Disraeli was more concerned with passing any kind of bill than with the specific content of his bill. Cowling (fn. 5) casts doubt on this idea, asserting that Disraeli's strategy could not have been better designed to serve conservative interests. See Smith, *The Making of the Second Reform Bill* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

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chances, however. In the accompanying measure to the reform bill that redistributed parliamentary seats, Disraeli arranged to hive off any urban areas that were part of the counties and join them to already Liberal areas.

This act of gerrymandering helped to keep a powerful bloc of Conservatives in Parliament for decades to come. The redistribution bill granted some new seats to the biggest cities, but nowhere near in proportion to their populations. It is not surprising that the redistribution bill has been called the most important part of Disraeli's strategy.[7]

Because most urban areas were already voting for Liberal candidates before the 1867 reform bill, an increase in the number of voters in the boroughs would not do any damage to the Conservatives. Disraeli calculated, however, that the inclusion of large numbers of working-class voters would inevitably force the Liberal Party leftward, thus alienating the British middle class and driving them into the arms of the Conservatives.[8] Gladstone recognized what Disraeli was doing and sought to block passage of the bill, but Disraeli's acceptance of radical amendments had already assured him enough votes from the left wing of the Liberal Party to ensure passage.

The passage of the reform bill not only secured the position of the Conservative Party in British politics, just as Disraeli had foreseen, but also solidified Disraeli's place at the head of his party. Disraeli had faced opposition from the high-Tory (ultraconservative) wing of the Conservatives, a group as hostile as the Liberals to any expansion of the franchise. He overcame this threat, however, when he convened an unprecedented meeting of Conservative backbenchers and explained to the M.P.'s what the bill could do for the party. Once they saw that the bill would bring them tangible political benefits, the backbenchers lined up behind Disraeli.[9]

The passage of the bill was a disaster for the Liberals. In the long run it created the preconditions for the founding of the Labour Party, which would eventually replace the Liberals as the party of the Left. Disraeli must have realized that a powerful working-class party would eventually emerge as a result of his efforts—and indeed, Labour ultimately posed a greater threat to Conservative interests than Gladstone and his Liberals ever had. Disraeli was evidently willing to run this risk, however. The short-term benefits to his party were great enough to overcome any fears of future politicized trade unionism.

[7] Blake (fn. 4), 12.
[8] Adelman (fn. 4), 10; Cowling (fn. 5), 64–66.
[9] Blake (fn. 4), 463.

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Bismarck and Universal Suffrage

In Prussia, Otto von Bismarck and his Junker supporters were also confronted with a powerful liberal opposition. The Prussian nobility had designed the kingdom's electoral system to guarantee their hegemony over all the political organs of the state. The franchise, theoretically universal, divided the population into three estates of roughly equal total income. Each of these estates was granted equal representation in the Prussian Landtag. When the constitution was first drafted, the income distribution in the kingdom had assured the Junkers a dominant position in each of the estates.[10]

Industrialization, however, dramatically altered the situation. By the time Bismarck assumed power in 1862, the newly enriched bourgeois liberals dominated the first two estates, and their representatives had turned the Landtag into a powerful anticonservative chamber. Their resistance to the king's spending priorities had precipitated a constitutional conflict that almost forced him to abdicate. Although Bismarck had persuaded the king to ignore the wishes of the liberals, it was unclear whether the status quo was tenable.

This situation was exacerbated because the conservatives were increasingly unsure of what they stood for. Prussia had become embroiled in a series of international conflicts, as the last vestiges of the unity created at the Congress of Vienna melted away. Given the increasing tensions between Prussia and Austria, conservatives were not sure how to respond to German nationalists in Prussia and the smaller principalities. Siding with the nationalists would be tantamount to supporting the overthrow of the old order, but the status quo seemed to offer only instability. Members of the Prussian government began to speak about the possibility of a coup against the liberals.[11] A repetition of the violence of 1848 seemed possible.

The liberal dilemma that Disraeli recognized and exploited was not confined to the British Isles. Prussian liberals argued that the Landtag was the true representative of the Prussian nation and that its wishes should take precedence over the will of the king and his ministers. Nevertheless, the liberal parliamentarians viewed themselves as the spokesmen of the propertied classes, not of the workers and peasants who made up the majority of the population. Most of these bourgeois politicians were actively hostile to the idea of greater representation for the lower

[10] Theodore S. Hamerow, *The Social Foundations of German Unification* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 297–301.

[11] Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 219.

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classes, fearing the consequences of the political empowerment of groups that took a less benevolent view of laissez-faire capitalism. The masses, they argued, could not be trusted to make informed judgments about the great political questions of the day.[12]

Bismarck became aware of the Prussian liberal dilemma as a result of a rather surprising friendship. In 1863 Bismarck began a series of lengthy conversations with Ferdinand Lassalle, the fiery leader of the Prussian labor movement. Lassalle viewed the Junkers as enemies of far less immediate consequence than the liberals. Knowing that the labor movement could not develop into a major political force as long as the bourgeoisie held the preeminent position on the political left, he was determined to undermine the liberals in any way that he could. Lassalle urged Bismarck to suspend the constitution and to declare that further elections would be based on direct universal suffrage, without consideration of estate. This action, Lassalle promised, would be the death of the liberal opposition.[13]

Bismarck was receptive to the idea of using universal suffrage to attack the liberals. He believed that a strategy of liberalization could serve several other goals as well. He looked with envy at the example set by Napoleon III of France, who had managed to use universal suffrage and a program of social reform to secure massive popular support. Napoleon had demonstrated that the masses, particularly the peasantry, were not always the natural allies of liberals or socialists.[14]

Furthermore, the declaration of universal suffrage could be a potent weapon against the Austrians, too. Bismarck wanted the Prussian monarchy to assume the role of head of the German nationalist movement. And he hoped to garner popular support for Prussian ambitions in the lesser German states via a policy of revolutionary nationalism, combined with a demonstration of the king's willingness to listen to elected representatives of the entire German nation. Nationalism could then help to make a Prussian-centered Germany the equal of any other power on the Continent.[15]

Bismarck knew that the king would not accept Lassalle's proposal to

[12] For an extensive discussion of the Prussian liberals' fears about the consequences of democratization, see James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

[13] Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), 115–16.

[14] Brison D. Gooch, *The Reign of Napoleon III* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Albert Guerard, *Napoleon III* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943); J. M. Thompson, *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954).

[15] Lothar Gall, *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 286–89.

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mount a coup in support of universal suffrage, but he managed to convince the king that traditional conservative scruples about the sanctity of the monarchies in the small German states could be set aside in the interests of a greater Prussia.

In April 1866 Bismarck circumvented the Prussian Landtag and formally proposed to the all-German diet at Frankfurt that elections based on universal suffrage be held to elect a parliament for a united Germany.[16] Bismarck expected the Diet's disapproval, for the representatives of Austria and the lesser German monarchies knew perfectly well what he was up to. Nevertheless, it provided an excellent opportunity to frighten the liberals and the Austrians alike with the specter of Bonapartism and to make a well-publicized pitch to the German nationalists.[17]

Only when Prussian arms succeeded in creating first the North German Confederation and then the German Empire was Bismarck finally able to implement his plans for universal suffrage. Just as he had hoped, the voting that followed fractured the German liberal camp. Bismarck's offer of a bill of indemnity to the Prussian Landtag, asking for the body's forgiveness for the state's extraconstitutional actions, split the liberals in two. The progovernment wing, called the National Liberals, eventually became loyal supporters of the regime, especially after the Social Democrats for whom Lassalle had fought became the leading voice of the opposition.

In this regard, Bismarck was fortunate, since Prussian conservatives had originally fought his plan. Figures such as Ludwig von Gerlach had argued along the same lines as the liberals about the danger of popular participation in government, and many conservatives were horrified by the chancellor's drive to overthrow the rulers of the smaller German states and incorporate their territories into a new nation.[18] As it turned out, Bismarck, supported only by the National Liberals, was able to overcome conservative opposition in the Parliament of the North German Confederation.[19]

Bismarck was not deterred by the conservatives' warnings about the effects of giving political representation to the working classes. He was perfectly willing to risk the growth of proletarian opposition, since he was confident that the new parliament could be controlled by the king,

[16] Eyck (fn. 13), 115–18.
[17] Gall (fn. 15), 288–89.
[18] Hamerow (fn. 10), 292–93, 390–91.
[19] Pflanze (fn. 11), 331–34, 354–55.

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and the mechanism of the state turned against his opponents.[20] More importantly, he was more concerned with the immediate threat posed by the liberals than with the future consequences of his strategy. Although universal suffrage allowed the rapid growth of the SPD and the Catholic Party, the strategy of liberalization proved to be a powerful tool for the attainment of the chancellor's short-term objectives.

Reform in Italy[21]

In Italy the arrival of the twentieth century brought threats to the fragile political balance that Agostino Depretis had crafted during the 1880s. Centrist politicians had remained in power through the inclusionary instrument of the *trasformismo*, the policy of carefully tailoring government policies in order to capture the support of center-leaning politicians of parties to both the right and the left of the government. The centrists had usually managed to avoid the schisms characteristic of Italian politics and had thus clung to power.

Depretis's successor, Giovanni Giolitti, who assumed power in 1900, found it increasingly difficult to maintain the *trasformismo*. The franchise extension of 1882 had given the vote to citizens who achieved a certain level of literacy. In the decades since that time, however, literacy rates in the industrialized northern towns had increased to a degree that allowed the Italian Left to muster ever greater support. As the power of the Left grew, the Right rapidly grew more anxious, and the ability of the centrists to maintain a stable governing coalition seemed in peril. The situation was especially aggravated by rising tensions between the industrialized north and the impoverished south of Italy. It seemed that the *trasformismo* could not continue and that Giolitti could not last.

The main short-term danger to Giolitti's centrists was the growing power of the Italian Left. As long as literacy rates in the Italian north continued to rise, the ability of the government to maintain the *trasformismo* would be diminished. This point was brought home to Giolitti in 1909, when elections bolstered the number of extremist deputies in the lower house, with the Left making the greatest gains. Within the year Giolitti's ministry ended, and he found himself temporarily out of power.

In 1911 the government proposed a moderate electoral reform, and Giolitti saw in this an opportunity to return to power. Abandoning his

[20] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire* (Dover, N.H.: Berg Publishers, 1985), 53–55.
[21] The following section is based on the account of Denis Mack Smith, *Italy: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 211–62.

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previous position against popular participation, he instead demanded universal suffrage and was quickly brought back into office.

The proposal split the Left, as the most extreme radicals supported the government's proposal. Passage was assured when the Right threw its support behind Giolitti, believing that the inclusion of the southern peasantry in the voting rolls would provide a solid conservative counterweight to the vote in the north. The measure, which was soon approved, granted the vote to every Italian male over thirty and to all military veterans. The number of voters rose from three to eight million.

Giolitti had recognized that universal male suffrage would serve his interests in two ways. First, he was confident that the southern voters would counterbalance the Left. In this respect, his motivation was the same as that of the parliamentarians to his right. But he also believed that his own position would be considerably strengthened, because universal suffrage was ideally suited to his faction's greatest talent: election fixing.

Like Depretis before him, Giolitti had access to a huge network of regional prefects who were skilled at using rhetoric, trickery, and coercion to swing votes in any direction they chose. With large numbers of illiterate, apolitical rural voters included, Giolitti could guarantee his supporters large numbers of seats in the lower house and bolster his ability to continue the *trasformismo* for years to come.

In the long run, however, the reform would be Giolitti's undoing. In the years after the First World War mass parties began to dominate Italian politics. The chaos and devastation that had gripped the country by 1920 allowed the most extreme parties to engage in a kind of outright intimidation and terrorism that made the actions of Giolitti's prefects seem mild in comparison. As it turned out, the strategy of liberalization, which had proved so effective at blunting the power of the Left, led to the development of the fascist Right, which eventually overturned not only the *trasformismo* but Italian parliamentarianism as well. Giolitti had not worried about this danger. His strategy allowed his party to remain at the center of Italian politics for a decade longer than it might have otherwise.

Gorbachev and the Strategy of Liberalization

In the Western European cases political leaders used the strategy of liberalization to exploit the vulnerabilities of other political parties while protecting the interests of their own. The Soviet Union of the 1980s was a one-party state that differed in many important respects from the lim-

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ited democracies of Western Europe. Furthermore, Gorbachev's reforms were not as far-reaching as those of the Western Europeans, and his political success was more short-lived. Nevertheless, Soviet liberalization may have been a product of political calculations very similiar to those of Disraeli, Giolitti, and Bismarck. In this section, I explore that possibility.

The underlying force that propelled Soviet politics after Leonid Brezhnev's death was the almost universally accepted need for some kind of economic reform. By 1982 the country had exhausted the possibility of further extensive growth. Planners could achieve goals for output in certain key economic sectors, but only at the expense of frequent shortages and inefficiencies elsewhere. Soviet agriculture continued to be a frustrating area that even massive investment could not help. Waste was an endemic feature of the cumbersome Soviet system for internal trade and product distribution. The black market flourished. More ominously, the Soviets were on the wrong side of a growing technological gap with capitalist states, a gap that threatened to make even the most advanced Soviet weapons systems obsolete.[22]

The deterioration of the Soviet economic system made the status quo untenable for the Soviet political elite. Brezhnev's long rule had been supported by extensive logrolling that allowed the growth of bureaucratic organizations in virtually every segment of the political system. In the aftermath of Brezhnev's death, Yuri Andropov attempted to salvage the old system through reliance on discipline and the removal of the oldest and most corrupt of Brezhnev's followers. After a brief period of retrenchment under Chernenko, Gorbachev revived Andropov's campaign.[23]

The chaos induced by the overzealous enforcement of an antialcohol campaign and by the lack of improvement in the country's economic indicators convinced many members of the Soviet elite that the viability of their positions depended on more basic reforms of the struggling Soviet system.[24] However, this recognition shattered the consensus that had

[22] Anders Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 10–21; Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 32–67; Gail Lapidus, "Society under Strain," and Robert Tucker, "Swollen State, Spent Society: Stalin's Legacy to Brezhnev's Russia," both in Erik Hoffman and Robbin Laird, eds., *The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era* (New York: Aldine, 1984); Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 101–11.

[23] Archie Brown, "Power and Policy in a Time of Leadership Transition, 1982–1988," in Brown, ed., *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union* (London: MacMillan Press, 1989); Stephen White, *Gorbachev in Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1–22.

[24] Aslund (fn. 22), 23–55.

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characterized the Soviet leadership in the first few years of Gorbachev's tenure.

An effective economic reform of a planned economy requires, among other things, a drastic reduction in the size of the administering bureaucracy, a freer exchange of information, and the introduction of economic incentives tied to market conditions rather than to the dictates of local and national political officials.[25] In other words, the power and privileges of a significant proportion of the party and state elite has to be reduced or eliminated. Gorbachev's reform plan centered on his proposal for a new law that would decentralize enterprises. It quickly sparked the opposition of those segments of the state and party hierarchy most likely to suffer from its adoption.

It is not surprising that members of the leadership quickly stepped forward to gather the support of those members of the elite, principally party workers, who were agitating against reform. Egor Ligachev, assumed to be the most powerful man in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev, was widely recognized as the leader of this antireform faction.[26] In contrast to the old Brezhnevites, Ligachev did not deny that the Soviet economy had been stagnant since the 1970s, but he insisted that increased discipline and very limited reforms were the appropriate remedies. He resolutely denounced any attempt to introduce elements of a market economy into the Soviet Union and defended the role of the Communist Party in Soviet society.[27]

Ligachev and his supporters quickly advanced a political strategy designed to galvanize a broad section of the elite in opposition to reform. Rather than attacking Gorbachev's proposals for cuts in the party apparatus, which could easily have been labeled as self-interested protection of power and perquisites at the expense of needed reforms, Ligachev and his followers centered their attacks on glasnost, the free exchange of information that was a vital part of Gorbachev's reform plans.

This strategy was remarkably effective, for a broad segment of the

[25] L. I. Abalkin, speech at the Nineteenth Party Conference, *XIX Vsesoyuznaya Konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Stenographic report of the XIX Party Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), 114–19; Anders Aslund, "Gorbachev, Perestroika, and Economic Crisis," *Problems of Communism* 40 (January–April 1991); Marshall I. Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Spring 1990); Ed. A. Hewett, "The New Soviet Plan," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Winter 1990–91); James H. Noren, "The Soviet Economic Crisis: Another Perspective," *Soviet Economy* 6, no. 1 (1990).

[26] *New York Times*, May 28, 1987, p. 1.

[27] "Perekhodit' k Konkretnym Delam," *Pravda*, August 27, 1987; "Zhivoi Istochnik Natsional'nykh Traditsii," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, April 7, 1988; Speech to XIX Party Conference, *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (fn. 25), 82–88; "Aktivnaya Pozitsiya Kommunista," *Pravda*, December 25, 1988.

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Soviet elite felt threatened by the attacks on corruption, inefficiency, arbitrary uses of power, and the suppression of criticism that had become a regular feature of Soviet journalism. In addition, the conservatives could point to the country's growing ethnic strife as a direct result of glasnost. Thus, while professing their adherence to perestroika, Ligachev and his supporters could demand measures that would undermine the underpinnings of reform.

By most accounts their strategy very nearly succeeded. The publication of Nina Andreeva's angry denunciation of glasnost in early 1988, reportedly with Ligachev's sponsorship, led many Soviets to believe that liberalization had come to an end. For three weeks, until Gorbachev rallied support and had a rebuttal printed in *Pravda*, officials awaited orders to reverse his reforms.[28]

Gorbachev now found himself in a very difficult position: he had acquired sufficient support in the Central Committee to assure the approval of needed reform measures in June 1987, but the opponents of reform had skillfully circumvented the application of reforms both by bureaucratic means and by highlighting undesirable side effects of glasnost. The reformers badly needed some way to undermine the positions of their opponents while securing their own positions. Gorbachev's response to this predicament resembles that of the Western European conservatives. Much as they had done, he turned to a strategy of political liberalization.

Gorbachev had given his support to the idea of some liberalizing measures even before he came to power, and his speeches often stressed the importance of *democratizatsiya*, but he never elaborated on exactly what this meant.[29] He did not introduce concrete proposals for a major reform of the Soviet political system until the Nineteenth Party Conference of June 1988 and at the Central Committee plenum that preceded it. Understanding Gorbachev's motives does not rest on the assumption that he had become a convert to the ideals of democrats in the Soviet Union and abroad. Rather, his actions, like those of Disraeli, Bismarck, and Giolitti, can be understood in terms of the struggle for political power.

Gorbachev's report to the conference was not a collection of random proposals for political pluralism. Instead, his speech carefully laid out a program very deliberately constructed to undermine the organizational

[28] See M. A. Ul'yanov's speech at the Nineteenth Party Conference, *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (fn. 25), 190–99; White (fn. 23), 196–99; Nina Andreeva, "Ne Mogu Postupat'sya Printsipami," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 13, 1988.

[29] "Zhivoe Tvorchestvo Naroda: Doklad Tovarishcha M.S. Gorbacheva," *Pravda*, December 11, 1984; "O Perestroike i Kadrovoi Politike Partii," *Pravda*, January 28, 1987.

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basis of his opponents' power while safeguarding the interests of his own faction.

Gorbachev opened his speech by reminding the delegates of the difficulties facing the Soviet economy, pointing out that reform efforts were not succeeding as well as had been hoped. He complained that perestroika was being frustrated by the forces of stagnation (*zastoi*)—a word associated with the late Brezhnev era. He thereby tried to convince his audience that if opponents of his reform plan were successful, the country would revert to the unacceptable status quo ante.

Having identified the threat to perestroika, he then offered a strategy to defeat his opponents. Reform, he said, could be made irreversible only through the instrument of political democratization. He called for the revival of the soviets (the country's local and national legislatures) and, more importantly, demanded that they be granted exclusive control over local and national governments.

The Communist Party must be separated from governmental control, he said, in order to restore the party to its natural role of political vanguard. Gorbachev was quick to point out that a vanguard party had little need of an extensive apparatus, since party involvement in governmental affairs was contrary to Leninist ideals. In short, he proposed to eliminate the CPSU as a source of political and administrative power. That power would be transferred to the state. Because Ligachev and his followers were concentrated in the party apparatus, the political reform would cut them off from the implementation of economic reform.

Gorbachev was careful to ensure that liberalization would not harm his supporters, however. Representation would be given not only to individuals in the country's various electoral districts but also to those groups likely to counteract any overly radical popular sentiments. Gorbachev had no intention of making it easy for radical democrats to push him and his supporters aside.

Gorbachev also proposed that, as a rule, local party bosses should chair the soviets in their areas, assuming that they could get themselves elected. Gorbachev thus guaranteed himself at least the tacit support of those first secretaries who believed that they could control their jurisdictions; in this way he cut off the central apparatus from its natural base of support in the provinces and further isolated his opponents. But of course, he said, those secretaries who could not muster sufficient popular support would have to "draw the appropriate conclusions."

Although he anticipated that cuts would be necessary in the government ministries, Gorbachev was careful not to echo the general anti-ministerial sentiment of many delegates. He was not so foolish as to risk

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losing the support of Nikolai Ryzhkov and other government figures in the Central Committee who expected to gain from the loss of party power. The state apparatus, in combination with the new structures created in the aftermath of the conference, formed the heart of the forces that Gorbachev mobilized against the Party.

Despite the vehement protests of many speakers at the conference, Gorbachev made sure that none of the fundamental criticisms of glasnost made their way into the official records of the conference. Ligachev was consigned to a committee that produced a meaningless document about the struggle with bureaucratism; he was not a member of the committees that prepared the conference's two chief documents, which adopted Gorbachev's major proposals.[30]

It can thus be argued that Gorbachev had used the strategy of political liberalization to attack his opponents while securing the position of enough of his supporters to be able to fend off attacks on his policies. It is certainly true that his victories at the May plenum and the June conference brought him considerable success in the short run. The Soviet Union witnessed its first real elections in March 1989. The Congress of Peoples' Deputies that resulted chose a Supreme Soviet that approved virtually every proposal Gorbachev put before it.

Over the course of 1989 and 1990 power steadily flowed from the national party apparatus to the state, leaving Ligachev and the other conservatives without a national platform. Gorbachev's success in 1988 gave his coalition the needed strength to ward off the attacks of hard-liners outraged by the growth of popular opposition and ethnic separatism. At the February 1990 Central Committee Plenum and the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, the remaining powers of the national party apparatus were transferred to strengthened state bodies, and the repeal of the statutory guarantees of party power was approved.[31]

More important, the Central Committee voted shortly before the congress to end its role as the most important constituency of Soviet politics. The clearest sign of this change was the reorganization of the Politburo, which was substantially enlarged while being deprived of its most influential members. The Central Committee lost its statutory right to remove the party leader and ceased to function as the primary forum for the discussion of important policy changes. Gorbachev's supporters in the committee evidently now felt free to exert their influence through state channels, bypassing the party-based conservatives. The success of

[30] Nineteenth Party Conference, *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (fn. 25), 19–92, 112–20, 135–44.

[31] John Gooding, "The XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in Perspective," *Soviet Studies* 43, no. 2 (1991).

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Gorbachev's maneuvering was dramatically illustrated in 1990, when conservatives abandoned the national arena in hopes of turning the newly formed Russian Communist Party into a counterweight to the national government.[32]

At the local level the liberalization activated popular pressures that swept conservative party secretaries from power over the course of the next year. Between the beginning of 1989 and the Twenty-eighth Party Congress in the summer of 1990, 42 percent of the regional first secretaries of the Russian Republic were retired, many as a direct result of mass agitation.[33]

Like Bismarck, Giolitti, and Disraeli, Gorbachev used a strategy of political liberalization to defeat opponents and to consolidate the power of his faction. But this victory came at a price. As was the case in Britain, Prussia, and Italy, the reforms generated popular pressures for further liberalization and created opportunities for new political elites to create bases of support.

Although Gorbachev maintained his hold on the national organs of power, radicals in several Soviet republics, including Russia, were able to gain power by taking advantage of the laws passed in support of Gorbachev's strategy. They obtained the repeal of some of those reform provisions designed to assure the supremacy of Gorbachev and his followers over the political system. More importantly, radicals were unafraid to use strikes and demonstrations to achieve political objectives.

Economic reform proved to be more intractable than reformers had imagined in 1988.[34] Successful reform required marketization and massive government cutbacks. But Gorbachev needed the support of state officials who would have been harmed by these measures. This dilemma, rather than any natural hesitancy, caused Gorbachev to vacillate on reform, as he accumulated new powers but hesitated to use them.

In the end the problems and contradictions of the Soviet regime proved to be insurmountable. Gorbachev's attempts to balance the ministries, security services, and military against the increasingly powerful democrats finally foundered when a weakly supported junta launched an abortive coup that quickly collapsed in the face of popular resistance. In the aftermath of the disaster the Soviet Union fell like a house of

[32] Ibid., 242–46.

[33] My own survey of Soviet announcements of personnel changes. See Viktor Radzievskii, "Konservatism Ukhodit v Otstavku," *Moskovskye Novosti* 9 (1990); "Kogo Zakhlestyvayut Volny?" *Pravda*, March 11, 1990.

[34] Anders Aslund, "The Making of Economic Policy in 1989 and 1990," *Soviet Economy* 6, no. 1 (1990).

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cards, leaving the question of economic and political reform in the hands of a fragmented democratic opposition.

The Soviet case differs from its Western European counterparts in that Gorbachev failed to create a lasting political base. Bismarck, Disraeli, and Giolitti used liberalization to consolidate their power and continue their political leadership for decades after the adoption of their reform proposals. Measured against this standard, Gorbachev was not very successful: he found himself out of power three years after his speech at the Nineteenth Party Conference.

In Britain, careful gerrymandering had combined with middle-class fear of the rising power of the workers to guarantee Disraeli political support for many years after the 1867 reform. Bismarck benefited from the National Liberals' fears of the socialists, and from his appeals to German nationalism. Giolitti relied on the support of his prefects, who gained from their powerful position in the countryside and rewarded him with electoral victories. Gorbachev did not control any equivalent of Giolitti's prefects. Party officials who could conceivably have played that role had been too seriously weakened by his original reforms and in any case were not ready to forgive Gorbachev. Worse still, the state officials who had been the original beneficiaries of Gorbachev's liberalization strategy no longer had confidence in his ability to maintain order. By August 1991 his support had evaporated.

In another way, however, the Italian and Soviet cases are somewhat similar. Giolitti's position depended on a careful balance of the Right and Left that became more and more tenuous over time, as both sides grew leery of the prime minister's constantly shifting allegiances.[35] Gorbachev sought to maintain just such a balance in the period following his liberalizing reforms, but the collapsing Soviet economy compressed the time available to him. Ultimately, the country was radicalized to a degree that made a centrist position impossible.

Conclusion

Between 1985 and its demise in 1991 the Soviet Union experienced tremendous changes. The Soviet Communist Party approved reforms that began a democratic transition, and it tolerated the growth of a powerful opposition that would eventually defeat it. By the end of 1990 the Party's Politburo and Central Committee had ceased to play a decisive role. By the summer of 1991 the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.

[35] Mack Smith (fn. 21), 337–47.

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Because the most important steps of this liberalization were approved prior to the activation of popular pressure, and because the Soviet elite had previously shown no great affinity for democratic values, it might seem that we are faced with a contradiction. Why would Soviet rulers choose to vote themselves out of power?

An examination of several cases from Western Europe has suggested an answer. Politicians locked in factional or party conflict sometimes employ a strategy of political liberalization as a means of defeating their opponents and securing their positions, even though they feel no great fondness for democratic participation.

In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and his supporters faced a severe threat, as conservatives strove to block their plans for economic reform. The reformers turned to the strategy of political liberalization, proposing measures designed to remove the opposition from the center of the political arena while safeguarding their own power and position. The successful implementation of these reforms shifted power to the Soviet state and undercut the support of Ligachev and his compatriots.

In Western Europe, Bismarck, Disraeli, and Giolitti were willing to risk the growth of mass opposition in exchange for short-term victory over their opponents. Although they operated under very different political circumstances, Soviet reformers also appear to have discounted future events. Gorbachev may have recognized that the liberalizing elements of perestroika would eventually jeopardize his and his supporters' positions, but it appears that he was willing to take this risk in exchange for the defeat of the conservatives who posed the most immediate threat.

From this perspective, perestroika is no longer a mystery. A proper accounting of the interests and motivations of political actors yields the expectation that a politician's calculations of his immediate political needs will often overcome ideological scruples about popular participation. Because Gorbachev convinced pivotal members of the Soviet elite that his reforms would bring them significant gains in the short term, they supported liberalization. As was the case in Western Europe, even those who are apparently hostile to liberalization can, under the right circumstances, become champions of democracy.

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SOVIET POLITICS AND AFTER
Old and New Concepts

By WILLIAM E. ODOM

THE kaleidoscopic pattern of events in Soviet politics makes analysis of them a hazardous endeavor, but it is imperative to try to interpret the radical change that has come with more than six years of perestroika, punctuated by an abortive coup in August 1991, the recognition of the independence of the former Baltic republics, and the transition from the Soviet Union to a commonwealth of independent states. At the same time, the breakdown of the old political system offers unprecedented opportunities, first, to reassess some of our older analytic concepts and second, to think tentatively about some new approaches.

The totalitarian model essentially dominated Western analysis until the early 1960s, when several new paradigms were proposed. T. H. Rigby's "organizational society,"[1] Alfred Meyer's "USSR, Incorporated" model,[2] and Carl Linden's conflict model[3] were among the first such attempts to reconceptualize Soviet politics. Rigby suggested that political systems can be "traditional" (based on "custom") or "contract" (based on "markets") or "organizational" (based on "command"). And of course, in the developmental process elements of two or all three types may be found in a single polity. The Soviet Union, in his view, "is one of the most highly developed . . . 'organizational' societies." Meyer emphasized the organizational aspect as well, treating the USSR as one big corporation. Both scholars emphasized the continuity of the enormous state role in the economy and society together with the abrupt decline of Stalin's terror. And they were concerned with how power might diffuse within the massive bureaucratic structures. Linden focused exclusively on the changing politics at the top, finding conflict among cliques of leaders that

[1] Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964). This excellent essay still offers useful ways of looking at Soviet politics.

[2] Meyer, "The USSR, Incorporated," in Donald W. Treedgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). Meyer elaborates the concept more fully in *The Soviet Political System* (New York: Random House, 1965).

[3] Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). Linden's excellent monograph, *The Soviet Party-State* (New York: Praeger, 1983), strikes me as somewhat at odds with his effort to develop his "conflict" model. Rather, his insightful treatment of the ideological foundations of the system places him closer to the totalitarian model.

World Politics 45 (October 1992), 66–98

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had been repressed under Stalin. For him, the diffusion of power pattern was from the "one" to the "few."

In the early 1970s H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths applied group theory to the Soviet Union.[4] Unlike the earlier three alternatives, which took a comparative approach but emphasized the unique organizational character of the Soviet system, group theory implicitly shifted attention away from that dominating reality and imputed a Western pluralist pattern of diffusion of power. Somewhat surprisingly, the first three successor models never really took hold in the field, even though they captured much that was central and important in Soviet politics. Equally surprising, group theory did catch on, notwithstanding its many shortcomings in dealing with the Soviet realities.[5]

In the 1980s Skilling offered an appraisal of the results of using group theory and a critique of two additional models for understanding the Soviet system. Darrel P. Hammer's "bureaucratic pluralism" and "corporatism" as applied by Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols III struck Skilling as not very compelling alternatives. At the same time, he was remarkably candid in admitting that group theory "did not succeed in one of its purposes—namely, to contribute to a more comprehensive general theory of group politics," but he nevertheless insisted that it had proved useful in much empirical research. As for the future, he saw little prospect "for an early advance to a more pluralistic society in the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe."[6]

For all the efforts at developing new concepts and approaches for studying Soviet politics, nothing fully replaced the old totalitarian model. Certainly nothing rivaled its dominance, and even in recent years some distinguished scholars had not wholly discarded it. As late as 1987, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr., still found it applicable.[7]

The first part of this essay explains why the totalitarian model has far more analytical utility than its competitors (which is not to deny that the others have yielded insights). At issue is what each emphasizes, uncovers, and encourages us to anticipate about system dynamics. The totalitarian model captures critical features of the system that tend to get pushed aside by other models. Had those features been the central focus for anal-

[4] Skilling and Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[5] For a critique of its limitations, see Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," *World Politics* 28 (July 1976).

[6] Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited," *World Politics* 36 (October 1983), 24–27.

[7] Moore, *Authority and Inequality under Capitalism and Socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 36.

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ysis, scholars would likely have asked more appropriate questions about change and where the system was tending. Moreover, the model could have been supplemented by middle-range theories to help answer those questions.

Second, and equally important, in dismissing the totalitarian model, we lost the basis for measuring change. The alternative models introduced notions of change a priori without empirically establishing them, much less providing reference points for demonstrating the degree of change. Further, they encouraged us to see political development and the emergence of new institutionalization in the Soviet Union when in fact we were witnessing the political decay of totalitarian institutions. The abortive coup in August 1991 revealed precisely this: the absence of political development and the advanced stage of decay.

The latter point leads to the third part of the essay, a consideration of concepts that are appropriate successors to the totalitarian model. The demise of the old system offers the opportunity to bring the field of Soviet studies successfully into the mainstream (if there is one) of comparative politics. Early efforts to achieve this failed because they aspired much too early or were attempted at the wrong level of generality.

Reference Points

For at least three decades we were concerned with change in the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev's reform efforts gave new urgency to that concern. We must have reference points against which to measure change, yet the record of establishing such a basis is poor. Following Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and renunciation of the blood purge in party politics, the generally accepted reference points seemed to be the six defining characteristics of the totalitarian model. Not everyone accepted them, of course, and much of the debate over the past couple of decades included claims that the totalitarian model never really described the Soviet system.[8] As this outright rejection came to be more widely accepted, we found ourselves left without a common basis for discussing either what existed before or what has come to pass more recently. Unless such a reference can be established, any discussion will lack both clarity and cogency.

A macromodel for a political system cannot account for every political action within a state, but it should at least (1) capture the features of critical importance; (2) offer a basis for comparison with other systems;

[8] See the discussion in the *Russian Review* 45 (October 1986), 357–416; and 46 (October 1987), 379–431.

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and (3) account for change.[9] The six defining characteristics offered by Friedrich and Brzezinski certainly identified the most important patterns and institutions of the system. Moreover, unlike some of the later candidates to replace it, the Friedrich-Brzezinski model has empirical referents for these characteristics, that is, institutions, ideas, and processes that can be identified as either extant or absent.[10]

For all its imputed faults, however, the old model measured up fairly well as a broad concept for defining the Soviet political system in its second and third decades. If that can be reasonably demonstrated, it seems fair to take the totalitarian model as a reference point for examining what has changed between then and now. It would then fall to the dissenters to provide a better alternative. Let us review the model against the first of the foregoing three criteria—that it identifies the features of critical importance.

1. The official ideology has been abundantly evident. The outpouring of free expression under glasnost has demonstrated how thoroughly embedded ideological precepts were in Soviet political thought and analysis.
2. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union indisputably existed until very recently. It long proclaimed itself both a revolutionary party and an elite party, the leading sector of society. A great deal is known about its structure and its methods of operation, as well as about how it penetrated and used state administrative organs, the courts, mass organizations, educational institutions, and all other social and economic institutions. Its central role in the system has never been disputed.
3. Terror certainly characterized Soviet politics from the revolution onward. Some have argued that the Great Terror of the 1930s was not all that great,[11] but no one has seriously argued that it was not terror. Some have argued that it essentially disappeared after Stalin, but most Soviet spokesmen today disagree. Certainly, its forms became more subtle, more subdued, and much less intimidating.[12]

[9] Huntington discusses these three features, which are necessary for a model to be "accepted and useful." See Huntington, "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (March 1974), 7.

[10] The literature on the totalitarian model is growing, and the variety of arguments is large. I am sidestepping most of the debate by taking only the Friedrich-Brzezinski variant. The concept has too many authors and too much history to list them all briefly and elaborate them fairly. Proponents who offer strong, commonsense analysis include Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 3:1745–411; Moore (fn. 7), 36ff.; and Pierre Hassner, "Communist Totalitarianism: The Translantic Vagaries of a Concept," *Washington Quarterly* 6 (Fall 1985). Although this selection does injustice to a large number of other scholars, it at least captures important highlights.

[11] See J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Jerry Hough, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 174–78.

[12] Part of the problem with "terror" as an analytical concept is defining it. The authors of the model would surely qualify as terror the fear of incarceration and execution with no

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4. The command economy, created in the course of the First Five-Year Plan, gave state planners unprecedented central control over resources, which allowed them to dictate investment rates and patterns to a degree never seen before. The persistence of the enormous bureaucratic structure required by Soviet central planning was painfully evident during perestroika. Much of the Western optimism about various reform efforts to decentralize the system (such as "Libermanism" in the 1960s) has proved grossly misplaced.

5. The party monopoly of the media was certainly a reality from the late 1920s up to Gorbachev's glasnost policy. Western specialists never disputed the existence of this important institution of control. Rather, they worked to penetrate it, to understand the party's "general line" and its specific lines, and to discern esoteric signals reflecting dissension and conflict in the policy processes.

6. The Party's monopoly of the armed forces and the police was sustained by a vast party apparatus within these institutions, a highly visible and vocal structure dedicated to ensuring party loyalty at all levels, especially within the officer corps. While there has been dispute about the party-military dynamics created by party controls, their existence and purpose was never in question.[13]

Surely the central realities of Soviet politics, if not all the lesser realities, are captured by these six characteristics. They embrace the system's ostensible goals, its institutional and ideological means, and their mutually reinforcing relationships.

As for the second standard, that a model be comparative, this totalitarian pattern has appeared in several other states, namely, the East European members of the Warsaw Pact, China, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Albania, and, to a considerable degree, Yugoslavia. Signs of the emergence of the pattern have appeared elsewhere, for example, in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, and South Yemen. The fit is far from perfect in several of these states, but it is certainly sufficient to make the model an excellent basis for comparison.[14]

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serious judicial process, if one had seen that happen to a significant number of fellow citizens. Fear of losing one's job, career, and status with no recourse might also qualify, but agreement on this definition might not be as wide. I have no solution to this definitional problem beyond a commonsense judgment that fear was more widespread and far more significant for Soviet citizens than for those living under most other political systems; and in some states, fear and terror for some parts of the population may be as severe as it ever was in the Soviet Union. In general, however, the Soviet system seemed to create that climate on a broader scale than did most nontotalitarian forms of dictatorship.

[13] For a debate on this topic, see Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), chaps. 1–3.

[14] Although Giovanni Sartori rejects most attacks on the totalitarian concept, he objects to grouping these six characteristics as a totalitarian "syndrome," noting that some of them are shared by liberal democracies, e.g., control of the armed forces and the police. He does not see the "interconnectedness" necessary to make them a syndrome. See Sartori, *The Theory of*

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Whether the model meets the third standard—that it account for the dynamic behavior of a system—is subject to debate. There is unquestionably a static quality to the way Brzezinski describes it.[15] Cycles of purges repeatedly restore the system's vitality, keeping it in equilibrium. Perhaps more troublesome, the Friedrich-Brzezinski version of totalitarianism seems to leave the leader with only a single, predictable course of choice making. He must act to maximize this power, to resist its diffusion, and to eliminate all challenges to it.

Among the early critics of the model, Robert C. Tucker focused specifically on this problem.[16] According to the model, Khrushchev should never have de-Stalinized. Instead, by renouncing the blood purge, he undercut one of the major defining characteristics of the system and made it easier for political opposition to erode his power. Why did he do it? The model is silent; indeed, according to the model, the question should never have arisen. The answer, however, is fairly clear: political leaders are voluntarists, free to make choices.[17] Dictators especially have a broader latitude of choice than their subordinates and fewer constraints on its exercise. The leader who wins the top position in such a system is certainly free to make choices that will undermine his power—and the system. He may intend that result. Or he may be a poor judge of the potential consequences of his policies and fail to anticipate how they will reduce his power or impair the political system. Khrushchev and Gorbachev apparently fall into the latter category.

The way Friedrich and Brzezinski defined the system does not inherently rule out such system-altering choices, but they did not stress them as a possibility, apparently because they deemed the probability as remarkably low. Both Khrushchev and Gorbachev demonstrated that leadership choice had become one of the more important variables in the system. The implication of this voluntarist element for the totalitarian model is that the system can decay, lose its restorative quality, and per-

Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987), 193–203. As we watch the Soviet Union and the new East European regimes struggle with system change, however, the interconnectedness of the characteristics becomes painfully evident.

[15] Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

[16] Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics* 17 (July 1965).

[17] This assertion, of course, eschews the traditional philosophical debate about determinism and free will. Western political science, however, generally takes as one of its distinguishing philosophical foundations that humans can and do make choices in some "free will" sense; this assumption is essential for the normative side of the discipline. For other disciplines—psychology, sociology, and anthropology—the assumption is much less important. Even Marx assigns a critical role to voluntarism: the working class has to achieve "consciousness" of the role of property ownership so that it will understand why revolution makes sense. Some recent trends in political science, i.e., the use of rational-choice theory, seem destined to revive the old philosophical debate in the guise of "human agency."

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haps even collapse. It does not suggest an evolutionary dynamic, a continuous process leading smoothly to systemic change. On the contrary, it removes the totalitarian system from the continuum that runs from authoritarianism to pluralism and endows it with a uniqueness that distinguishes it from other types of dictatorships.

Another frequent criticism of the model's static quality is less convincing. Presumably, if Stalin had amassed all the power for himself, he essentially destroyed "politics" within the system, politics being choice making below the level of the Politburo about "who gets what, when, and how," to borrow Harold Lasswell's definition.[18] Clearly that is what both Lenin and Stalin sought, but both also understood politics as having a strong voluntarist component, one they tried to constrain with mass ideological training and party discipline. They also knew that such constraints were not sufficient to prevent a gradual diffusion of power within the party and state bureaucracies after power had been centralized. Periodic purges were one mechanism to contain this diffusion of power, to recentralize it to the degree possible.

Far from being devoid of politics, the totalitarian system housed politics in the extreme. Blood purges were highly political. Initiating them and managing them required enormous skill. To be successful, they required cooperation from below—induced, if not voluntary—in identifying deviant behavior among party and state cadres and in rooting it out. The process was inherently messy, and the innocent as well as the guilty suffered mightily. Not surprisingly, cadres at the local level exploited the purges for their own purposes to the extent possible.[19] However stressful and terrifying a purge might be, lower-level cadres were nevertheless soon exercising limited discretion at the expense of the center, and within a few months or years the diffusion of power began once again.[20] In this sense, in its emphasis on terror and the leading role of the party, the totalitarian model captured a central dynamic feature of the system: the extremism of its political life.

Thus, as measured against these three criteria, the model is hardly a

[18] Essentially this is the starting assumption for "social historians" such as Sheila Fitzpatrick, J. Arch Getty, and Roberta T. Manning. See the discussions in the *Russian Review* (fn. 8). These scholars use the dichotomy "from above"/"from below" to study the Stalin period in a way that ridicules the totalitarian model. To a large degree, they have adopted a straw man as an alternative in their effort to make a straw man of the totalitarian model.

[19] Merle Fainsod offers abundant empirical evidence of this local political voluntarism. See Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). Getty (fn. 11) lets a similar impression emerge from his evidence, though his thesis may seem to say otherwise.

[20] For a case study of this kind of bureaucratic diffusion of power and its periodic recentralization, see Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

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failure. No other model comes close to describing adequately the Soviet political system during most of its existence. The earlier alternatives offered by Rigby, Meyer, and Linden did not reject the totalitarian concept so much as they attempted to modify it. Ribgy's "organizational society" and Meyer's "USSR, Incorporated" focused on the extreme bureaucratization of the system, but they tended to de-emphasize the ideology and to be tentative about the dynamics, that is, where the system was headed. Linden's "conflict model" looks less like an alternative model than a modification of the totalitarian view of leadership. He correctly shows that even after Khrushchev was indisputably in charge, conflict continued in the top leadership circles. In retrospect, that was true for Stalin until late in his rule; and he continued to act as if it remained true, anticipating and preempting such competition.

The later alternatives—group theory, institutional pluralism, bureaucratic pluralism, and corporatism—break sharply with totalitarianism. They all imply that a systemic change was occurring, a transformation caused by increasing policy initiatives from below aimed at competition for resources. And they have difficulty finding clear and unambiguous cases to demonstrate this change. Most of them can be better analyzed with concepts from organizational theory. Group theorists in particular have difficulty clarifying both the "group" and the "interest" in specific cases. Darrell Hammer, hard pressed to explain why bureaucratic pluralism is not really group theory, says that it is not "a struggle for power but a struggle for resources."[21] But are not resources the substance of power? Moreover, struggle for resources is at the heart of totalitarianism. Both institutional pluralism and corporatism hold that policy initiative comes more and more from below, and they also assume the ascendancy of law, rules, and constitutionalism, implications wholly unsupported by the events of the Gorbachev period. And although neither deals with the stagnation of the command economy, both assume that a modicum of economic growth can be sustained indefinitely. Where these models capture the central realities of the system, they overlap with totalitarianism, and where they emphasize other things, they neglect central realities.

False and Valid Promises

The most serious flaw of the various alternatives is not that they fail to capture what is central about Soviet politics (although some are very weak in this regard) or that they fail to provide a basis for comparison

[21] Hammer, *The Politics of Oligarchy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 238.

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with other systems. Rather, they err in their characterization of the dynamic character of the system, in the kind of change they promise. Those that introduce the concept of group politics or some notion of pluralism are weakest in this regard.

Jerry Hough, a persistent critic of the totalitarian model, observed: "Had we continued to accept the interpretation of the literature on totalitarianism, our initial assessments of Gorbachev's prospects would have been far more accurate"[22]—a remark that, needless to say, occasioned surprise among many of his readers. His purpose, however, was not to restore the general utility of the model but rather to make the case that Gorbachev had vanquished his opposition and was powerful enough to carry through radical reform. In general, Hough emphasized liberal trends in Soviet politics. With Western liberal democracies at one end of the spectrum and authoritarian systems, including the Soviet Union, at the other, change in the Soviet system would move it in the liberal democratic direction. It may not have moved very far, but it was moving nonetheless. Thus, Hough treated "participation" in Soviet politics as having a great deal in common with participation in Western systems, and the general secretary of the Party and the Central Committee as having a lot in common with a prime minister and a parliament.[23] Concerning the diffusion of power within the system, he uses the term *institutional pluralism* (rather than interest groups), though he would admit that it is not wholly parallel to pluralism in the West.

In 1979 Hough was fairly cautious about the future and recognized the potential for fragmentation among national lines.[24] Nevertheless, he did not rule out a liberal democratic development stemming from the forces of generational change, social change, urbanization, and industrialization.[25] Based on various factors—creeping institutional pluralism in the mid-1960s, his perception of Brezhnev's economic program as a large wealth transfer to the lower-income strata, and analogies he drew with Western participatory democracy and parliamentary rule—Hough expected continuing movement toward the liberal end of the spectrum.[26]

A similar expectation is much stronger in the group approach to So-

[22] Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," *Problems of Communism* 36 (July–August 1987), 21.

[23] Hough (fn. 11), 277–78, 544.

[24] Ibid., 556–76.

[25] See Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980).

[26] To be sure, Hough never made highly specific predictions on this point, and he occasionally provided caveats—especially in the final chapter of *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (fn. 11)—but this was hardly of sufficient weight to balance his optimistic message about liberal trends in Soviet political change.

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viet politics, which held that power was diffusing to groups. Groups compete and constrain each other; deals are cut; decisions are made on how resources are allocated. Rules for this pluralist political process are not formal but become internalized. If this is happening, adherents would say, the system is moving on the spectrum of extremes from the authoritarian pole toward the liberal pole. Unfortunately, such analysis does not give any hint of a discontinuity on the spectrum or a limit beyond which the system cannot evolve. Indeed, the group approach to Soviet politics failed to see that the logical consequence of increasing group activity could be the breakdown of the system.

Models of Soviet politics that emphasize the enduring authoritarian character of the system, such as Hammer's bureaucratic pluralism, may come closer to identifying critical and central aspects of the system, but they too imply the possibility of a liberal development. Because the system is no longer totalitarian, but merely "authoritarian," that is, a specie of the general family of dictatorship that excludes totalitarianism, it must have prospects of liberal development. The period since World War II has witnessed the transformation of several authoritarian systems to liberal democracy, for example, Spain and Portugal. And others, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Chile, show progress in that regard. The change was not accomplished by a system collapse or upheaval but rather was managed with a large degree of institutional continuity.

George Breslauer offers a similar line of analysis. For him, "authority is legitimized power";[27] the removal of terror opened the door to the building of authority and the increase of legitimacy of the rulers. Moreover, the dynamics of this process included a reformist impulse that was checked by limited resources and excessive expectations, a leadership crisis, and another reformist impulse by the next leader to build authority. Breslauer implies that the reformist impulse and the increasing dependency on legitimate authority were pushing the system toward a qualitative change in a liberal direction. His analysis is quite persuasive about the sequence of reform and reaction, but he fails to consider that reforms could undermine the system and thus leaves the liberal promise as the logical inference.

In the first few years of the Gorbachev regime, this promise, implied or explicit in the newer models of Soviet politics, seemed on the verge of realization. Gorbachev had more or less suspended censorship, invited the liberal intelligentsia to participate in perestroika, undercut the Party's power, and introduced free elections. In 1990, however, a number of

[27] Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 3.

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repressive steps were taken, and the reformers lost ground. In 1991 the fecklessness of repressive policies was increasingly apparent, as the system verged on breakdown, prompting a reactionary clique to try to reverse perestroika and save the old order. The immediate aftermath of the abortive August coup witnessed not evolution but the collapse of the old system. This included the breakaway of the Baltic republics, with the other republics soon to follow, the latter retaining a loose commonwealth relationship.

Proponents of the optimistic view of the prospects for liberal development often spoke of the need for more time for authority to reassert itself and carry through liberal reforms.[28] To be sure, political reform takes time, but a generous amount of time has already elapsed—Stalin died almost forty years ago. If pluralism and group politics have been identifiable on a significant scale for nearly four decades, if authority based on legitimacy has been accumulating over that period, if social changes in the education and urbanization have brought the Soviet population into line with liberal democracies of the West, why then was it not a relatively easy matter for Gorbachev to move to liberal democracy? That was what we had been led to expect, and although Gorbachev himself was never so explicit, that is what Western analysts generally intended when they referred to his "success."

Certainly, the scholars in question would argue that they did not specifically predict liberal development. Thus, Hough in his 1979 textbook refuses to predict, and he reviews possible scenarios that capture much of what eventually happened under Gorbachev. Breslauer avoids speculation about the future. Most other scholars subscribing to one or another version of creeping pluralism in the Soviet Union hedged their bets about specific outcomes. But the fact remains, nonetheless: they encouraged the expectation of pluralism, law-based stability, and constraint on the leadership[29] by analysis that implied system transformation through gradual reform. What we witnessed during the abortive August coup suggested little reform and transformation over the past several decades.

Another kind of false promise did not anticipate pluralism in the near future. As Timothy Colton put it, the backlog of problems is serious, but "the survival of the Soviet system is not in question."[30] This was not an imprudent judgment in 1986 when it was made, but the accompanying

[28] See, e.g., Stephen F. Cohen, "Gorbachev the Great," *New York Times*, March 11, 1991, p. A15.

[29] Skilling is the exception. He flatly judged the prospects for such an outcome to be very small.

[30] See Colton, *The Dilemmas of Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 32.

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prediction of "moderate reform" was. Once moderate reform begins, Soviet-type systems seem to become unstable. Imre Nagy discovered this in Hungary in 1956, and Dubcek found it to be true in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Chinese leaders, too, have had to pull back from moderation.

Had Colton based his analysis on the potential dynamics of totalitarianism, he might well have argued compellingly that the system's survival was not at stake. For that to be the case, however, he should have predicted not moderate reform but cadre revitalization, purges, and greater party discipline. Only thus could Gorbachev have slowed the system's decay. Alternatively, the prediction of moderate reform should have been accompanied by greater concern with system breakdown.[31] Alexander Motyl has recently advanced an analysis precisely on this line, arguing that reform endangers multinational totalitarian systems rather than achieving improvements or evolution.[32]

The point here is not to mark scorecards on past predictions. It is to demonstrate that any useful model of Soviet politics has to convey something about the dynamics of the system, the kind of change that is occurring, and where it will lead. Most of the efforts to find successors to the totalitarian model have fared poorly in this respect. Hough was quite right in saying that we would have understood the Gorbachev period better had we stuck with the totalitarian model.

Asking the Right Questions

With Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and the disillusionment with the totalitarian model, many analysts began to ask what new model would make sense. The failure to provide an answer that fully displaced the old model suggests it may not have been the most important or the most analytically promising question. At least two other questions could have yielded more fruitful answers.

First, let us assume that Khrushchev did indeed bring an end to terror. That would mean that one of the six defining features of the model had disappeared but that the other five remained, even if not in the healthiest condition. The most appropriate question should then have been to ask what the dynamics of Soviet politics were within the context of these remaining five.

Textured answers to that question would have required extensive em-

[31] For this line of analysis, see Odom "How Far Can Soviet Reform Go?" *Problems of Communism* 34 (November–December 1987).

[32] Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 64–71.

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pirical research, but some speculative answers come to mind at once. If there were no blood purges and if party cadres were allowed to remain fairly stable (and not shuffled frequently), we should have expected that cliques of local elites would form to defend themselves and their privileges from pressure to meet performance goals dictated by Moscow. Had they not tried that even during the purges? Had they not fought each other for power? Would not diffusion of power be a function of the degree to which they succeeded in forming and maintaining these small cliques? And would that not erode the system's capacity to shift resources dramatically for investment and new programs?

In hindsight, we are much aware of the so-called second economy. We know of regional mafias, of the sale of offices in some regions, of the sale of advanced degrees and many other political, social, and economic goods. We have witnessed a decline in ideological fervor, yet a clinging to ideological precepts and formulas when they justified a desired allocation of values.[33] In other words, what has happened is more or less what we would have anticipated at a general level had we asked the right question.

Actually, a number of scholars implicitly took this analytical approach in a small volume edited by Brzezinski in 1969.[34] The group split on the issue of whether the system would evolve or degenerate and collapse. Robert Conquest, Isaac Don Levine, Giorgio Galli, and Eugene Lyons discounted the possibility of successful evolution in favor of a number of scenarios leading to a system collapse. Boris Meissner, Joseph Clark, and Arrigo Levi offered scenarios for evolution. In his introductory essay, Brzezinski left the way open for a system "transformation"; in responding to his critics at the end, however, he tilted toward system "degeneration" as he considered the special character of the economy and the national minority problem. The central problem addressed in all these analyses is what changes in the totalitarian system would mean for its dynamic behavior. From today's vantage point, a number of them look quite sound in their identification of the important determinants of change precisely because they began with the totalitarian model. They

[33] For firsthand reports on this kind of behavior, see Konstantin Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). See also Jeffry Klugman, *The New Soviet Elite* (New York: Praeger, 1989). His analysis of interview data shows how ambitious Soviet citizens, before 1985, saw the nature of opportunity and the requirements for getting ahead. They understood the role of the Party, the ideology, and the state monopoly of the economy, and they quickly learned how to make connections, to join cliques, and to climb various bureaucratic ladders. They were not particularly fearful of being purged, but they greatly feared being cast into poverty by exclusion from political circles.

[34] Z. K. Brzezinski, ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

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used it both as a reference point for judging change and as a context for explaining the system's dynamic behavior.

A second question should have occurred to us as well, since the absence of the blood purge and terror on a mass scale is likely to allow a diffusion of bureaucratic power to republican and local levels. What "middle-range" theories of organizational and bureaucratic behavior might be used to supplement the totalitarian model, to provide a finer grained understanding of the diffusion process?[35] Actually, Alfred Meyer's "USSR, Incorporated" implicitly invited this line of research, but it was little followed. The same is true of Rigby's "organizational society."

A number of such limited theories were easily applicable to the analysis of much of Soviet political behavior. "Goal displacement," for example, devised by Robert K. Merton, emphasizes that subordinate organizational units slowly give their own goals priority over the larger organization's goals, and subunit goals are accomplished at the expense of larger organizational goals.[36] That has occurred extensively in the Soviet Union. In fact, much of the empirical work that Skilling cites as usefully applying group theory would be better cast in the theory of "goal displacement."

Michel Crozier's theory of bureaucratic behavior as a "vicious circle" has rich applicability to Soviet political life. Because every member of a bureaucracy holds some power (that is, some discretion over outcomes in production or services) and uses it for personal aims, the aggregate organizational behavior is not "rational" in a goal-seeking sense. Rather, the institution's rationality is destroyed by all the individual voluntarism by bureaucrats and employees.[37] Crozier also offers a peculiarly Russian variant of this theory based on Russian cultural patterns. Subordinates, he says, are forced to deceive superiors about results when goals cannot be met with the available resources. Superiors respond by raising the goals even higher. Is this not reminiscent of the politics of party and economic management at local levels in the Soviet Union?

A third analytic concept with considerable potential for the study of Soviet politics emphasizes resources. James Q. Wilson has made the case that to understand the behavior of a political institution, one must know

[35] By "middle-range" theories, I mean what Robert K. Merton defined as "*theories of the middle range*: theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization, and social change." See Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 39.

[36] Ibid., 253–55.

[37] Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

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how it gets its resources.[38] The social democratic parties in Europe have traditionally assessed membership dues. The Democratic Party in the United States (until recent decades) depended on small voluntary contributions from as much of the voting population as possible. Not surprisingly, power is more bureaucratically centralized in European social democratic parties and much less so in the American Democratic Party. The American donors can more easily withhold contributions; power is consequently far more diffused.

The relevance of this proposition to Soviet politics is fundamental. The power of political groups is, not surprisingly, very much a function of the wealth they can amass; as long as most organizations depend on the state plan and budget for resources, power will remain highly centralized. Citizens have little influence on the institution's resource base except as co-opted labor and services. Had the proponents of group theory as applied to Soviet politics been mindful of Wilson's middle-range theory about resources and institutional behavior, they would long ago have abandoned that approach. Most groups in Western liberal democracies have their own private sources of income and do not have to depend on the state budget as their only resource. But in the Soviet Union how would a group have acquired wealth that could be used to oppose or change party policies? It would have had to have been done surreptitiously, which would have tended to limit the size of the group, usually to face-to-face size, a clique, or an informal gang. Group theory is hardly the best hypothesis for analyzing such small groups.

What would have had to occur in the Soviet Union to bring an end to such constraints on the formation of political groups? First, state ownership of property would have had to yield fairly large ground to private ownership. Second, control of the media would have had to decline so that groups could communicate publicly with their members and political leaders. Third, group access to the policy process would have had to have been greater than was traditionally the case. In other words, several of the remaining features of the old system would have had to diminish greatly, to allow a large shift in resource control.

The economic theory of rents has been used to explain some of the corruption that became so rampant during Brezhnev's rule, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus.[39] Its applicability seems especially appropriate in some of the republics in these regions as long as they held on to

[38] Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[39] See Arye L. Hillman and Adi Schnytzer, "Illegal Economic Activities and Purges in a Soviet-Type Economy: A Rent-Seeking Perspective," *International Review of Law and Economics* 6 (1986).

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the old economic and residual state structures for controlling resources. Control and sale of positions for periodic payments of tribute and services were made possible by the command economy and party control over it. Moreover, rent theory has the virtue of sharing Wilson's focus on the acquisition of resources. Additionally, it tends to make us see not modern interest groups evolving in old regional party organizations but a throwback to the Russian medieval principle of *Kormlenie*, that is, letting a centrally appointed official rule a province for a time to enrich himself through tax and rent collections and any other abuse of local power he could devise.

The main point in this line of questioning should now be clear. Indeed, the old totalitarian model could have been richly supplemented by numerous "theories of the middle range." Most of them tend to deal head-on with a lot of the criticisms of the totalitarian model. They show how power was diffused. They help anticipate how individuals at various levels of the state and party bureaucracy were most likely to exercise their limited discretionary power. They explain a lot of the deviant behavior that blossomed during the era of "stagnation." Rather than announcing that the totalitarian model had not explained such microbehavior and declaring it invalid, as group theorists, proponents of variations of pluralism, and social historians have done, we could have held much of the macro model's perspective and at the same time explained more fully much of the microbehavior either as consistent with it or slowly eroding its applicability.

Measuring Change under Gorbachev

As we mentioned above, assessing change requires reference points. What existed before? What is the nature of the difference, qualitative or quantitative? Proponents of pluralist change have referred to the totalitarian model in a special way as their reference point, either declaring that it was never useful for analyzing Soviet politics or limiting its utility to the Stalin period only and denying it any continuing validity afterward.

A more compelling approach, however, would be to take the six characteristics and ask how each changed or eroded, a process that should yield an empirically based assessment of both the degree and the kinds of change. If change had become systemic, obviously a new set of references would be needed, but until that happened, the totalitarian model retained utility as a yardstick for the study of Soviet politics. Let us,

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therefore, take a rough measurement of how things stood in the first half of 1991, before the August coup.

Ideology

By the late 1960s it was popular among scholars to return from a visit to the Soviet Union and report that their Soviet interlocutors were denying their old ideological convictions. Marxism was dying in the Soviet Union, these Soviet citizens declared. The only true Marxists were in the West!

Notwithstanding these professions of a loss of faith, the Soviet official press sounded all the more orthodox. The persistence of the ideological precepts for analyzing foreign affairs and military issues was especially obvious. While some samizdat pieces in the 1970s began to reflect envy of Western market economics, the debates in the official economic journals showed little such inclination despite their criticism of many aspects of Soviet central planning. In military affairs ideological orthodoxy was the enthusiastic rule. The ideology defined the "threat" against which the Soviet armed forces were built and sized. And the concept of the international class struggle, a central element of the "peaceful coexistence" formula, viewed most of the world as hostile. The ideology also served to make the nationality problem look manageable, even yielding to a solution in *sblizhenie* (rapprochement) and *sliyanie* (merging) of the Soviet peoples. It justified Moscow's rule over non-Russian peoples. "Internationalism" was perhaps more important for Soviet domestic politics than for policy toward foreign communist parties because the Soviet Union was a community of nations denied independence based on an ideological justification.

No doubt, a growing cynicism about the ideology had advanced quite far by 1985. As Vladimir Shlapentokh has pointed out, however, Soviet citizens had learned to manage two levels of consciousness—one private and realistic, one public and ideological—without excessive cognitive dissonance.[40] The official ideology was steadily losing ground in the private citizen's life, but the leadership found it necessary to sustain the basic ideological tenets in order to legitimize formally the regime's power.

Overall, the glasnost period has shown us not that the ideology was dead but rather the ways in which it had become internalized and how important it remained for the system. The reformers' attack on the ide-

[40] Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 18–23.

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ology dealt it a death blow, but one has to be struck by its persistence up through the August coup attempt.

Gorbachev, of course, introduced radical revisions in the ideology. None was more shattering for the old belief structure than the invention of "humankind interests," giving them the highest priority, and relegating "class struggle" to trivial significance in the present epoch. Had the ideology been dead, as many scholars assumed, this revision would have occasioned little reaction, little objection. In fact, the leadership in the military was stunned. Senior officers struggled to interpret the revisions so that class struggle was maintained.[41] Gorbachev's former Politburo colleague, Yegor Ligachev, observed publicly that the notion of "humankind interests" was confusing communists at home and abroad.[42] Glasnost had admittedly seriously undermined much of the remaining foundation of the ideology by the summer of 1991, but voices were still heard in the struggle to return to something like ideological orthodoxy. The Main Political Administration in the Armed Forces, having escaped dissolution by the Twenty-eighth Party Congress in June 1990, was especially vigorous in trying to restore mainline orthodoxy.

The Party

Until its formal dissolution after the coup's failure, the Party remained the key institution of rule. At the local level party committees controlled housing, food, resources, economic firms, and collective farms. Open struggle against that control had made progress, of course, especially in some of the non-Russian republics, and Yeltsin's banning of party cells in Russia probably helped inspire the coup attempt in August.

Gorbachev began his tenure as general secretary with what appeared to be a campaign to revitalize the Party, to shake it from "stagnation," and to make it carry through perestroika—a vaguely defined process and goal. In some ways his actions were highly traditional. He carried out the largest turnover of cadres in the party, state, and military since Stalin's purges of the 1930s.[43] In 1989 he began to neutralize, even dismantle,

[41] See, e.g., Major General N. Tabunov, "Dialektik klassogo i obshchechelovetskogo," *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil* 8 (1989). Tabunov struggled to discover a "dialectic" between class and humankind interests that salvages the international class struggle.

[42] *Pravda*, August 6, 1988.

[43] See Dawn Mann, "First Secretaries of Krai and Oblast Party Committees," *RL Report on the USSR* 1, no. 41 (October 13, 1989). For the turnover in the senior military ranks, see Linda Brewer, "The Soviet Military Elite under Gorbachev" (Unpublished paper, the Air Force Intelligence Agency, August 22, 1989). Virtually the entire high command of the military down to the army and division levels was changed in a couple of years. Of a total of 155 krai and oblast party secretaries, Mann finds all but 23 changed. The change in central committee membership in Gorbachev's first years was greater than at any other time since 1961.

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much of the Central Committee secretariat apparatus, and essentially he took policy-making away from the Politburo. At the Twenty-eighth Party Congress in 1990 calls were made for a rebuilding of the central apparatus, and in the months that followed, party conservatives held ground but regained very little.

Hough has been on the mark in assessing Gorbachev's mastery of the party center. Superficially, Gorbachev matched Stalin in manipulating his opposition, purging it, and anticipating its regrouping; a closer look, however, reveals a critical difference. Stalin's purges led to executions and fanatic professions of ideology, orthodoxy, and commitment. Gorbachev's purges led to mere reassignment of cadres and ideological confusion. Stalin purged the Party to strengthen its responsiveness and adherence to the ideology. Gorbachev's purges made it less responsive by failing to provide clear ideological direction and purpose. One ominous result was that some party leaders in the republics went over to the national secessionist movements.

Thus, the Party had been weakened, but no new institutions had emerged to assume its "prefecture" role in integrating all government functions at the regional level. The exception, of course, was in those republics where national movements began to rival the Party for political authority—in Lithuania and Georgia, for example—but they still lacked the administrative apparatus to replace it. Where they tried to use the local state structures, the Party and the police fought them with mixed success.

At the center, the plethora of new parties in the Supreme Soviet failed to yield an effective multiparty system because none of them had the resources or the organization, particularly in the republics and oblasts, to challenge effectively the Communist Party's dominance.[44] To use Huntington's terms, six years of perestroika, it seems, produced fairly rapid "political decay" in the party but failed to achieve effective "political development" of new political institutions. At the republican level, the picture was different in some places because a modicum of "political development" had been achieved.[45]

[44] Vera Tolz offers the first effort to analyze the proliferation of new parties. She concludes that "it is more likely that outbreaks of popular discontent will occur than that there will be gradual transformation of the country into a democratic, multiparty state"; see Tolz, *The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 93.

[45] Boris Kagarlitsky offers an eyewitness account of efforts to organize political movements on an all-Union basis, the obstacles they faced, and the contrasting organizational strength of those in some republics. See Kagarlitsky, *Farewell Perestroika: A Soviet Chronicle* (New York: Verso, 1990).

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Terror

Subtle forms of psychological and even physical intimidation persisted up until the demise of the Soviet Union; in allowing many Soviet citizens to speak openly about terror, glasnost obviated much of the argument that it was a thing of the past. Nonetheless, by the standards of the totalitarian model, this feature of the system was the most eroded. While dissident intellectuals, religious minorities, and a few other groups suffered from severe repression under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, party members did not. And the result, as noted earlier, was a slow diffusion of bureaucratic power at the expense of the Politburo and the Secretariat.

Monopoly of the Media

This feature of the system remained in good repair right up to the period of glasnost. The degree of self-censorship and party discipline among the media elites was conspicuous on a couple of occasions during Gorbachev's first four years. The media reaction to the attempted crackdown in Lithuania in January 1991, however, showed that the liberal media leaders had lost their fear and were prepared to resist reassertion of the party's monopoly.

At the same time the old censorship bureaucracy remained in place. It continued to apply guidelines governing military secrecy but with only intermittent and inconsistent political guidance.[46] A multifaceted campaign to regain at least some control over the media was conducted throughout most of 1990 and into early 1991. This involved interference in a number of areas: personnel appointments, delivery of supplies of paper, television programming, and mail delivery of periodicals. Some of these developments may not have been intentional but were merely the result of growing disorder throughout the country. In the final event the campaign failed, and Yeltsin's Russian government played a key role in helping editors and television producers evade encroachments by registering them officially when the central government would not.[47]

In a critical sense perestroika marked the rapid destruction of the Party's monopoly of the media—without which the remaining features of

[46] See *Izvestiia*, October 9, 1990, for a report on GLAVLIT (the censorship bureau) and its list of topics to be censored.

[47] Throughout his personal chronicle of political developments, Kagarlitsky (fn. 45) offers examples of officially guided media attention and deliberate neglect of various political groups to shape both domestic and foreign perceptions. For considerable detail on the politics of media controls, see an unpublished paper by Bradley Peniston, "Gorbachev, *Glasnost*, and GLAVLIT: The Persistence of Controls in the Soviet Media" (New Haven: SEES, Yale University, April 15, 1991).

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totalitarianism were rendered vulnerable to attack and eventual dismemberment. The reasonably free media stimulated public outrage against the military and the KGB, the Party, and the economic apparatus.

Monopoly of the Economy

Of the six characteristics of the totalitarian model, monopoly of the economy seems to be the most critical for systemic change. As long as the state effectively owns and controls most property, the means for what Robert Dahl calls "political contestation" remain limited.[48] For this reason the emergence of several new parties in the Supreme Soviet was a misleading index of the degree of pluralism in the system before the August coup. These parties had extremely limited resources, and even a large membership could not supply the funds necessary to sustain a countrywide organization. It takes more than free elections to win power in a democratic system. It also requires capital and the freedom to spend it for property, for television and newspaper coverage, and for salaries for party officials.

The meager progress toward legalization of private property, market pricing, and a legal system able to handle the civil litigation necessary in a market economy indicates how persistent this feature of the Soviet system had been. Its durability was not just a result of strong party control. Rather, it reflected a most understandable reluctance to accept the social consequences of a transition to a market system. Massive unemployment and the lack of management know-how make such a change frightening for most people, especially for those with reasonably good positions in the old system.

Although the military-industrial sector was the most intransigent part of the old planned economy, Western scholarship has been surprisingly neglectful of its central role. Not only was its size grossly underestimated,[49] but the military rationale that underlay the central planning system from its inception was basically overlooked. Some of the liberal reformers rightly insisted that no serious economic reform was possible without the destruction of the Military Industrial Commission and its vast network of ministries and firms.[50]

With Gorbachev's reluctance to implement the Shatalin plan to introduce market reforms in the fall of 1990, all serious efforts at systemic

[48] For elaboration of "contestation," see Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

[49] For essays that demonstrate how serious this error has been, see Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds., *The Impoverished Empire* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990).

[50] This case is vigorously advanced by A. Kireyev, "Konversiia v sovetskom izmerenii," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* 4 (1990).

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economic reform came to a standstill. Nonetheless, change did occur. Cooperatives captured about 1 percent of the national income in 1988,[51] but far more important has been the drift of control from the central planning apparatus to republican authorities and factory managers. The 1987 economic law on the firm gave managers discretion over part of their production capacity, and some used it and sought out nongovernment markets. The impact on the central planning system has been deleterious. Another step toward destruction of the system occurred when Gorbachev appointed a commission to try to define "economic sovereignty" for the republics as a gambit to deflect their demand for "political sovereignty." The republics seized the opportunity to wrest more control over economic affairs from Moscow.[52] Yeltsin's success in getting control of most of the coal mines in the RSFSR transferred from the Union to the republic further advanced this trend. Meanwhile, in the first part of 1991 only 60 percent of the centrally directed contracts among state firms had been fulfilled, an ominous sign of deterioration in the command economic system.[53]

At the time of the August coup attempt, much of the old economic structure was still extant, effectively blocking efforts at directed reform. Ownership of property was still an open issue. Central planning was still in practice, but both the willingness and the capacity of firms to follow it had significantly declined. In the ensuing chaos, cooperatives made very modest progress, and many firms tried to adjust to economic realities while dealing with formal economic direction. Here, as in most other aspects of perestroika, institutional decay was progressing rapidly, but institutional development was hardly adequate to fill vacated roles in the economy.

If anything distinguished the Soviet dictatorship qualitatively from other forms of authoritarianism, it was the command economy. To argue that the Soviet system after Stalin evolved to a more traditional form of authoritarianism—to put it in the same category as Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, or Chiang Kai-Shek's Taiwan—is to ignore one of its key features. Most of the alternatives to the totalitarian model simply failed to take account of the command economy and what it implied

[51] John Tedstrom reports this figure for 1988 and also a continuing increase in 1989. It was probably larger in 1990 and 1991. See Tedstrom, "The Soviet Cooperative Movement: An Update," *Report on the USSR* 1, no. 41 (1989), 3–5.

[52] Joseph C. Brandt, "Economic Reform and Soviet Nationality," *Telos*, no. 84 (Summer 1990).

[53] For this point specifically and for an insightful analysis of the forces of change in the Soviet economy, see Anders Aslund, "Prospects for Economic Reform in the USSR" (Paper presented at the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991).

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about system change—again, Meyer's "USSR, Incorporated" is an exception. Only the totalitarian model emphasized it adequately along with its ideological basis and the concomitant commitment to an international class struggle that justified military priority within the command economy. These characteristics of the system distinguished it qualitatively from other systems, and they did not disappear with de-Stalinization. Brezhnev actually reinforced them.

Political Control of the Military and the Police

Party controls in the military and the police were not challenged early in the perestroika years, but their traditional discipline began to erode. By 1989, however, the Main Political Administration in the armed forces was under public attack, and during the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, it came close to being abolished. Instead, the military political organs accepted a decree to be reformed, changed to purely "state" institutions from party institutions. In the event, however, the reform proved largely cosmetic, and during the year after the congress, they were struggling for a political revitalization.[54]

Notwithstanding the persistence of the party control system, the Soviet military experienced a dramatic erosion in morale and discipline, one that accelerated in late 1988 and became a matter of wide public debate in 1989 and 1990.[55] Popular disaffection with the military, especially over brutal hazing of first-year soldiers and the lack of housing and schools for officers and their families returning from Eastern Europe, created unprecedented morale problems. These problems took on a national minority cast when the republics in the Baltics and the Caucasus permitted open resistance to military conscription. In light of the increasing unreliability of military units, Gorbachev and his ministers of internal affairs took measures to create new police organizations for controlling public demonstrations, but they proved too little and too late. By the time of the coup the poor morale in the lower ranks and the confusion in the higher ranks left both the police and the military incapable of restoring the party dictatorship.

An important point about party-military relations in the old system is worth underscoring. Some analysts have insisted that the military, if denied the lion's share of the economy's output, would pose a serious control problem for the Party.[56] Yet Gorbachev was able to impose signifi-

[54] See *RFE/RL Daily Report* 170 (September 9, 1990); 183 (September 25, 1990); and 188 (October 2, 1990).

[55] See Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1990).

[56] See Herspring and Volgyes (fn. 13), especially the chapters by Kolkowicz and Colton.

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cant military reductions on the Ministry of Defense. To the degree the military, that is, the senior officers, became politically more active during perestroika, it was as Communist Party members, defending the old system, not opposing it. A few senior officers stand out as exceptions. Colonel Generals Volkogonov and Kobets, for example, joined Yeltsin in supporting Russia vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The military coup anticipated by many observers was never a threat because the congruence between party and military values in the Soviet system was so great. Again, right up to the crisis in August 1991 the apex of the old military and police feature of the totalitarian system remained stable. It did not evolve in the post-Stalin decades. It simply rotted from the bottom up.

What does this review tell us about overall change in the Soviet system? First, it shows a serious degree of erosion, leading toward a general political collapse. Second, it helps explain why evolution toward a pluralist system did not occur and create institutions to replace the old structures. The command economy and the residual strength of the party structure made it impossible for power to diffuse to opposition parties on a significant scale. The diffusion of power was largely to the republics, to various informal institutions in the "second economy," and to the media. To the extent they had a political goal, it was the destruction of the old system. Yet only the republics were in a position to replace it. Finally, this review reveals the remarkable persistence of many of the key aspects of the totalitarian institutions.

Systemic versus Non-systemic Change

As of spring 1992 the Soviet Union has been formally abolished as a political entity, and the republics have become independent states. All but the Baltic republics have retained association within the Commonwealth of Independent States, which has its offices in Minsk. To all appearances, it will be merely a transitory institution. While the CIS still has the old Soviet armed forces under its formal authority, the reality appears to be the slow but sure breakup of the Soviet military into republican armed forces. Because the commonwealth has no way to extract taxes from the republics that they do not wish to pay, it has no assured public sector budget to spend. Thus, it can hardly govern. Small civil wars in some of the republics wax and wane, and larger ones are not to be excluded, but for the present—1992—a psychological exhaustion seems to characterize the populace in the Slavic republics, making major military action unlikely. That could change, however, and Russia could eventually revive its old imperial instinct, although it seems improbable.

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Let us set aside interrepublican relations and keep our focus on domestic politics. It is futile to try to anticipate precisely what road political change will follow within the new states, but it is possible to identify some structural realities that will constrain the choice of routes. Systemic change seems inexorable, but history can play tricks on us. Let us, therefore, explore what systemic change entails.

The matrix in Figure 1 puts the problem in graphic form. The horizontal rows indicate two dimensions of change, political and economic, and the vertical columns indicate two kinds of change, system revitalization and systemic change. Traditionally the old Soviet system managed political revitalization by circulation and renewal of elites through purges. While they always met with mixed success, they did keep the diffusion of power from threatening stability.

Economic revitalization has been entangled with political revitalization. Reorganization through restructuring of central planning tasks and implementation tasks has traditionally been heralded as necessary for improving economic performance. In fact, it has also involved the circulation of elites and factional struggles at the party center. Khrushchev's economic reorganization in 1957 is a conspicuous example. In reality, economic reforms yielded little or no economic improvement. Rather, the pattern has been alternations between the territorial and the production principles of control mixed with schemes for changing firm managers' incentive structures.

The matrix cells in the second column show the kind of political and

	System Revitalization	Systemic Change
Political	circulation of elites through purge	expansion of political participation by competitive elections and policy influence access
Economic	reorganization, with retention of central control over ownership, prices, and production	decentralization of authority over economic resources, private property, and the creation of a competitive market for price formation

FIGURE 1
POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE

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economic change that must occur for a shift to liberal democracy. The political franchise would have to be widened, allowing for a much broader base of political participation. Genuine economic decentralization must include a considerable degree of private ownership of the means of production and a competitive market that yields "scarcity prices" as information for investment decisions, production, and sales.

Suppose there is only political change or only economic change. What would that imply for the changed nature of the system? Would it mean that change is systemic? In the sense of destroying the old totalitarian system, the answer has to be yes. But it also means that the outcome could be either an authoritarian system coupled with a market economy or a democratic political system coupled with a planned economy. We have many examples of authoritarian systems with market economies, and given the experiences of South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and others, that would be an attractive outcome in some regards, especially because the resulting system would have prospects for further development toward democracy. Moreover, several Soviet observers advocated precisely this approach for perestroika, citing such examples.[57] As Charles Lindblom has pointed out, we have no examples of liberal democracies without market economies.[58] It would be an unprecedented outcome, not one we should expect.

Neither of these outcomes was possible for Gorbachev to achieve, and the reason is found in the Soviet nationality problem. A democratic system with a planned economy has inherent problems of its own, but in the Soviet Union the expanded political franchise opened the door to national secession movements. Given the chance to vote, non-Russians tended to vote to secede. The secessionist idea caught hold even in Russia, especially in Yeltsin's circle, where a willingness to let the republics go their own way distinguished Yeltsin's policies from those of all other ethnic Russian political leaders, particularly Gorbachev. Whether this policy will persist is an open question, very critical for future developments.

The alternative, moving to a market economy under a strong authoritarian Soviet leadership, was equally unviable. The increase in control over their economies strengthened the republics in their struggle for political independence. As property shifted to private ownership, the central government's capacity to extract and reallocate resources to ensure central control would decline. The diffusion of economic power would

[57] See Vladimir Sokolov, "Reflections on the Variants of Our Immediate Future: To a Market Economy under the Cover of the Army?" *Literaturnaya gazeta* 12 (September 1990).
[58] Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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surely carry with it a diffusion of political power, giving the republics the means to secede.

We simply have no examples of liberal empires. Some might point to the British Empire as the exception, but it was British liberalism carried to the colonies that produced separatist leaders like Washington, Jefferson, Gandhi, and others. Similarly, perestroika as a program of political liberalization implied the breakup of the Soviet Union. For Gorbachev to "succeed" in the sense of keeping the Union together under a nonauthoritarian government and with a market economy was an oxymoronic expectation.

Priority and Sequence for Change

It is one thing to look at the matrix in Figure 1 and think through the structure of the problem of systemic change. It is another to develop a strategy of sequence for achieving change. The matrix gives some hints about what will not work, but it says little about how to move to what will work.

In retrospect, it seems doubtful that Gorbachev had a clear strategy for reform. He moved first on the economic front and was stymied. Next he turned to political reform. In that struggle he widened the political franchise first in the Party, then in the Soviet legislative structure to unseat party officials he could not purge. This left him with less and less power to execute new policies—thus the war of decrees between the president of the Soviet Union and the republics.

The core of the totalitarian system—the command economy—simply proved beyond his capacity to change. Yet he had dealt it a death blow, although apparently inadvertently. He allowed a political context to arise in which the national republics took more and more power and in which adequate administrative discipline to operate the command economy ebbed away. In a real sense, then, Gorbachev was a revolutionary, not a reformer: he went far in destroying the old system but had virtually no success in building a new one. Given the nature of the old system, this was the only alternative to restoring it.

There has been much debate about priority and sequence in Gorbachev's programs. The "might have beens" are useful to contemplate, but given the nature of the totalitarian state, even in a highly eroded condition, and given the multinational character of the specific Soviet case, evolution through clever sequences was just not in the cards. For a national totalitarian state, say, Poland, one might make another case, but even in those instances there seems to be a boundary beyond which evo-

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lution does not take it. If there is a lesson about sequence, it is that the political must precede the economic. That occurred in Poland, and it is occurring in the territory of the old Soviet Union. Gorbachev faced severe economic problems that could not be dealt with until the political crisis was resolved. Under whose laws was private property to be registered, for instance—the Soviet Union's or the republics'?

Concepts for the Study of Post-Soviet Politics

Does the collapse of the Soviet system mean that we can usefully discard the old totalitarian model? Yes, but not immediately. Some of the successor republics may try to keep the old institutions for a time. And in many parts of the country, internalized beliefs from the ideology, especially about socialism, private property, and profit making, will play a significant role. Police methods will not change overnight, nor will deeply ingrained concepts about the role of law. Perhaps most important, how quickly will the old command economy be dismembered? As long as parts of it exist, we shall be dealing with vestiges of totalitarian institutions. The greatest utility of the model in this regard is not in its description of the successor systems. It is rather in understanding what they are overcoming, what they carry as legacies. The legacies of Stalin's rule will not disappear at once, and without a grasp of them, analyzing future political behavior will be difficult for Western scholars.

This issue of what new or different concepts should be taken to the study of the successor systems—and the plural is used here on the presumption that at least some of the republics, if not all, will not come back under Moscow's rule soon, thus leaving several political systems on the former territory of the Soviet Union—is abruptly upon us. The field of Soviet politics has long aspired to use concepts from the mainstream of political science, and at last a valid opportunity has arrived. Aspiring too early was probably a mistake, as the various successor models to totalitarianism demonstrate. Aspiring quite late is not an incapacitating handicap if we pick one or two of the wandering tribes of political science and go back to traditional questions.

The "political development" tribe strikes me as the proper choice, although it has become passé in some circles, and the appropriate questions are the traditional ones: how democracies and dictatorships come to be, what institutions make them stable, and how they change. The collapse of the Soviet system presents us with a set of new states that are facing many of the questions that political development theorists have been trying to answer about other countries since the 1950s. Actually, a political

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development approach to Soviet politics is not new. The totalitarian model itself is a political development model, and the Marxist-Leninist variant is treated in some of the political development literature, specifically, by Samuel Huntington in his effort to explain political stability.[59] T. H. Rigby turned to a modernization and political development viewpoint three decades ago when it was still quite new, and the resulting analysis stands up to critical review even today.[60] Both Huntington and Rigby focused on political stability and political change. Huntington, to be sure, was also concerned with democracy, but political order was his central focus. Today all three issues are on the agenda—political change, political order, and the creation of democratic systems. The collapse of the old totalitarian institutions has at last created some degree of "liberal promise" in the politics of the successor states to the Soviet Union, but the obstacles remain enormous.

To make the case more specifically, if we are to judge accurately the chances for liberal democracy in any of the successor states—assuming civil war does not interrupt the process—we need to have a better idea of how democracies emerge. The political development literature offers several patterns for such a transformation. Dankwart Rustow, for example, describes the long linear sequence observed in northern Europe.[61] State boundaries were reasonably well established early in the sequence but not without a lot of warfare. For many decades thereafter competitors for rulership fought bitterly, engaging in civil wars, coups, and other forms of violence. After a long time, exhausted and tired of this way of resolving the competition, they agreed among themselves on rules for choosing a leader. Yet the rules were not internalized at once. Two or more decades were required for the rules to gain the full status of law, of a constitutional basis.

This sequence suggests for the successor states to the Soviet Union that defining boundaries on national lines will have to precede democracy. Multinational democracies are difficult to build. Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada come to mind, and the latter two are still struggling with ethnic divisions. Rustow's analysis suggests that liberal democracy in the old Soviet Union was never a serious option. Rather, the breakup into

[59] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) is perhaps the best example. More recently, Philip G. Roeder has criticized Huntington's approach but has remained in the political development paradigm of analysis. See Roeder, "Modernization and Participation in the Leninist Development Model," *American Political Science Review* 83 (September 1989).

[60] Rigby (fn. 1).

[61] Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970).

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national states has been a precondition for democracy, although it by no means assures it. It merely removes a serious obstacle to it.

The long linear sequence, to be sure, is not the only road to democracy. Huntington identifies two others—the "dialectical" path marked by an "urban breakthrough" based on a strong middle class with a market economy, and the "cyclical" pattern of a shift to democracy followed sometime later by a relapse to dictatorship, a cycle often repeated within one state.[62] Robert Dahl points out a "free farmer" path, as observed in the United States, New Zealand, and Norway, in which democracy preceded urbanization and industrialization.[63] It should be noted, however, that these paths to democracy apply principally to states where issues of self-determination and of borders have for the most part been settled.

The relationship between democracy and economics has also been a subject of considerable investigation. Over three decades ago Seymour Martin Lipset noticed the positive correlation between democracy and economic growth.[64] Lindblom points out that all liberal democracies have private property and large market sectors in their economies.[65] John Freeman has examined the connections between democratic government and predominantly market economies and mixed economies.[66] The Marxists, of course, had a clear theory about the relationship between private property and liberal democracy, and both Lenin and Stalin understood that peasant ownership of land posed a threat to the Soviet dictatorship. Much of the political development literature would suggest that reversing the situation—introducing private property—is essential for liberal constitutional development to succeed in the new political systems.[67]

To be sure, conditions in the territories of the old Soviet Union differ significantly from conditions in the states that provide the basis for much of the political development theory. Equally important, conditions vary widely among the republics, with the contrasts being most sharply drawn

[62] Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984).

[63] Dahl (fn. 48).

[64] Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 27–63.

[65] Lindblom (fn. 58), 162–69.

[66] Freeman, *Democracy and Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[67] For reasons of space, I do not spell out an important distinction between "liberal" and "democracy." Sartori (fn. 14) states it succinctly: "We cannot speak of political freedom without referring to liberalism—liberalism, I insist, not democracy" (p. 309). The diffusion of power through private property has been most important for liberalism, that is, the defense of individual rights. It by no means ensures it, but liberalism has preceded the broadening of the democratic political franchise in most Western liberal democracies, and the concern with rights has underpinned constitutionalism far more predominantly than concern for the right of democratic majorities to decide "who gets what, when, and how."

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between the republics of Central Asia and those of the Baltic. At the same time, they all share the unique problem of making a transition from the old command economy to new economic patterns, a problem development theorists have never examined. Applying concepts from political development theory to these new cases will therefore require great care in selection and adaptation to ensure their conceptual appropriateness and to avoid serious category mistakes.

For example, Jerry Hough,[68] Moshe Lewin,[69] and others accurately noted the enormous change in social structure in the Soviet Union, and they have argued that it portended liberal political development. The higher levels of literacy, the much larger urban population, and the patterns of industrial life were strong evidence in this regard, but have they created a "middle class" of the kind Hough insists? Similar change in social structure in Japan and Germany several decades earlier did not produce liberal results. Middle-class government and party bureaucrats do not always share the political values of middle class private business owners. The problem here is classification both in the proper categories and in causation—what actually causes a liberal political development.

A great deal more than mere social change is involved in political change. Rates of social mobilization, institutions, and leadership are equally, perhaps more important, factors. As we address them, we are likely to be concerned first of all with institutions, particularly state institutions. Indeed, it has become fashionable of late to rediscover the state,[70] but some political development theorists never let it slip from their view, and thus their work will be of key importance for following politics in the new states of the old Soviet Union. Huntington's work of over two decades ago marked a major shift in the field by focusing on institutions, their decay and their development, the "degree" of government as a determinant of political stability, and the role of leaders as both revolutionaries and reformers in determining the course of political change.[71] Again, his work points to some promising directions for the Soviet field, not least because he tried to embrace the Soviet case in his larger developmental scheme. Many of his illustrious peers and also

[68] Hough (fn. 25).

[69] Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989).

[70] See, e.g., Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[71] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Huntington has his critics concerning the applicability of some of his concepts to the Soviet political system. Roeder (fn. 59) challenges Huntington by distinguishing between institutionalized "participation" (which Huntington's "civic" class of systems involves) and institutionalized "coproduction" (which Roeder sees as the Soviet reality).

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younger scholars since the early 1970s have much to offer as well. Joel Migdal, for example, has advanced an explanation for why most Third World states are weak, and much of his analysis will probably be relevant to the successor regimes in the Soviet Union.[72]

The concept of "political culture" was suggested as useful for the study of Soviet politics nearly two decades ago, by Robert C. Tucker.[73] The argument is still valid, but today it must deal not with Soviet political culture but rather with the several political cultures of the various successor states. Lack of access for gathering survey data limited the application of this concept in the past, a constraint that scholars may no longer face today.

The possibilities are quite broad, and the suggestions made here are tentative, meant to demonstrate only that there is no dearth of concepts for new approaches to analysis. This is not, however, to advocate planting just any flower from political development theory and other subfields of political science. Some of those flowers are inherently more suitable than others, some are faulty, and some are more appropriate to the post-Soviet landscape than are others. Moreover, these new cases, with their unique circumstances, will surely require conceptual innovations. For example, the kind of deinstitutionalization required of Soviet-type systems in both the political and the economic spheres is unprecedented. No less novel is the mix of high levels of literacy and urbanization with low levels of income. In a word, the old Soviet region is still unique in certain respects.

Conclusion

Looking back on the field of Soviet studies, one has to be impressed with the scholarship of the 1950s and early 1960s. The totalitarian model, for all its faults, kept the focus on the central and unique features of the system. The more prolific scholarship of the following decades certainly yielded a great deal of empirical data about Soviet politics, but much of it lacked the solid conceptual basis of the earlier work. The efforts to find a successor paradigm introduced two serious problems. While they emphasized change in the system, they tended to be ambiguous about the reference points for measuring change. That ambiguity made it easier to mistake the direction of change as evolution toward a liberal sys-

[72] Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capacities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[73] Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Societies," *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (June 1973).

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tem than to recognize that the old system had to collapse before such a liberal development could become a serious possibility. Political decay of the old system was mistaken for political development toward a new system. Admittedly, a liberal development was not always explicitly asserted, and several scholars have never been optimistic about that prospect. But even they have frequently mistaken political decay for political development.

Having witnessed the collapse of the old system, we can now more easily see why a successor model never captured the field. There was no new system to model, and the old system did not stand on a continuous spectrum of possibilities ranging from authoritarian to liberal democratic. It stood apart, preventing the emergence of a new system while it decayed, unlike other types of dictatorship which may allow new and more effective institutions to emerge slowly to a point where the transition to a new and stable successor system is relatively easy.

In all events, the field is now free to return to much of the mainstream theory in political science. At the same time, the old legacies and the unique patterns of change in the successor states will give the field a few distinctive peculiarities.

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FISCAL REFORM AND THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LOCAL STATE CORPORATISM IN CHINA

By JEAN C. OI*

WHILE clearly lagging behind the Eastern bloc countries and the former Soviet Union in political reform, China is arguably the most successful of the socialist states in implementing economic reform. Real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 10.4 percent from 1980 to 1988 compared with only 6.4 percent during 1965–80; total GNP grew more than twofold between 1978 and 1988. During 1978–88 per capita GNP doubled in real terms.[1] The most impressive strides were in the rural economy. Calculated on the basis of comparable prices, total agricultural output value increased by an average annual rate of 6.04 percent between 1978 and 1990. Output value of rural collective enterprises increased 26.7 percent for that same twelve-year period. Per capita net income among peasants increased from 133.57 to 629.79 yuan, with an average annual increase of 41.4 yuan, as compared with only a 3.2 yuan increase on average for the previous twenty-eight years.[2]

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[1] Kang Chen, Gary Jefferson, and Inderjit Singh, "Lessons from China's Economic Reform," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 16 (June 1992).

[2] Zhang Hongyu, "China's Land System Transformation and Adjustment of Agricultural Structure: Reviewing China's Rural Reform and Development since 1978," *Liaowang Overseas Edition* 47 (November 25, 1991), 16–17, translated in *FBIS-CHI-91-241*, December 16, 1991, pp. 52–54. The most impressive growth in agriculture was prior to 1985. For a useful economic overview of the impact of the reforms on agriculture, see Terry Sicular, "China's Agricultural Policy during the Reform Period," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 1:340–64. After 1985 the most dynamic growth was in rural industry.

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Far from standing in the way of change, local officials have spearheaded the reform drive. What explains their response to national reform initiatives? Bureaucratic change is a function of whether "net incentive effects upon key officials are positive or negative, and to what degree."[3] In China the necessary incentives were provided by fiscal reform. This article seeks to illuminate how this institutional change caused local officials in a socialist system to pursue rapid rural industrial growth.[4]

North and Weingast have pointed to the importance of secure property rights for economic development.[5] The discussion has been limited to a large extent to market economies, with a focus on individuals as entrepreneurs—those who own and operate the firms within a market economy. The importance of this principle underlies the felt need in formerly socialist countries such as Poland to privatize. There is, however, no inherent reason why only individuals, as distinct from governments, can be entrepreneurs. Similarly, there is no inherent reason why secure property rights will be an effective incentive only if they are assigned to individuals.

Growth will result as long as there are secure property rights for *some* organized unit and sufficient incentives for that unit to pursue growth. The impressive growth of collective rural industrial output between 1978 and 1988 is in large measure a result of local government entrepreneurship. Fiscal reform has assigned local governments property rights over increased income and has created strong incentives for local officials to pursue *local* economic development. In the process local governments have taken on many characteristics of a business corporation, with officials acting as the equivalent of a board of directors.[6] This merger of state and economy characterizes a new institutional development that I label *local state corporatism*.

I want to make clear that "corporatism" as used here differs from its use in previous studies. By local state corporatism I refer to the workings of a *local* government that coordinates economic enterprises in its terri-

[3] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 201.

[4] On institutions and the incentives within them that shape economic and political behavior, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

[5] Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49 (December 1989).

[6] I present a preliminary version of this argument in Oi, "The Chinese Village, Inc.," in Bruce Reynolds, ed., *Chinese Economic Policy* (New York: Paragon House Press, 1988). Others have drawn a similar analogy between local government and business entities. See, e.g., articles in William Byrd and Lin Qingsong, eds., *China's Rural Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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tory as if it were a diversified business corporation. I am not concerned with the role of the central state in the vertical integration of interests within society as a whole.[7] Whereas the central state set the reform process in motion and provided localities with the incentives and the leeway to develop economically, it is *local* government that has determined the outcome of reform in China. Hence, my designation *local state* corporatism.

Local state corporatism suggests a loosening of central control in a Leninist system, but it does not refer to a process that some have labeled the reemergence of civil society.[8] My argument also contradicts, or at least greatly qualifies, theories of market transition that posit a corrosive effect of markets upon the power of local officials.[9] Local state corporatism is similarly difficult to square with the view that market reform is destroying the cellular, or honeycomb, nature of Chinese rural society and allowing for greater penetration by the central state.[10] On the con-

[7] Schmitter, for example, defines corporatism "as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selections of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (pp. 94–95). See Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" reprinted in Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Strich, eds., *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974). Joseph Fewsmith uses a version of Schmitter's understanding of corporatism to describe China during the Republican period. See Fewsmith, *Party, State, and Local Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890–1930* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). Alfred Stepan provides one of the most useful general treatments of corporatism. See Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), esp. pt. 1. Stepan uses corporatism to refer to "a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest representation. . . . In return for such prerogatives and monopolies the state claims the right to monitor representational groups by a variety of mechanisms so as to discourage the expression of 'narrow' class-based, conflictual demands. Many . . . have used such corporatist policies for structuring interest representation" (p. 46).

[8] This link is explicit in David Ost's treatment of Solidarity as an example of societal corporatism. See Ost, "Towards a Corporatist Solution in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," *Eastern European Politics and Societies* 3 (Winter 1989). A similar link to civil society is pursued in the writings on China, although with many more reservations. See, e.g., Anita Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism? Chinese Workers in Search of a Solution" (Paper presented at the conference Toward the Year 2000: Socioeconomic Trends and Consequences in China, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Western Australia, January 29–31, 1992); Mayfair Yang, "Between State and Society: The Construction of Corporateness in a Chinese Socialist Factory," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 22 (July 1989); Peter Lee, "The Chinese Industrial State in Historical Perspective: From Totalitarianism to Corporatism," in Brantly Womack, ed., *Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Margaret Pearson, "The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises" (Manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1992).

[9] Victor Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism," *American Sociological Review* 54 (October 1989).

[10] Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).

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trary, this analysis highlights the coexistence of a strong local officialdom and public enterprise with a thriving market economy and a weakened central state.

This paper shows how fiscal reforms have provided incentives for local government officials to pursue economic, especially industrial, development. I limit my discussion to an examination of local government at the county, township, and village levels—the lowest levels of government and those most directly involved in rural industrialization. First, I describe the ways that fiscal reforms changed the rules for the disposition of locally collected revenues. Second, I analyze the interests and incentives that these new rules have created. Third, I show why local governments chose to pursue rural industrialization. Finally, I examine how local governments plan and coordinate economic activity to maximize local interests. In the conclusion I consider some broader implications of local state corporatism for China's political future.

The analysis is based on interviews conducted with rural officials in China and on published Chinese sources. I conducted 222 interviews,[11] the bulk of which were with officials at the county, township, and village levels and with managers of industrial enterprises owned by local government. A smaller number were with officials at the prefectural and provincial levels in Shandong. They include interviews at finance and tax bureaus, banks, material supply bureaus, township industry management bureaus, agriculture bureaus, grain bureaus, science and technology commissions, bureaus for the administration of industry and commerce, commerce bureaus, and economic and planning commissions. I also interviewed county magistrates and county first party secretaries, township and village heads, party secretaries, and accountants, plus officials of organizations such as savings and loan cooperatives, supply and marketing cooperatives, and grain stations, and, finally, private entrepreneurs.

I. The Fiscal Reforms and Rights to Revenue Flows

As part of the effort to reform the economy, the Chinese leadership began instituting fiscal reforms in the early 1980s. The major objectives were to make localities fiscally self-sufficient, to reduce the central state's own fiscal burden, and to provide incentives for local authorities to pro-

[11] The interviews were done in 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1991. I conducted fieldwork in three primary research sites: two counties in Shandong province and one county outside Tianjin. I also conducted interviews in a few counties and villages in Liaoning and Sichuan provinces. Most interviews lasted two to three hours. A few of the interviews were with scholars working on related topics at various research institutes and with national-level officials in Beijing.

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mote economic development. The most important of the fiscal reforms was a tax responsibility system for each administrative level down to the township.[12] By the mid-1980s provinces, municipalities, prefectures, counties, and townships were subject to a bottom-up revenue-sharing system that required localities to submit only a portion of their revenues to the upper levels and then allowed them to retain all, or at least most, of the remainder. Localities became independent fiscal entities that had both responsibility for local expenditures and the unprecedented right to use the revenue that they retained.[13]

Fiscal Contracting

Revenue sharing was formalized in fiscal contracts signed between the central state and each of its provinces, between each province and its prefectures, between each prefecture and its counties, and between each county and its townships.[14] Some places use an overall ratio, such as 70:30, where the locality keeps 70 percent and 30 percent is sent to the next higher level. In other cases the locality pays a set quota to the next higher level, but once that quota is met, the locality retains all or at least the bulk of the remaining tax revenues. Unlike previous revenue-sharing arrangements that changed annually, these contracts run from three to five years.

Whether a locality shares its revenue with the higher levels is determined by a complex calculation of fixed expenditures, fixed receipts, fixed payment upward, and fixed subsidy. The fixed expenditure is the amount that the higher authorities recognize as the minimum essential

[12] For a useful summary of the evolution of fiscal policies and variations in the formal system, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971–1984: The Formal System," *China Quarterly* 125 (March 1991); and James Tong, "Fiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao China," in *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 22 (July 1989); Christine Wong, "Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China," *Modern China* 18 (April 1992); and idem, "Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," *China Quarterly* 128 (December 1991). See also Audrey Donnithorne, *Centre-Provincial Economic Relations in China* (Canberra: Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, 1981). For more specific treatment of the tax reform in Shanghai, see Lynn T. White III, *Shanghai Shanghaied? Uneven Taxes in Reform China*, Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs, no. 84 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1989). See also Shaoguang Wang, "From Revolution to Involution: State Capacity, Local Power, and [Un]governability in China" (Manuscript, Yale University, n.d.).

[13] The changes during the prereform fiscal system are numerous. On the early periods up until 1960, see Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967); on the later period, see Wong (fn. 12, 1992).

[14] Tong (fn. 12) notes in his survey of the tax reforms that there is tremendous variation. Not all areas have instituted the tax responsibility system to the township. The specifics of the tax responsibility system are too diverse and complex to detail here in full.

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budget items of local governments. The level at which the fixed expenditure is pegged determines how much a locality will pay to the upper levels or the amount of subsidy it will receive. The fixed expenditure includes the base salary of state cadres on the local government's payroll[15] and basic services, such as education and health. The amounts are based on past expenditures, with some provision for increases based on population. The fixed expenditure is then compared with the fixed receipts, the tax collection quota set for the locality. Not all provinces, prefectures, counties, or townships pay revenue to the next higher level. A locality makes a fixed payment upward to the next higher administrative level only if the tax revenues are greater than the fixed revenues. At each level from the province to the township there are some units that cannot generate sufficient revenues to cover expenditures.[16] And if the fixed receipts are less than the fixed expenditures, then that difference becomes the fixed subsidy for an area. The fixed subsidy is the subsistence ceiling for poor areas. If expenditures and receipts are equal, then a locality neither pays revenue to the upper level nor receives a subsidy. In one Shandong county of seventeen townships, ten were deficit and therefore received subsidies from the county, and the other seven paid taxes to the county.[17]

The system is very effective in promoting local government entrepreneurship because not all revenue collected by a locality is subject to revenue sharing. Only certain taxes collected by localities are subject to share contracts. The most important of these, the taxes on state and collective industries, constitute the core of the locality's "within-budget revenues" (*yusuannei zijin*).[18] Most of the other revenue that a locality collects is considered its "extrabudgetary revenues" (*yusuanwai zijin*).[19] This latter category includes (1) all those taxes that have been designated "local taxes," including the slaughter tax, the individual income adjustment tax, and the tax on private enterprise, and (2) nontax revenues, such as the various fees and surcharges collected by local government.[20] Most of

[15] Some cadres who work for local government are not considered state cadres. They are paid not from the official budget but from extrabudgetary funds.

[16] Based on a report by China's minister of finance, Wong (fn. 12, 1991) writes that in 1989 localities remitted a total of 44.7 billion yuan to the central budget while receiving central subsidies of 56.3 billion yuan (p. 698).

[17] China Interview 52290.

[18] The other major items that make up the within-budget revenues include the agricultural tax and the profits from state-run enterprises within the locality. China Interview 8891.

[19] In addition, there are some taxes designated as "central" taxes. These similarly are not subject to revenue sharing. Central taxes are the sole property of the central state. Localities collect but receive nothing from central taxes, such as those on government commercial agencies like banks and the post office.

[20] For the details, see Oi, "Private and Local State Entrepreneurship: The Shandong Case" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., April 2–5, 1992).

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these local taxes have remained fairly inconsequential as revenue sources. Since the tax designations were drawn, however, the tax on private enterprises has become a very lucrative source of income for localities, a reflection of the dramatic growth of the private sector in the 1980s. Taxes on the private sector accounted for close to a quarter of all taxes collected in one Shandong county in 1990.[21]

Extrabudgetary funds existed at various times during the Maoist period, and as in the current period they consisted of minor taxes and surcharges. The fiscal reforms greatly altered both the size of these funds and the rights of localities to use these funds: before the reforms were enacted, all use of extrabudgetary funds by a locality was subject to prior upper-level approval. Now localities have license to use these funds as they wish. Furthermore, the amount of these funds has grown enormously. During the Maoist period these funds reportedly constituted from about "1%–2% of revenue collection in rich provinces and no more than 5% for most provinces."[22] During the reforms, between 1978 and 1988, there has been an estimated sixfold nationwide increase in extrabudgetary revenues.[23] In 1989 the total extrabudgetary funds were 91.2 percent of within-budget revenues.[24] In some townships the sum of extrabudgetary revenues now *exceeds* the within-budget revenues. It is very difficult to know precisely how much such revenues any locality might have. In addition to the reported extrabudgetary funds held by local governments as an administrative entity (such as a county or township), by specific bureaus within a county, and by enterprises, there are also hidden extrabudgetary funds.

In the following section I examine the within-budget taxes to show why so much revenue remains within the localities. In a later section I describe the nontax revenues extracted by and retained by local governments. Table 1 is a list of the major taxes and nontax levies taken by local governments.

Within-Budget Tax Revenues

Taxes on industry constitute the bulk of the revenue that localities share with the upper levels. In the aftermath of the reforms, state-owned industry remains the largest contributor of tax revenues to local government, but the share of total taxes contributed by state-owned enterprises

[21] China Interview 81391.
[22] Wong (fn. 12, 1992), 205.
[23] On Kit Tam, "Fiscal Policy Issues in China" (Manuscript, University of New South Wales, Canberra, July 1990).
[24] *China Statistical Yearbook 1990* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 223.

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TABLE 1
WITHIN-BUDGET TAXES AND EXTRABUDGETARY REVENUES FROM TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES

Within-Budget Taxes	*Extrabudgetary Revenues*
1. Income tax	1. Local taxes
2. Circulation tax/industrial-commercial tax —product tax —value-added tax —turnover/business tax	2. Nontax levies —contracted profits quota over quota —management fee —ad hoc charges

is decreasing.[25] At the same time taxes on rural collective industry continue to grow in importance for local treasuries. Between 1978 and 1990 the tax from township and village enterprises increased nationally from 2.2 billion to 27.55 billion yuan (see Table 2). Taxes on both state and collective rural enterprises fall into two major categories: tax on profits and tax on sales.

TAX ON PROFITS

The enterprise income tax (*suode shui*) was billed as the means by which the state would receive revenue but still provide incentives for enterprises to be more efficient and profitable. Because the income tax is levied only on profits, it might more properly be called a profits tax. It is based on an eight-grade progressive scale, with the rates ranging from a low of 10 percent to a high of 55 percent on profits. The rate for the large enterprises (that is, those with profits over 200,000 yuan) is 55 percent.

In practice, income tax comprises only about a quarter of total industrial taxes nationally.[26] The income tax rates are not negotiable, but the tax an enterprise pays can be reduced by inflating costs, thus decreasing profits. What can be written off as costs is largely at the discretion of the local officials charged with assessing the tax. In a semiplanned economy such as China's, "profits" and "costs" are subjective categories affected by factors beyond the control of a factory manager. In addition, institutional arrangements routinely allow the profit base to be reduced. For example, until the rule change of the late 1980s, income tax was commonly reduced by allowing enterprises to deduct loan payments from

[25] See Wong (fn. 12, 1991); and Barry Naughton, "Implications of the State Monopoly over Industry and Its Relaxation," *Modern China* 18 (January 1992).

[26] In 1988 it was 25.3% of total industrial taxes. *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1989* (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1989), 240.

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TABLE 2
COLLECTIVE, TOWNSHIP, AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES, 1978–90[a]

Category	*Unit*	*1978*	*1980*	*1985*	*1986*	*1987*	*1988*	*1989*	*1990*
Enterprises	million	1.52	1.43	1.57	1.52	1.58	1.59	1.54	1.45
Workers	million	28.27	30	41.52	43.92	47.18	48.94	47.2	45.92
As % of rural labors	%	9.5	9.4	11.2	11.6	12.1	12.21	11.53	10.93
Output Value	billion yuan	49.3	65.69	198.78	245.87	323.74	436.27	485.56	542.92
As % of rural output	%	21.2	23.5	43	47.7	34.32	34.81	33.53	32.67
Income	billion yuan	43.15	59.61	182.74	222.36	293.41	423.22	482.16	521.86
Taxes	billion yuan	2.2	2.57	10.86	13.73	16.81	23.65	27.25	27.55
Net Profit	billion yuan	8.81	11.84	17.13	16.1	18.78	25.92	24.01	23.27

SOURCES: *Xiangzhen qiye nianjian 1978–1987* (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989), 569; and *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1991* (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1991), 315–78.

[a] Figures for 1978 and 1980 refer to all categories of rural enterprises. Figures for 1985 to 1990 refer only to collectively owned township and village enterprises.

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income before assessing the tax. In addition, there are areas that grant across-the-board cuts as standard practice; some provinces are particularly generous in this regard. In the eastern province of Zhejiang, for example, if the applicable tax rate is above 30 percent, then the amount taxed at the higher rate is cut in half. In the southern province of Guangdong, if the rate is above 20 percent, the tax levy above that level is cut in half.[27] My interviews reveal that a number of established township and village enterprises either had never paid income tax or were just about to be assessed income tax for the first time in 1988.

National regulations allow favorable treatment for township and village enterprises with regard to the collection of income tax, but whether the central state intended to provide the deep discounts described above is questionable. National regulations exempt new enterprises from income tax on their first year of business; some localities have extended the exemption to two or three years. In addition, local authorities confer a favorable tax status on enterprises that meet any of a long list of conditions.[28] To mention just a few, exemptions are granted to factories that serve agriculture, hire the handicapped, or are located in the designated old revolutionary base areas. Existing factories that start a new product line receive a tax holiday on the profit from that production.

TAX ON SALES OR VALUE ADDED

Local governments also derive revenue from enterprises through a second category of taxes based on production, income, or sales, irrespective of profits. These taxes are sometimes loosely termed circulation taxes (*liuzhuan shui*) or the industrial-commercial taxes (*gongshang shui*). The primary ones include the product (*chanpin*), value-added (*zengzhi*), and turnover/business (*yingye*) taxes (see Table 1).

Together these levies comprise the bulk of township and village enterprise taxes; nationally for 1988 they yielded almost three-quarters of the total taxes on township and village enterprises.[29] For example, one large Shandong village factory had total gross profits of 376,000 yuan for

[27] He Xian, "Woguo xiangzhen qiye shouru fenpei wenti," *Zhongguo nongcun jingji* 3 (March 21, 1988), 34.

[28] See *Xiangzhen qiye nianjian 1978–1987* (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989), 270, for an official list of exemptions. Setting up factories for the disabled and therefore earning tax-free status was pursued in two of the Shandong villages that I investigated.

[29] *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1989* (fn. 26), 240. These proportions were similarly reflected in my field research. China Interview 6688. Andrew Walder also found that second category taxes on *state*-owned enterprises located at the county level contributed more to the local treasury than did the income tax. See Walder, "County Finance and Local Industry: A View from Zouping County, Shandong" (Paper presented at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, February 15, 1990).

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1987–88. It paid a total of 146,000 yuan in taxes, or 38.8 percent of total profits. But of this amount only 36,000 yuan was income tax; the remaining 110,000 yuan, or 75.3 percent, was sales and other taxes. When one compares the industrial-commercial tax with the agricultural tax, the logic of pursuing industry is obvious. In one township the industrial-commercial taxes yielded almost twice the agricultural tax—485,000 yuan as compared with 260,000 yuan.[30]

Second-category taxes are more strictly enforced and collected than the income tax.[31] Yet, as in state industry, there seems to be room for reductions and exemptions.[32] For example, in a highly industrialized Shandong village, taxes as a percentage of total village enterprise income decreased over time. Tax breaks, especially for new enterprises, explain some of the decrease. Thus, in the last few years this village developed a number of new enterprises, the income from which is eligible for various tax holidays. The village has also been able to reduce its tax base with the arrangement that allows for repaying loans before taxes. Similar tax breaks were enjoyed by a county outside Tianjin. In 1987 the county collected 59.30 million yuan in taxes, but almost half as much, 26.65 million yuan, was given in tax breaks.[33] In a Shandong county the amount given in tax breaks from 1987 to 1990 averaged close to 7 million yuan per year. In 1990, for example, 39.2 million yuan was collected in taxes, but 5.3 million was given in reductions or exemptions.[34]

Extrabudgetary Nontax Revenues

Localities can collect a minimum of taxes to satisfy tax quotas and provide a sufficient base for local expenses, but they need not assess national taxes in the predatory fashion that some might expect of a government in fiscal need.[35] A locality need not lose revenue by not collecting the maximum amount in taxes. Which level of government receives what income and how much through nontax levies depends on whether an enterprise is owned by a township or a village. Village-owned enterprises pay no nontax levies to the township.

[30] China Interview 21688.

[31] He Xian (fn. 27).

[32] On the state urban sector, see Andrew Walder, "Local Bargaining Relationships and Urban Industrial Finance," in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

[33] China Interview 8888.

[34] China Interviews 52290 and 81391.

[35] Margaret Levi, among others who have highlighted the predatory nature of states, tends to focus on taxation policies. See Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

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Up to this point I have referred to local governments as a single entity, but in reality, even though the government may be seen as a corporate entity, within the corporation there are diverse interests competing for limited resources. Hence, it is useful to distinguish between a township government and the specific agencies within the government, particularly the economic commission. This distinction may seem overly technical, but in interviews local government officials and factory managers were careful to distinguish between the two. All within the township government have an interest in developing industry, all look to the profits from industry, but different parts of the government are responsible for different expenses. The township government as a whole is responsible for all aspects of the township and all of its various economic interests and welfare needs. The township economic commission is under the township government, but it is also a subordinate organ of the county-level township enterprise management bureau. It is specifically responsible for collectively owned enterprises. Money paid to the economic commission is more likely to be used exclusively for township and perhaps for village enterprises. In most townships, the township collective enterprises pay the bulk of the nontax levies to the economic commission, not to the township government.[36]

BEFORE-TAX LEVIES

The one levy that is paid directly to the township government is a set percentage of a township enterprise's gross income before any taxes are deducted. National regulations stipulate 10 percent, but the precise amount in some cases is higher, sometimes reaching 20 percent. While the amounts vary, all townships seem to require this payment. Some areas levy an additional amount, an "aid agriculture, aid sidelines fund" before taxes.[37]

AFTER-TAX LEVIES

Most of the after-tax levies are paid to either the township or the village, depending on the level of ownership. Because each level of government, but not individual enterprises, has property rights to after-tax profits, townships and villages use after-tax levies as a second source of revenue.

[36] Again, there seem to be regional variations. But in the majority of my cases profits are paid to the economic commission.

[37] He Xian (fn. 27) provided no details, but I assume that the sidelines refer to such activities as pig raising done by households. Around Shanghai, this is an additional 10%. In the same region there is yet a third levy, this one on workers in the enterprises, that goes toward the "aid agriculture, aid sidelines fund." He Xian (fn. 27).

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At the township level, township-owned enterprises are under the supervision of the township economic commission, which collects revenue from its enterprises in two ways. First, it gets a management fee of 1 percent of total sales. This is one of the few sources of nontax levies that the township shares.[38] A percentage (50–70 percent) of this goes to the county township enterprise management bureau.[39] Second, the economic commission receives rent from factory managers who contract to use the collectively owned enterprises. This is the contracted profits stipulated under the responsibility system, consisting of quota profits and over-quota profits. Quota profits are those that a factory has contracted to meet; over-quota profits are those above that target.

National regulations stipulate that township governments are to limit themselves to no more than 20 percent of an enterprise's total after-tax profits. However, in practice, the actual share taken by economic commissions is higher. In one county outside Tianjin, for example, the economic commission took 40 percent of the quota profit and 30 percent of the over-quota profit. The way that local officials justified this in terms of national regulations reflected their view of the economy as a corporate entity. Since the funds were used for the unified management of the enterprises in the township as a whole, they explained, some of the money would eventually be returned to the enterprises.[40]

On top of the standard fees and levies, such as the management fee and contracted profit, there are a variety of other local ad hoc levies on enterprises designed to meet shortfalls in local revenue. Because the levies are taken on a need basis, these enterprises have been dubbed the "cash registers" of local government. Those who most often take such funds are the economic commissions that directly control the enterprises. Heads of economic commissions in a number of localities freely admit that they take profits from rich enterprises whenever they need extra funds. And those who deny using such practices are all aware of the practice and places that use it. This "borrowing" is most commonly done when the economic commission needs to pay off debts incurred by one of its enterprises or to expand production in one of its enterprises. One

[38] This also varies. In one county, which contains one of the richest and one of the most industrialized villages in China, the economic commission took only .6% of sales as a management fee.

[39] There are indications that this amount is not always forwarded.

[40] China Interview 8688. As a result of national regulations the amount taken by some economic commissions has apparently been reduced in the last couple of years. According to one county official of a township enterprise management bureau in Shandong, before 1985 the township economic commission took as much as 40–50% of total after tax-profits. China Interview 53188.

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township economic commission took over 3 million yuan for these purposes between 1986 and 1988.[41]

At the village level, too, village factories (like township enterprises) must turn over the contracted after-tax profits. The amounts vary considerably: some pay a set percentage of profits, others a fixed levy. In the more developed villages, factories pay the village enterprise management committee a management fee of 1 percent of total income. In some highly industrialized villages, enterprises also pay an assortment of other fees and "voluntary contributions" as needed by the village (see Table 3). And as in the case of townships, villages simply take profits from well-off factories as the need arises. The nontax levies on village enterprises may seem less complex, but compared with township enterprises in terms of amounts taken out, they are on the high end of the continuum. In one village about 70 percent of enterprise profits either were taken out in taxes or turned over to the village as profits and fees.[42]

Because of the small size of village governments and the overwhelming power of the party secretary, it matters little if the profits and fees are paid to the enterprise management committee or to the village government. At the village level they are one and the same. More than any of the other levels, the village economy is the closest to that of a small corporation, where profits from one sector are freely used to support other sectors.[43]

TABLE 3
TYPES OF NONTAX LEVIES ON VILLAGE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

1. Contracted Profits
2. Management fee
3. Other Fees for
   - old age pension
   - culture-education
   - benefits
   - building fund
   - land use
4. Voluntary contributions
   (ad hoc payments, sometimes requested as donations, and given as needed)

[41] China Interview 71988.
[42] China Interview 6488.
[43] For further documentation on this, see Oi, "The Fate of the Collective after the Commune," in Deborah Davis and Ezra Vogel, eds., *Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen: The Impact of Reform*, Contemporary China Series, no. 7 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990).

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II. Institutional Interests and Incentives for Local Economic Growth

Budget constraints make it imperative for all local officials who have political ambitions, however modest, to try to expand revenue-generating sources.[44] This applies to those from whom the state requires payment of revenues, to those from whom it requires no revenue payments, and to those to whom it makes subsidy payments. County-level finance officials are quick to point out that the fixed subsidies are barely sufficient to maintain a functioning township government. There is no slack for the improvement of services; there is no room for bureaucratic growth. The number of bureaucratic positions for which the fixed subsidies will pay is set.[45] The upper levels do not provide additional funds to localities as expenditures increase. The fact that some have not succeeded in developing their local economy is due not to the lack of incentives but to other constraints, such as a locality's lack of resource endowments or the incompetence of its officials.[46]

How hard local governments work to increase revenues is tied to secure rights to increased revenues, however. Knowledge that they would be the direct beneficiary of increased revenues at a minimum fixed rate for three to five years was critical in prompting local governments to respond enthusiastically to the incentives embedded in the revenue-sharing system. Before localities had such assurances there had been few incentives to be entrepreneurial. Local finance officials have criticized the tax-sharing systems in effect in the early 1980s as offering them little incentive to work harder. Not only did localities have to meet tax quotas set by the upper levels, but they also had to turn over all surplus profits.[47] Such sentiments are reminiscent of the complaints by peasants under the Maoist system: they had little incentive to produce more grain because

[44] For the purposes of this analysis I am assuming that cadres are noncorrupt. Obviously, some are. But corruption is not a very useful explanation and would leave unexplained the impressive growth that has taken place in China's rural economy. Moreover, rapid economic growth does not preclude the improved well-being of those local officials. One must also keep in mind that the new budget constraints imposed by the fiscal reforms compel local officials to keep their own greed in check and use the profits and revenues from local enterprises to fund local expenditures and for reinvestment. The rapid growth in China's rural economy, particularly the 25-plus percent growth rate in rural industrial output, suggests that officials have used these funds to promote further growth, not just to line their pockets.

[45] On the growth of local governments, see Tyrene White, "Political Reform and Rural Government," in Davis and Vogel (fn. 43); and idem, "Below Bureaucracy: The Burden of Being a Village under the Local State" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, April 5–8, 1990).

[46] Byrd and Lin (fn. 6) examine reasons why some areas have not successfully developed rural industry.

[47] China Interview 52290.

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they knew that increased production had no positive effect on the amount of their grain rations.[48] The principle that "what is important is not what is taken out, but what is left"[49] holds at least as much for taxes as for grain.

To ensure that all local officials do their utmost to develop rural enterprises, officials at each higher level of government set quotas for the subordinate level. The bonus pay of officials becomes linked to the performance of township enterprises in meeting profit and production quotas. The prefecture docks the county, and the county docks the bonus of township-level officials if the enterprises for which they are responsible fail to meet the quotas set by the county.[50] The township can affect the bonus that village officials take, but its control is less complete. But village-level officials have their own incentive to promote village industries actively since their salaries are directly tied to the total income of the village. The system is structured so that local officials have a double incentive to promote rural industry: growth allows them to benefit economically as individuals, without resort to corruption, and it allows them to alleviate the budget constraints that make their jobs difficult. Both their personal economic well-being and the financial health of the local economy are tied to successful economic development.

The most problematic aspect of the fiscal reforms for local government is the revenue sharing and assessment of within-budget taxes. The interest of local governments with regard to taxes is colored by the conflicting role that officials are expected to play. On the one hand, if local government pursues its interests as a corporation, it will try to maximize its profits and pay as little tax as possible to the central state. The rather lax assessment of the income tax is one manifestation of this tendency. On the other hand, local government cannot behave simply as a corporation intent on maximizing profits; local government is also the agent of the central state charged with tax collection, and it must meet the tax quotas agreed upon in the fiscal contracts signed with the higher levels. These tensions inhere in the broader problem faced by all local officials—having to represent both central and local interests, while watching out for their own political interests.[51] The solution that allows local governments to meet their responsibility to the upper levels and also

[48] For an elaboration of this point, see Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[49] James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

[50] China Interview 21688.

[51] I discuss how this tension was resolved by Maoist cadres in Oi (fn. 48).

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increase local revenues lies in the extraction of nontax revenues and collection of those taxes designated as local.

III. Fiscal Reform and the Rise of Rural Industry

The problem faced by local governments was how best to generate revenues. Decollectivization eliminated agriculture as a viable source of needed revenue. After the institution of the responsibility system that made the household the unit of production and accounting, local governments, especially at the village and to a lesser extent at the township levels, lost legitimate access to all income from agriculture, except for a percentage of the nominal agricultural tax. Income from the sale of agricultural products went to the household.

The combination of decollectivization and revenue sharing forced local officials to make careful calculations of the benefits and costs of the different sectors of the rural economy. The smaller return on funds invested and the limited access that local officials had to income from agriculture, especially grain production, made agriculture the least desirable investment option.[52] Once the diversification of the rural economy was encouraged, local officials diverted resources and energies from agriculture to more profitable enterprises. One possible source was to promote the development of the private sector and gain revenues through taxation.[53] That, as I noted above, can be quite lucrative for local coffers. However, because of the political taint still associated with private enterprise and the shifting political winds at the center toward private entrepreneurs, that route is taken cautiously.[54] The most lucrative and least problematic strategy politically was the development of rural collective enterprises (*xiangzhen qiye*).[55]

Not only did rural collective enterprises provide a solution (applauded by the national leadership) to the surplus labor problem that arose from decollectivization,[56] but they were also increasingly lucra-

[52] For a more detailed discussion of the diverse effects of the fiscal reforms on agriculture, see Oi, "Chinese Agriculture: Modernization, But at What Costs?" in Thomas Robinson and Zhiling Lin, eds., *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992).

[53] I examine this option in Oi (fn. 20).

[54] The exception is in places like Wenzhou, which is famous for its private businesses.

[55] The term *rural enterprises* includes various types of ventures, from factories to food stalls, that range from collective to private owned. The largest and economically most significant of the enterprises in terms of output value, number of people employed, and taxes paid are those owned by local government, either the township or village. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion in this article is limited to collectively owned enterprises.

[56] The percentage of the rural labor force engaged in all types of rural enterprises rose

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tive.[57] Beginning as a small part of the rural economy in 1980, by 1987 industry had already surpassed agriculture nationally as the dominant source of rural income.[58] For the twelve-year period from 1978 to 1990 the output value of these collective enterprises increased by 26.7 percent.[59] By the end of 1991 rural industry was producing 50 percent of total industrial output, equal to that of the state-owned industrial sector.

As the legal owner of these enterprises, local governments could legitimately extract nontax levies—the various fees and ad hoc surcharges described above. Revenue from rural collective enterprises has been the source of funds for public services, welfare, and subsidies to other, less profitable, sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, in addition to serving as the base for industrial expansion. Localities that have rural industry can provide services and are most likely to be strong effective governments; those that do not are most likely to be weak and ineffective governments.

Given the fiscal importance of rural industry, it is not surprising that it has mushroomed throughout rural China, in particular, rural industry owned by village governments. By 1988, 46.6 percent of all counties in China had rural industry with output value in excess of 100 million yuan.[60] Township and village enterprises total around 1.5 million. Table 2 provides a twelve-year overview of the development of these enterprises. In absolute numbers they are only a minor portion of the more than eighteen million enterprises in the countryside, but they are the most important in terms of the amount of revenue and output value generated.[61]

The local variations and the ad hoc levies also make it difficult to determine precisely how much of enterprise revenues any township government and its economic commission take. A national study of township governments found a tremendous range in what they took from their enterprises: from the bulk of enterprise profits to a small portion to little more than the management fee (see Table 4).[62] The amount turned

from 9.5% in 1978 to 22.1% in 1990. The proportion is even higher in areas with developed rural industries. Zhang Hongyu (fn. 2).

[57] See Byrd and Lin (fn. 6) for detailed studies of rural enterprises based on survey data. See also Christine P. W. Wong, "Interpreting Rural Industrial Growth in the Post-Mao Period," *Modern China* 14 (January 1988); and Oi (fn. 43).

[58] *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988* (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988), 214.

[59] Zhang Hongyu (fn. 2).

[60] *Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1989* (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989), 20.

[61] The others are private or joint-stock enterprises.

[62] He Xian (fn. 27).

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TABLE 4
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN AFTER-TAX PROFITS PAID TO TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE GOVERNMENTS

Proportion Paid	*Example*	*% of Profits Paid to Government*
1. Large	Beijing,	56.99
	Shanghai	71.67
2. Small	Jiangsu,	30.00
	Zhejiang,	30.00
	Hebei	30.00
3. Minimal	Zhejiang (Wenzhou)	management fee

SOURCE: He Xian (fn. 27), 34.

TABLE 5
DIVISION OF TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE PROFITS, 1984–87

Year	*Income Tax as % of Total Profits*	*% of After-Tax Profits Taken by Government*
1984	24.8	52.17
1986	—	40.78
1987	21.7	39.1

SOURCE: *Xiangzhen qiye nianjian 1978–1987* (fn. 28), 270.

over was correlated with the extent to which government was involved in investment and development of production. Unfortunately, the study does not tell us which method is the most common. It is important to note that the "small" amount is still 30 percent of after-tax profits.[63] Aggregate statistics suggest, however, that the percentage of such profits going to government may be decreasing. Comparing 1984, 1986, and 1987, the amount of after-tax profits paid to either township or village governments has decreased from 52.17 percent to only 39.1 percent (see Table 5).[64]

Regardless of the precise amounts, overall revenues from enterprises at the township, and particularly at the village, level are controlled either directly or indirectly by local officials. Profits that are not extracted are strictly regulated. Rules stipulate *how* retained profits must be used—this holds for township as well as village enterprises, and there is a formula that sets strict limits on the amount that can be used for workers' benefits and bonuses; the bulk of profits must be used for reinvestment.

[63] Ibid.
[64] *Xiangzhen qiye nianjian 1978–1987* (fn. 28), 270.

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IV. The Sinews of Local State Corporatism

Some might read the above statistics on high rates of extraction as evidence that local officials are corrupt and bleed the collective enterprises under their control—behavior that could be seen as confirmation of the predatory nature of states. But one should go further, to examine how this income is used rather than simply accepting this behavior as rent seeking. A framework that would account for both the heavy local extractions and the significant growth of China's rural economy is to analyze local government as a corporation: it takes profits from its factories to pay for expenditures and for reinvestment.

The extraction of profits from enterprises is one of the most important mechanisms for allowing local governments to operate as a corporation. As the holders of rights over income flows, local governments can decide as a corporation how to use profits from its various enterprises and how to redistribute income.[65] But a successful corporation also needs other means to control the operation of its enterprises. Among the most important of these are the selection of management personnel, control over the allocation of scarce production inputs, provision of services, and control of investment and credit decisions. Much of the infrastructure for exercising government direction remains from the Maoist period. Let me now turn to an examination of the levers of government control.

Factory Management

Contracting or leasing of enterprises to individuals rather than privatization facilitates local government intervention and control. Decollectivization leased ("contracted") but did not sell collectively owned factories to private individuals under the *contract responsibility system.*[66] Furthermore, factory managers who contract to operate factories do not have the same degree of autonomy as do peasants who contract to farm collectively owned land. In practice, the contract responsibility system has only decentralized the day-to-day management of collectively owned enterprises and provided incentives for factory managers to be efficient and increase production—they receive bonuses if they overfulfill their quotas. But beyond that, the lessee is nothing more than an employee of

[65] See Oi (fn. 43) for a more detailed discussion of how this income keeps the village together as a "collective" by providing the necessary funds to pay for welfare and public services and to support agriculture, as well as for reinvestment in industry.

[66] An exception seems to be Fujian, where Nee and Su indicate that they were sold. See Victor Nee and Su Sijin, "Institutional Change and Economic Growth in China: The View from the Villages," *Journal of Asian Studies* 49 (February 1990).

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the corporation; he has no rights to dictate the disposition of enterprise profits. That role remains with local government.

The contract responsibility system charges factory managers with the burden of running the factory efficiently and profitably—but with only limited control over factors of production. Those who lease collective factories are dependent on higher executive management (that is, the local officials who are sometimes, concurrently, the chairmen of the village's industrial corporation) to make key decisions. Where the factory manager may make suggestions about personnel, development, investment, and product line, the implementation of these changes and programs requires official approval. Factory managers who make good suggestions or happen to run the factories targeted for development or expansion may receive large bonuses, but the engine for change and development is local government.

Resource Allocation

Ideally, all the divisions within the corporation should receive assistance, but rarely do corporate resources offer such undifferentiated support. During the Maoist period all enterprises received some subsidies, but the fiscal reforms mandate that local governments make inequitable treatment of enterprises a matter of policy. The unofficial favoritism of the Maoist period has now been formalized, and new criteria are applied to determine who will receive preferential treatment: resources and breaks are directed to those enterprises that can generate the most benefit for the corporate good.[67]

The strategy of selective support of certain enterprises is reminiscent of Japan's administrative guidance.[68] Preferential allocation of key production inputs and bureaucratic support provides certain enterprises with the most favorable environment for growth. To this end local governments have begun to rank enterprises. Moreover, they let it be known that certain enterprises are considered especially important and therefore worthy of special treatment.

The rating of enterprises is yet to be firmly institutionalized, however. Political pressure and personal connections may still lead to preferential access, but banks and bureaus are increasingly allocating resources and providing assistance based on the merit of an enterprise or its potential to generate revenues. One way that local governments have tried to in-

[67] The corporate good is defined more broadly than narrow economic interest and profits. It may include social as well as ideological interests.

[68] Chalmers A. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).

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stitutionalize this preferential treatment is to rate firms on the basis of past performance, with a firm's rating determining the level of services and assistance it receives from the government and its affiliated institutions. Sometimes the ratings are done within specific bureaus. For example, the material supply bureaus have industries that are supplied first and have the best chance of getting the lowest-price inputs; these are designated key points (*zhongdian*). The rural industry management bureau working with the science and technology commission provides technical assistance to those units that they assess as the most promising.

There are two types of selective allocation. The first is privileged access to those inputs that are supplied to localities under the central allocation system, that is, the plan, which still exists. These are items that are rationed and for which the prices are lowest. For inputs such as steel and cement, the quantities allocated to rural areas are severely restricted. Officials have little discretion with regard to these production materials, as they are usually earmarked for specific enterprises that are producing for the plan. The most that a locality can hope for is access to state-supplied goods that are sold at higher than rationed prices but at lower than market prices.

The second, more common form is privileged access to inputs that are not rationed but are simply scarce. This would include, for example, fuel oil, supply of electricity, and raw materials. This privileged access is to goods that are secured and sold at *market* prices. Like the privileged access that comes from using connections and going through the back door, common not only in China but in all communist systems, what is being given is not necessarily a cheaper price but the opportunity to be first in line to buy the best of the available items at the posted prices. In the Chinese rural industrial context this means being able to buy the one ton of steel that the material supply bureau was able to procure at a favorable market price. It might also mean the opportunity to be hooked up to the special electric generator the township has installed to provide uninterrupted power to its most important industries. Plant shutdown because of power shortage is one of the major problems faced by factories in both urban and rural areas.[69]

Bureaucratic Services

In addition to supplying production materials, local governments also promote certain enterprises by providing bureaucratic services. These include help in securing licenses, certification and prizes for products, and tax breaks. As one might expect, agencies that are essential to rural en-

[69] Some factories regularly work in the middle of the night when the supply of electricity is more reliable

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terprises, such as the science and technology commission and the township industry management bureau, expend large amounts of time and energy intervening with key agencies at the higher levels on behalf of local industry to acquire technology, materials, funding, and so on. They often personally accompany factory managers to the higher-level bureaus. The daily routine of leading cadres at the county-level township industry management bureau is filled with trips to the prefecture, even to Beijing, on behalf of specific enterprises.

Local state corporatist systems are noted for their ability to mobilize not just one but all agencies and bureaus within local government to nurture selective township and village enterprises. Moreover, these agencies provide services well outside of their administrative domain. For example, the county tax bureau not only collects taxes and gives tax breaks, but it also helps enterprises train accountants and find scarce technical personnel, one of the most pressing problems facing rural industry. Agencies use their connections to influence other agencies to bend the rules in favor of an enterprise. County tax bureaus, for example, lobby banks on behalf of local enterprises. To encourage a bank to give a risky loan, the tax bureau agrees to allow an enterprise to repay the bank loan before taxes are assessed.

In addition to providing routine and extraordinary service to selective enterprises, various agencies—including the tax bureau, the finance bureau, and the science and technology commission—have funds that they loan directly to enterprises. Banks are still the major source of credit, though it is possible to bypass this complicated official credit system. The local government bureaus have amassed pots of money from which they can unilaterally give no- or low-interest loans to help industries. The amounts are not large, but they can make a difference, particularly if a factory needs circulating capital to purchase raw materials. These local government sources of funding become critical when the upper levels decide to rein in growth by cutting credit, as they did in 1988–89.[70]

Investment and Credit

Control of investment and credit decisions is one of the most effective levers used by local governments to shape the course of development. Much of their ability to control investment is related to the amount of available credit in a given locality. Like an enterprise in a market economy, a Chinese rural enterprise goes to a bank to get loans. However,

[70] See Oi, "Fiscal Reform, Central Directives, and Local Autonomy in Rural China" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29–September 1, 1991).

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unlike banks in a market economy, banks in China are not fully commercial operations. The amount that local banks can lend is determined by quotas set by the upper-level banks. The bank hierarchy allocates set amounts of funds to individual branches. Only recently have local banks been able to lend additional amounts based on their own deposits.[71]

Local governments exert further control, because in China a rural enterprise needs a guarantor to secure a loan; its own property is not sufficient collateral. The township economic commission often serves as the guarantor for township enterprises. Regardless of whom a factory manager secures as a guarantor, the banks are hesitant to make a capital investment loan of any size unless the local officials approve and support the project. For any major investment undertaking, it is the local officials who personally mobilize funds through the use of personal and professional connections. The head of the economic commission, the party secretary of a township, and the county head use their influence to persuade bank officials of the merit of favored projects. Sometimes tax officials, either on their own or at the urging of a county leader, will try to persuade bank officials to release a loan, by offering to allow loan repayments before taxes are assessed.

In recent years enterprises have been given credit ratings. County officials rate enterprises annually to determine the fixed capital credit as well as the financial services that each is eligible to receive at the local bank or savings cooperative. This further identifies for the banks those enterprises deemed important and creditworthy by local officials. These enterprises are then accorded the quickest approval for loans within their prescribed credit limit.

Local officials also promote local industry by allowing semiprivate credit institutions to operate. These sources of credit have only limited funds, but in periods of tight credit, such as 1988–89, they provide a critical avenue for bypassing regulations aimed at constraining growth.[72] Local officials usually do not serve on the boards of these credit institutions, but their tacit support is important for their continued operation.

V. Implications

The successful role of local governments in China's development points to the need to specify further the existing theories about the relationship

[71] For a more detailed discussion of bank reforms, see On Kit Tam, "Prospects for Reforming China's Financial System" (Paper presented at the Conference on China's Reforms and Economic Growth, Australian National University, Canberra, November 11–14, 1991).

[72] Oi (fn. 70).

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between economic growth, property rights, and government intervention. In this study I have shown that individuals need not have property rights over enterprise profits for economic growth to occur. Given the large number of formerly socialist systems attempting market reform and economic development, the Chinese model may stand as a less radical but viable alternative to privatization. Furthermore, the Chinese case raises questions about the adequacy of rent-seeking theories of the state to capture the role of extracted revenues when the local state is the entrepreneur and redistributive orientations hold sway.

The economic outcome of local state corporatism in China is a thriving rural economy with an industrial sector that now rivals state-owned industry in production value and factor productivity. Some economists have questioned the economic efficiency and value of rural industrialization. Critics stress that because growth in China's reform economy has been driven by the fiscal needs of individual local governments rather than by a nationally coordinated effort, rural enterprise may be profitable locally, but they may be redundant if viewed nationally.[73] Nonetheless, the rise of rural collective industry has created market competition and reduced the role of the central state in dictating patterns of economic growth. In the short run localities might subsidize enterprises simply to generate sales and product taxes, which are unrelated to profits, and to employ increasing numbers of surplus laborers from agriculture.[74] Over the long run, however, severe budget constraints will cause local officials to change product lines or close inefficient rural industries. Certainly, rural enterprises have shortcomings, but some economists have begun to consider them as the necessary competition to make state enterprises more efficient.[75] In the short run the problem for the central state is that state industry can no longer show a high rate of profits, which in turn reduces revenues to the central government.[76]

The Chinese case also demonstrates that the introduction of markets has not resulted in a proportionate decrease in the role of local government. Authors who originally stressed the transformative effects of markets now emphasize the ways in which rural governments are like local corporations.[77] A distinguishing characteristic of local state corporatism

[73] See Wong (fn. 12, 1991 and 1992).

[74] Walder (fn. 29) has found the same phenomena operating with regard to the state-owned factories at the county level.

[75] Chen, Jefferson, and Singh (fn. 1).

[76] See Naughton (fn. 25).

[77] Compare Nee (fn. 9) with Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 37 (March 1992).

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is that markets are a key part of the local economy but government coordination and intervention continue. Most of the materials used by the rural enterprises are secured through the market; but ability to pay is necessary but not necessarily sufficient for access. Local officials have assumed new roles as entrepreneurs, selectively allocating scarce resources to shape patterns of local economic growth.

Moreover, the combination of the fiscal reforms and market competition has reinforced rather than broken down the cellular nature of rural society in a number of respects. Although there certainly is more mobility, opportunity, and trade across "cells," there is strong parochialism. Rural industrial development has made possible substantial redistribution of income and the provision of greater services and benefits than was ever possible under the Maoist system, but provision is limited to registered members of the community. The benefits given to outside workers in village-run collective enterprises are less than those given to workers from the village. The growing protectionist sentiment is evident in the unwillingness of local grain stores to sell low-priced, subsidized grain to any urban residents holding valid grain-ration coupons other than to those registered in the locality. In the past localities routinely complied with national regulations stipulating that anyone holding valid coupons should be sold subsidized grain. These regulations still hold, but budget constraints have made it too costly for localities to spend their valuable subsidies on outsiders.

Up to this point, I have focused on the economic importance of local state corporatism, but its importance goes beyond the economy. Local state corporatism may provide China with an alternative to the pains of privatization and regime collapse experienced by the Eastern bloc countries and the Soviet Union. Local state corporatism has provided China with a relatively nonthreatening alternative economic system that allows for strong local state intervention. Communist party officials can play a leading economic as well as political role. In most of the localities where I have done fieldwork, it is the local party bosses—the first party secretaries of the county, township, or village—who are at the helm of the drive for economic development. Party secretaries are involved most intimately with the development of rural collective industry, leaving other matters to their subordinates or to their counterparts in the administrative portion of government. This is especially so in villages, where the village party secretary oversees industry while the village head is responsible for agriculture. Many a village party secretary also serves as the chairman of the board of directors of the village industrial corporation, the body established in some villages to oversee village industry. It is

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perhaps this aspect of local state corporatism that best explains why local officials in China, unlike those in the Soviet Union, have embraced rather than resisted economic reforms. For Chinese local officials, both party and nonparty, the reforms could be achieved without any real threat to their power.

No simple, direct correlation exists between decollectivization, market reform, and the power of local officials in China. The Chinese experience has shown that some local governments have been weakened by the reforms, whereas others have been strengthened. The key variable seems to be the sources of income in a village, specifically the degree of local industrialization after the adoption of the household-responsibility system. Local governments that control only an agricultural, particularly a grain-based, economy are left with few options other than to levy ad hoc surcharges and various other fees and penalties, which the Chinese press often refers to as "increasing the peasant burden." Local governments that have continued to be strong and effective have developed nonagricultural sources of income that accrue directly to local government. The higher the level of industrialization, the more likely that local government will act in a corporate manner to intervene, extract, and redistribute income.[78] Carrying out economic reform and pursuing growth hold the potential of strengthening, not weakening, local official power.

Local state corporatism is also a path of least resistance because it allows China, a country socialized in the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought, to maintain its old values. As I have elaborated on elsewhere,[79] the income from rural industry has allowed local governments to redistribute substantial amounts of money to its members in the form of various subsidies, including grain subsidies and subsidies for education, health care, old-age pensions, and housing. In addition, local state corporatism allows local officials to be not just businessmen but also overseers of community well-being. And furthermore, it allows local officials to take social need into consideration when making economic decisions; the profitability of an enterprise may not be the most important factor in determining whether it will remain in operation. The need to employ the surplus labor released by decollectivization may make it eco-

[78] Writing shortly after the reforms started, Kathleen Hartford points to the general need for cadres to increase their control over finances if they are to keep the collective alive and their power strong. See Hartford, "Socialist Agricultural Is Dead: Long Live Socialist Agriculture! Organizational Transformations in Rural China," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China*, Contemporary China Series, no. 2 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1985).

[79] Oi (fn. 43).

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nomically rational for villages to keep open an unprofitable factory.[80] One can wonder how efficient this growth will be over the long term, but at least in the medium term the emergence of local state corporatism allows the redistribution of income to remain an established and viable part of economic life in China's rural communities.

Local state corporatism holds the most threatening consequences for central-local relations.[81] The issue is how the pursuit of local interests conflicts with larger national concerns. Withholding of income and manipulation of tax revenues are only two examples of how the fiscal reforms have colored the way that central directives are implemented at the local level. More generally, the fiscal reforms have given local authorities access to and the ability to increase their resource endowments, to be used however they wish, regardless of constraints imposed by the center. The Chinese reforms have invigorated the economy, but the success of local state corporatism may in the long run force the emergence of something akin to a federal system that more clearly recognizes the rights and power of localities.

[80] China Interview 8691.
[81] See Oi (fn. 70).

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DEHIO, LONG CYCLES, AND THE GEOHISTORICAL CONTEXT OF STRUCTURAL TRANSITION

By WILLIAM R. THOMPSON*

ONE of the more vigorous areas of inquiry within international relations today focuses on the rise and decline of major powers, the etiology of systemic power concentration/deconcentration, and the wars that punctuate the periodic major redistribution of power. To explain these changes and transitions in the international hierarchy, one needs theories of the underlying processes and a historical interpretation of how those key processes unfolded over time. The revival of interest in these phenomena has yielded various theories and historical scripts,[1] each of which comes with a menu of distinctive assumptions, a set of theoretical strengths and liabilities, and a group of adherents and critics. As no one interpretation has managed to achieve intellectual hegemony, per-

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[1] Speculation on these questions and their interrelationships is certainly not novel. The modern study of international relations was inaugurated by late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century geopoliticians, most notably Mahan and Mackinder, and the critics of imperialism, such as Hobson and Lenin. Both schools of thought were responding to the structural changes that their authors were experiencing, most conspicuously, the decline of Britain and the ascent of Germany and the United States. Similarly, the contemporary revival of interest in questions of macrostructural change comes in response to another round of perceived power deconcentration. Some recent examples include Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); William R. Thompson, *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Manus Midlarsky, "Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability in Multipolar Systems," in Midlarsky; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); David P. Rapkin, ed., *World Leadership and Hegemony* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990); and Charles F. Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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haps some synthesis and borrowing might yield a new theory that reduces the weaknesses and blind spots that characterize each framework.

A case in point is the analysis of leadership long cycles.[2] One of the more salient features of this approach to macrostructural change is its emphasis on sea power and sea powers. It is also one of the more popular targets of criticism. How can a theory of macrostructural change that focuses on fewer than half of history's major power elite groups expect to explain, among other things, wars fought between and among both sea powers and land powers? Furthermore, is one to consign to theoretical oblivion such states as Ottoman Turkey, Hapsburg Spain, France, Sweden, Prussia, Austria, and Russia—most of which did not have any substantial or persistent interest in bluewater sea power?

Some critics have dismissed leadership long-cycle theory as a fundamental misinterpretation of the very behavior it seeks to explain. However one views the utility of emphasizing sea power, it is fair to say that leadership long-cycle theory could be made more robust if it also dealt more explicitly with the non–sea power portion of the world system's elite population. One way to expand the original theory in this way involves co-opting another theoretical structure—Ludwig Dehio's geohistorical interpretation of European international politics.[3] Where Dehio highlights the cyclical interaction of conflicting land and sea powers within a primarily *regional* focus, the leadership long-cycle theory focuses on the cyclical interaction of conflicting land and sea powers primarily within the context of the *global* political economy. Despite or due to the different yet overlapping biases, the two theories are highly compatible and can be readily integrated to create a stronger argument than either one can offer in isolation.

A brief overview of Dehio's interpretation of international politics since 1494 is provided as a foundation for evaluating three of his most important generalizations in the light of data on continental (land) and maritime (sea) powers.[4] Of particular interest is Dehio's assertion that

[2] See Modelski (fn. 1); George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower and Global Politics, 1494–1993* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); George Modelski and Sylvia Modelski, *Documenting Global Leadership* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); and Thompson (fn. 1).

[3] Dehio, *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle*, trans. Charles Fullman (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

[4] It might be argued that there is no need to outline what some scholars already regard as a classic analysis of international relations. It seems more realistic to assume, however, that familiarity with Dehio's specific arguments is actually quite uneven. And for all the citational homage Dehio's work may receive as an exemplar of the balance-of-power tradition, very few contemporary analyses actually adopt similar interpretations. One exception is Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, *Studies of War* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 177–209.

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there existed a long wave of continental power concentration at the European regional level that interacted with maritime power concentration. Leadership long-cycle analysis has already demonstrated the existence of a long wave of sea power concentration at the global political economy level.[5] If Dehio's key argument is also empirically supported, the pattern of interaction between these two waves and its implications will provide the basis for a robust theoretical synthesis.

Dehio's Interpretation of Historical World Politics: The Basic Principles

The crux of Dehio's interpretation of world politics is associated with his contention that if Europe had been a closed system, some great power would eventually have succeeded in establishing absolute supremacy over the other states in the region.[6] But the system was never entirely closed. Immediately before a would-be continental hegemon could unify the European region by coercion, counterweights on the eastern and/or western wings of the Continent emerged to deny a hegemonic victory by introducing new, extraregional resources into the struggle for regional supremacy. The eastern wing supplied brute land force commanded by some form of "oriental despotism." The western wing specialized in sea power, which was closely associated with its assumption of the principal commercial intermediary role between Europe and Asia and America. When both eastern and western counterweights operated simultaneously, they forced the aspiring regional hegemon to fight a resource-draining war on two fronts. The outcome was an intermittently renewed

[5] See Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2); and William R. Thompson and Karen A. Rasler, "War and Systemic Capability Reconcentration," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June 1988).

[6] Dehio (1888–1963) was a German historian, archivist, and archival administrator whose professional career spanned the period from the early 1920s to the mid-1950s. He developed his historical interpretation in response to mainstream German historians who he felt had seriously misread Germany's situation, especially prior to World War I, and thereby contributed to the German defeat in both wars. Very briefly, Dehio felt that the basic errror was the assumption that Germany could attempt to improve its relative standing as a world power without being seen as an acute threat by British decision makers. This assumption, Dehio argued, stemmed from a tendency to view world politics as if it functioned along the same lines as continental or regional balancing politics when, indeed, the two spheres operated on different principles. Dehio (fn. 3) attempted to spell out just what the rules of the world game had been in the 1494–1945 era. A second book requires some familiarity with the 1962 book and can be misleading because it focuses almost exclusively on late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German foreign policy. Dehio did not view these policies as fully isomorphic with the activities of earlier aspirants to regional hegemony. The concerns of the second book also lead to an emphasis on the significance of the opposing maritime coalition at the expense of discussing the historical role of the eastern flank. See Dehio, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, trans. Dieter Persner (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).

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balance of European power as the regional system was opened to extraregional resources controlled by states on the region's main flanks. The intermittency of the balancing dynamic depended on a periodic concentration of strength on land in the form of an aspiring regional hegemon.

France made the first bid for regional supremacy in 1494, by attacking Italy. It was resisted by Spain and then, briefly, by a unified Hapsburg entity led by Charles V. The second bid, this time in the name of Hapsburg regional hegemony, was stopped by a Franco-Ottoman coalition prior to the emergence of a functioning western maritime flank. Working in conjunction with the English, the Netherlands became the first western counterweight to Spain's bid for continental supremacy under Philip II.

By the middle of the seventeenth century Spain had yielded its status as a primary continental power to a reascending France. Louis XIV's activities of the late seventeenth century ultimately threatened both the continental and the maritime spheres. Another Anglo-Dutch coalition organized the first large-scale maritime encirclement of the Continent and defeated the navy of the leading continental power at La Hogue in 1692. In the trough between La Hogue and Trafalgar (1805), the declining strength of the French kept the mid-century (1740s–80s) Anglo-French fighting from turning into a struggle over either continental or maritime supremacy.

The Spanish and first French ascents to continental domination and their subsequent declines were gradual, drawn-out affairs. The second French ascent, in 1792, "reared up abruptly out of the uttermost depths of the trough, only to crash down with equal abruptness."[7] Russo-British probing and sparring along the Asian-Balkan imperial perimeter followed the exhaustion of Napoleonic France. The Russian forward momentum, frequently tentative in nature, was repeatedly checked by British containment strategies.

From Dehio's perspective, the ascending Germany of the late nineteenth century was seeking equality with other leading powers (rather than European supremacy) and an acceleration of Britain's relative economic decline. In response to a combination of commercial and naval rivalries and geographical proximity, Britain, in turn, identified Germany as its primary threat. The strategic circumstances of World War I combat then encouraged Germany to operate as if it were indeed seeking regional supremacy. By the Second World War, both Germany and Japan had become more overt and ambitious in their assault on the status

[7] Dehio (fn. 3), 139.

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quo. The end of the war brought the territorial division of the losing European challenger as well as the division of the entire region into American and Soviet spheres. In the process, the European system of states and the distinctive modes of behavior associated with its functioning came to an end in 1945.

Dehio identified the principal dynamic of this system as the movement from a peak in the strength of the leading continental powers through a long trough to the next peak and so on. The long troughs were characterized by a leveling process: the continental power that had earlier peaked was in gradual decline while one or more other states were likely to be on the ascent. During these troughs, relative power relationships were unstable and in flux, making realignments likely. As phases of least likely resistance, the troughs provided windows of opportunity for the emergence of new land powers, and upwardly mobile aspirants were encouraged to "break through the dead weight of the status quo." Finally, Dehio contended, the strength of the western sea powers should be most concentrated during the continental troughs.

Thus, Dehio's interpretation emphasizes the rhythms of two ongoing and dissynchronized cycles, or waves, centered on two very different types of major powers: on land, the leading continental power rose and declined; at sea, the leading commercial intermediary and sea power rose and declined. For the most part, the one was in decline as the other was peaking and vice versa.

Not only were the relative power trajectories of continental and sea powers dissynchronized with one another, but they also built and maintained power in totally different ways. For their part, the continental powers were seen as rising to regional primacy on the basis of absolute monarchies, large armies and bureaucracies, and the variable success of foreign policy strategies. Proximate adversaries were beneficial to the extent that they provided a motivation for developing strength. In marked contrast, the maritime powers were successful in long-distance trade to the extent that they were able to restrain their monarchies, to develop large navies instead of large armies, and to substitute some element of democracy for bureaucratic government. Their security depended on geographical insularity or the absence of proximate adversaries. Some type of water barrier—marshes, rivers, dikes, channels, oceans—was needed to provide protection against predatory land powers.

As specialists in long-distance trade between different cultural regions, the maritime powers were primarily concerned with territorial and market expansion outside the European region; by contrast, the continental powers tended to be preoccupied with territorial expansion

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within the region. Operating on entirely different strategic vectors, it would seem that the interests of maritime and continental powers were not inherently likely to conflict, at least not on an ongoing basis: maritime powers had little interest in territorial expansion on the Continent; and the continental powers were unlikely to set the cultivation of long-distance trade as their highest priority.

Collisions over conflicts of interest nevertheless occurred with impressive regularity, with the implications of achieving regional supremacy at the root of the problem. Once a continental power achieved regional supremacy, it was in an excellent position to acquire supremacy in the realm of maritime, intercontinental trade—the quest for regional supremacy invariably led would-be hegemons to seek control over adjacent sources of economic prosperity. Historically in Europe this meant attacking either northern Italy (in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries) or the Low Countries. Successful expansion into these areas brought with it the promise of a quick fix for relative wealth standings as well as significant improvements in maritime capabilities. Hence, there were strong incentives for the leading maritime power and would-be successors to prevent another power from achieving regional supremacy or hegemony because that could threaten their own sphere of activities, the global economy.

That would-be regional hegemons were not always fully cognizant of the maritime implications of their continental stratagems made occasional conflict with the western maritime powers even more likely. Furthermore, when the continental powers were explicitly interested in competing for control of long-distance trade, the potential for acute conflict at the regional and global levels was even greater. By contrast, collision between an aspiring regional hegemon and the counterweights on the eastern flank was dependent on the less subtle dynamics of mutually timed interests in expansion into the same territories.

Therefore, an aspiring regional hegemon that moved to expand toward the immediate north (the Low Countries) and toward the east, either simultaneously or sequentially, ran the risk of galvanizing resistance on both flanks. Dehio suggests that regional hegemons repeatedly made this same strategic error. Rebuffed in an unsuccessful clash with the western maritime power(s), continental powers would then attempt to compensate by attacking in the opposite direction. They doomed their own efforts time and again by creating the geostrategic preconditions for the extraregional intervention that would preserve the European balance of power.

Compensatory behavior is not the most compelling explanation for a

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consistent pattern of strategic irrationality. However, Dehio pointed out that the maritime powers increasingly sought to contain hegemonic aspirants by encircling the European peninsula. If, however, the leading continental power could expand to the southeast successfully, it might deal with two strategic problems with one offensive push. The maritime containment strategy could be defeated by outflanking the naval encirclement via land while also evading "the Russian colossus." But to work, this scheme required regional supremacy, a tautological assumption: it could not very well be a successful strategy to achieve supremacy if supremacy was assumed to be a prerequisite to success. As a result, in misconstruing the grand strategies of the leading continental power, the aspiring hegemon often overextended itself and depleted its resources and energies.

In this fashion, the challenger to the regional and, potentially, the global status quo contributed to the maintenance of the regional balance of power by consistently developing strategies of attack that only increased the probability of failure. This sequence of events could not be repeated indefinitely: the tendency to draw in the flanking powers and their resources concealed an important hidden cost. Each successive iteration of the balancing process further diminished the amount of power resident within the European region relative to what could be mobilized outside it.

The European regional system of states therefore had a finite life. Born in a struggle that had extinguished the autonomy of an even smaller region and its prototypical predecessor (the Italian state system), it in turn was extinguished in another hegemonic struggle and replaced by a new, bipolar global system. Hence, the durability of the European regional system may have depended on a unique constellation of geohistorical factors. Would-be regional conquerors found themselves sandwiched between sea powers enriched by intercontinental trade on one flank and large reservoirs of military manpower on the other. Despite repeated attempts at achieving regional domination, challengers were unable to overwhelm the western and eastern flanks with their powerful resources. Simultaneously and equally consistently the continental strategies created to overcome these twin barriers to supremacy proved to be self-defeating. As a consequence, the European subsystem retained its basic pluralism and independence as long as it managed to maintain its central position in the larger system. Ultimately, however, the narrow regional stage came to be absorbed by the broader, global stage when the principal eastern and western flanking states divided the European region into their own spheres of influence.

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Some Implications of Dehio's Perspective

Dehio's interpretation of world politics since the 1490s has implications for current theoretical assessments of international relations. First, it is necessary to draw descriptive and theoretical distinctions between global and regional theaters of action. Second, one must evaluate the empirical accuracy of some of Dehio's key generalizations. Third, assuming a suitable level of empirical corroboration, one can explore the possibility of integrating the Dehio argument with leadership long-cycle theory.

Nongeneric International Relations

Underlying Dehio's distinctions between regional and global activities is the idea that much of what we conventionally think of as modern, or post-1500, world politics is not really world politics at all. Rather, it is the regional politics of one particular subsystem, namely, Europe. This is hardly a startling observation: many international relations analysts would no doubt find such a statement noncontroversial. It is one thing to assume it, however, and quite another to acknowledge all its ramifications.

The modal approach to this question is to acknowledge that between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries the most significant international actors tended to be European. The European subsystem dominated the rest of the world, and therefore it is European international relations that defines the immediate past history of contemporary world politics. Granted, there are prime non-European candidates, such as the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, that deserve consideration as sometime members of the most significant elite actor category. It is also important to note that European dominance over the rest of the world was achieved only gradually. Despite these caveats, it is the image of European dominance or, at least, centrality that fosters the assumption that the external relations of the European great powers have been synonymous with what might be called *generic international relations*—a notion that Dehio's perspective implicitly rejects.

European international relations between 1494 and 1945 were in large part the product of a uniquely configured regional context that featured intermittent interventions of extraregional resources by actors on the region's eastern and western flanks to defeat tendencies toward regional unification. By contrast, international relations scholars are more likely to interpret the balance-of-power mechanism as operating independently of a particular context, in which it is logical for the members of a state system to band together to prevent one of its members from achieving

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hegemony over the system. At best, some nod toward the specific European context is made by creating a special role for the "balancer," a state (usually modeled on Britain) that is somewhat aloof from the fray yet almost altruistically prepared to ensure that a balance is maintained by adding its resources to whatever side is necessary to achieve this functional goal.

Clearly, there is some inherent logic to a united front against a mutual threat. According to Dehio, however, the celebrated European balance owed less to the inherent logic, which seemed to escape the attention of a number of European decision makers from time to time, and more to sea power on the western regional edge and those huge reservoirs of manpower and territory on the eastern edge attempting to break into European politics for their own expansionary purposes. Presumably, another regional system that lacked these twin geopolitical features either would lack a history of (successful) power balancing or might have developed an entirely different approach to the problem of preserving its actors' autonomy.

To what extent, if at all, does the historical evidence lend credence to the Dehio interpretation? Fortunately, the central thrust of Dehio's perspective is readily susceptible to empirical testing; and should it find ample empirical support, its implications for other theoretical interpretations will be all the more reinforced.

Testing the Dehio Interpretation

Dehio emphasized a central rhythm of regional politics predicated on the relative rise and decline of a leading continental power. He was quite specific about the shapes of these waves. Spain gradually rose, peaked in 1585, and then gradually declined. France gradually rose as well, bypassing Spain by 1659–61 and peaking in 1692, before beginning a long and gradual decline in the eighteenth century. The second, revolutionary and Napoleonic rise of France was meteoric. Peaking just before another decisive sea battle in 1805, its crash was equally abrupt. Dehio describes the fourth and final crest, Germany's in the first half of the twentieth century, as if it took place quite prematurely. Once war began, however, circumstances encouraged Germany to seek regional domination. By contrast, German aspirations in World War II adhered more closely to the historical pattern of regional domination. Unlike the earlier three cases, though, no decisive sea battle demarcated the apex of the German ascent.

A four-crested wave of regional power concentration and domination, with its delineation of peaks and troughs and waves of varying shapes,

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certainly provides an explicit empirical focus. Yet Dehio's interpretation offers even more, arguing that each successive, would-be conqueror was in a relatively weaker position than its predecessors had been to achieve its regional objectives.[8] He proposed a metaphorical explanation for this negative trend—that by the eighteenth century the "outer-regions of West and East [had begun] to rob the ancient central region of light and air." Put less metaphorically, the relative power potential of the European interior was diminishing as extra-European power potentials improved. Thus, we should expect the four-crested wave of regional power concentration to have an observable negative slope that becomes particularly more noticeable after Louis XIV.

Finally, Dehio argued that western sea power was concentrated in the troughs of the continental power wave,[9] though with the qualification that this was a post-Louis XIV phenomenon. Since Dehio's troughs are fairly long, the precise timing of the alternation of the peaks of continental and sea power is less than exact. Still, the notion of alternating peaks is quite novel. Nor is it intuitively obvious. Sea powers might peak, for example, in the process of blocking continental powers that are also peaking. Alternatively, one might not anticipate any consistent relational pattern between concentrations of the two types of power.

Yet the pattern of alternation is fairly important to Dehio's interpretation, for sea power becomes increasingly important to his scheme after the sixteenth century. Further, he credits declining sea power with encouraging assaults on the status quo in the twentieth century. Although this factor clearly cannot be said to operate at constant strength from 1494 on, however, Dehio never made clear precisely when it became operative as an important feature.

In any event, the Dehio interpretation suggests at least three highly significant features that need to be examined empirically. We should expect to find a negatively sloped set of fluctuations in regional power distributions with four peaks—three of which are identified as occurring at 1585, 1692, and 1805. The first two waves should be gradual; the second two should be abrupt. The fourth wave should probably be the most difficult of the four to discern. And last, the concentration of sea power, at least after 1714, should occur somewhere in between the peaks in continental power.

There is already ample access to serial data on sea power concentration.[10] What is needed is a similar series for continental power distribu-

[8] Ibid., 139.
[9] Ibid., 90.
[10] See Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2).

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tions. Fortunately, the concept of continental power does not require information on all conceivable dimensions of capability. Nor does the concept imply that we need to be concerned about whether a continental power's influence attempts are successful or even executed.

A continental power is a state that organizes its resources, especially bureaucratic and military ones, to advance its territorial, economic, and security interests in its roughly immediate neighborhood. Thus, although continental powers may have some interest in sea power, their primary orientation remains fixed on adjacent territorial concerns. One expects continental powers to have large armies and comparatively smaller navies, just as one associates states that are primarily maritime with large navies and small armies. Therefore, a primary emphasis on developing armies should suffice as an indicator for comparing the relative strength of continental powers.

The most direct and probably most time-honored way to measure armies is to count personnel. Army size need not be correlated with efficiency, combat readiness, élan, or the general quality of the soldiers. Nor need we assume that a large army can overwhelm a technologically superior, if less numerous, foe. Thus, army size is admittedly a crude indicator, but it does seem to correspond closely to the notion of continental power.

For the most part, Levy's guidelines on identifying great powers have been followed: France (1490s–1945), England (1490s–1945), Austria (1490s–1918, with a break at 1520–55), Spain (1490s–1800, with Spain assuming the united Hapsburg identity between 1520 and 1555), the Netherlands (1590s–1800), Sweden (1590s–1809), Russia/the Soviet Union (1700 on), Prussia/Germany (1640s–1945), and Italy (1860s–1943).[11] Data on non-European great powers (the United States, 1815 on; Japan, 1870s–1945) are also included because of Dehio's emphasis on the growing significance of extra-European resources. In some cases the dates of inclusion and exclusion are broader than Levy's, in order to smooth the impact of states breaking into and falling out of the elite circle.[12]

Inevitably, there is more information available for some armies than

[11] Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 47.

[12] Tilly notes that this type of Eurocentric bias overlooks large and powerful armies in China, west Africa, Persia, India, Mexico, and South America, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He is certainly right, but the current emphasis on Europe as a regional system neutralizes the power of the criticism for this examination of Dehio's propositions. See Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 171.

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for others. The worst case in terms of data is the Ottoman Empire, for which there is little specific information on army size. Indeed, on other grounds one could even argue against including the Ottoman army as an early extra-European resource, but the absence of data makes the issue moot anyway. In general, data availability improves after the sixteenth century and is best for the most prominent land powers (France and Prussia/Germany). The availability of data on states such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, and Russia varies from period to period; there are, for example, periods for which there is very little information. In these cases extrapolation between known points is utilized when necessary; that is, barring bouts of warfare, army size is assumed to be fairly stable between the better-documented periods.

A last point: the limitations of the available information base simply preclude providing data for each year from the 1490s on. Rather, observations encompassing five-year intervals (for example, 1490–94, 1495–1500) are about the best that can be expected. And even the five-year unit can have its problems. If war breaks out toward the middle or the end of the interval, the half decade will likely reflect very different army sizes for the times before and after the mobilization. One must decide whether to record the highest army size or attempt to arrive at an average for the entire interval. Wherever possible, the choice was to average, on the grounds that an average is apt to be less misleading than the highest figure, which may be an accurate representation of only one year in the interval. The drawback of this approach is that the peak size of each national army is artificially depressed unless that peak is maintained throughout the five-year span. Since this downward bias holds equally for all states, however, it should not create any major problems for comparison purposes.[13]

Analyzing the Dehio Propositions

Figure 1 plots data for the first two of Dehio's propositions. The proportional army sizes of Spain, France, and Prussia/Germany are plotted for five-year intervals beginning in 1490–94 and ending in 1940–44. Information on Prussia prior to 1840 is not plotted, solely in order to aid in

[13] Some data on comparative army sizes had been reported earlier in Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers* (Boston, Mass.: Unwin and Hyman, 1989); and it has been used in William R. Thompson, "The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing," *International Interactions* 16, no. 2 (1990). However, these data were extracted from other army size inventories, and the quality of some of the earlier information turned out to be lower than anticipated in that some army sizes were overinflated. The preliminary information base was also missing a great deal of data. The current army size data collection is based on information culled from some 150 sources. The data and the sources utilized are reported in Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "The Growth of Armies" (Manuscript in progress).

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

FIGURE 1
RISE AND DECLINE OF LEADING CONTINENTAL POWERS

interpreting the figure. We are looking for four crests at about Dehio's peaks, with each successive peak lower than the one that preceded it. The first forty years plotted in the figure indicate some oscillation of position between France and Spain with Spain's relative position definitively passing France's position in the first half of the 1530s.

The first peak in the series is reached in the late 1560s. Spanish decline then continued more or less through 1800. The rate of decline was slow until the early 1600s. What appears to be an early French passing in the interval 1610–14 actually reflects a short-term, rapid demobilization on the part of the Spanish during the Dutch-Spanish truce of 1609–1621. France's upward trajectory genuinely intercepts the Spanish downward trajectory about 1645–49.

A second peak is discernible at 1690–94. It too is followed by a drawn-out process of positional decline. Whereas the Spanish decline essentially moved steadily downward, the equally prolonged French decline was interrupted by a rally in the mid-eighteenth century that peaked at 1745–49. This peak is, however, noticeably lower than the first French peak and the last one at 1800–1804, in the midst of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. As predicted, the last French peak was abrupt and brief.

The second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the

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TABLE 1
PEAKS AND TRANSITIONS IN CONTINENTAL POWER

Leading Continental Power	*Dehio Peak*[a]	*Observed Peak*[b]	*Dehio Transition*[a]	*Observed Transition*
Spain	1585	1560–64 (.649)	1659–61	1645–49
France I	1692	1690–94 (.484)	n.a.	n.a.
France II	1805	1800–1804 (.414)	not specified	1870–74
Germany	WWI/ WWII	1910–14 1935–39 (.282/.257)	n.a.	n.a.

[a] Dehio (1962) is the source of the peak and transition predictions.
[b] The numbers in parentheses represent the leading continental power's relative share of army capabilities.

twentieth century are characterized by an oscillation between France and Germany (see Figure 1). Germany first passed France, though not decisively in terms of relative army size, during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). German positional passage is depicted as occurring again in both of the world wars of the twentieth century. Not depicted in Figure 1 are the other major states both within and outside the region. Their inclusion would demonstrate that the positional rivalries of this period were more complex than the simpler Hapsburg-Valois feud and certainly more complicated than the continental seesaw between France and Germany isolated in Figure 1.

Nevertheless, Figure 1 illustrates a series of wavelike continental transitions that closely accords with the expectations set by the Dehio perspective. Although the proportional army size peaks do not always coincide with the predicted years, they do fall quite close (always within two decades) to the critical sea battles used by Dehio as peak markers. The identity of the states and the shapes of their waves are predicted well. So, too, is the negative trend in the height of the wave peaks. Each successive peak identified in Table 1 reflects a smaller share of total army capability than the one preceding. Thus, Dehio's first two predictions are strongly supported fluctuations in continental power as measured by army size.

Figure 2 is useful for evaluating the third Dehio prediction of alternating concentrations in continental and sea power after 1714. To clarify the outcome of the test, three chronological series—two for continental

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

FIGURE 2
POWER CONCENTRATION

power and one for sea power—are plotted in Figure 2. The main continental power series splices together the Spanish series (1490s–1630s), the French series (1640s–1860s), and the German series (1870s–1940s). The proportional shares for these states are based on an aggregate of all of the information on army size. This series is the one most likely to exhibit Dehio's negative trend in successive continental power peaks. A second continental power series, indicated by a dotted line, focuses on the distribution of continental power within the region by removing information on Russia/the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.

The sea power series is based on data collected and analyzed earlier.[14] The principal focus is on the distribution of capital or first-line warships, the specific criteria for which are modified to reflect changes in naval technology and armament standards.[15] This series splices together the

[14] Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2).

[15] The data on distribution of naval power reflect changes in indicator emphases keyed to pertinent technological changes. The focus between 1494 and 1654 is on state-owned, armed oceangoing vessels. Over the next two centuries, from 1655 to 1859, the focus is on the number of ships of the line that qualify as front-line fighting vessels, as defined by their carrying an (escalating) minimum number of guns. First-class battleships, also determined by increasing minimal size attributes (guns, armor, and so forth), are counted between 1860 and 1945. Another series on naval expenditures (1816–1945) is factored in to smooth some of the abrupt technological changes that occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After 1945 the

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naval power proportions controlled by each century's leading maritime power—the Portuguese (1490s–1575), the Dutch (1580–1675), and the British (1680–1945).

Figure 2 depicts four waves for each of the three series. A Portuguese sea power wave crested first in the early 1500s and was overlapped by the Spanish continental power crest of the mid-1500s. The Dutch sea power peak occurred about 1615, or about six decades after the Spanish continental peak. The Spanish remobilized their troop strength for the Thirty Years' War but failed to alter their essentially downward trajectory.

The French relative continental position peaked in the 1690s, some six decades after the Dutch maritime peak. This was followed by the first British sea power peak, in 1720, certainly a time of trough for continental power concentration. Skipping over the moderate French rally of the mid-eighteenth century, the next two waves occurred close together. A continental power peak of the early 1800s in the main series barely rises above the naval concentration series that peaks two decades later, in the 1820s. Only in the European continental power series is the peak of 1800–1804 more respectable.

After a prolonged period of gradual decline in maritime capability concentration, the twin German crests of the twentieth century in the main series failed to surpass or even meet the declining British position at sea. The European series shows a similar peak for World War I. The World War II peak in the European continental series, however, more closely resembles the Spanish and French peaks observed earlier in the continental series. Although not depicted in Figure 2, a fifth sea power concentration peak, based on the United States lead after World War II, coincided with the German collapse.

Taken together, then, the navy and army distribution data, however conceptualized, strongly support Dehio's third proposition: the rhythms of continental and sea power are not in phase with one another. Rather, a general pattern of alternation more or less characterizes the entire period. After the first pair of Iberian waves, sea power concentration occurred immediately after the defeat of the hegemonic aspirations of the leading continental power. After a period of maritime power decay, a new continental source of threat emerged and the process repeated itself. Hence, while the continental and sea power concentration peaks do not coincide, this finding does not mean that the timing of the respective serial peaks is unrelated. A continental threat appears to have encour-

criteria shift to incorporate attack aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and sea-based missile accuracy and megatonnage.

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aged maritime power concentration; maritime power deconcentration, in turn, appears to have encouraged continental power challenges.[16] The only element of Dehio's argument that is not supported is his qualifier about Louis XIV. The data suggest that this alternation pattern preceded the demise of Louis XIV by one hundred years.

Dehio's Interpretation and the Leadership Long-Cycle Approach to the Study of War and Structural Change

Dehio's interpretation, predicated on a unique geohistorical approach, has yielded several strongly supported and reasonably novel generalizations about the historical evolution of what we frequently but not always correctly refer to as world politics. Is Dehio's approach worth co-opting to elaborate or modify more recently developed and still developing frameworks?

Of the several alternative approaches to the relationships between structural change and war, Dehio's interpretation is most compatible with the leadership long-cycle framework. The two approaches are also highly complementary: while they share some common denominators, each emphasizes some features that are less emphasized by the other approach. Thus, the two perspectives can be enhanced by a merger of their central premises.[17]

Integrating the Dehio and Leadership Long-Cycle Perspectives

The leadership long-cycle perspective argues that a global system began to emerge in the 1490s, after the Portuguese began to follow a new route for Eurasian trade. The governance of global politics, focusing primarily on the management of long-distance trade, is intermittent and dependent on the concentration of capabilities of global reach. One state, designated the world power, emerges from periods of global war in a position of preeminence and with a commanding lead in these global reach

[16] One anonymous reviewer has suggested that it is odd that alternating cycles should have been more conducive to European balancing than synchronous cycles in which one type of power would have been readily available to match or balance the other type. Although synchronization seems more logical, one's view of the European alternations depends on how one interprets the pattern. Thus, the pattern might better be labeled "synchronized alternation" if one emphasizes the tendency for declining sea power to encourage ascending land power, which, in turn, leads to a reconcentration of sea power in order to suppress the continental threat.

[17] Goldstein (fn. 1), 127, briefly hints that the two perspectives can be combined. However, some less direct integration of perspectives had already taken place. For example, Dehio's arguments strongly influenced the arguments about global warfare advanced in William R. Thompson, "Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of the Transitional Model," in Albert Bergesen, ed., *Crises in the World-System* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983).

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capabilities. The ability to pay for those capabilities is predicated in large part on leadership in a prewar wave of economic innovation. Winning the global war and controlling a high proportion of the most valuable capabilities then enables the world power to develop policies for the management of the world's political economy. As the leader's capability position erodes over time, so, too, does its ability to supply global governance.

Naval power and leading-sector economic innovation are two of the more important capabilities for achieving global reach. Naval power (and, more recently, aerospace power) has been necessary to move force over long distances, to protect long-distance trade, and to deny challengers access to the more important sea-lanes. Leading-sector innovation has been critical for fueling economic growth, developing elite interests in trade and global orientations, and generating economic surplus to pay for the naval power and efforts to manage global political problems. Since naval power tends to decay and leading-sector innovations cluster in time and space, however, they are subject to long waves of prosperity and depression.[18]

The timing of the ascent of the world power and of its relative decline basically determines the rhythm of the long cycle of global leadership. A period of postwar leadership gives way to deconcentration and deteriorating order. Challengers emerge and become stronger. The most dangerous challenger tends to be a hybrid power with mixed strategic orientations: primarily a land power with continental aspirations, it also makes some effort to acquire sea power. There begin to emerge signs of a nascent global strategic orientation, usually in direct conflict with the more traditional, local preoccupations. Others view a victory in dominating the European continent as a first step or worse to a more direct threat to the leadership, rules, and order of the global political economy. Yet another round of global war ensues to decide once again who will determine policy for the global system.

The common denominators of the Dehio and leadership long-cycle frameworks are a historical interest in systemic processes that began in 1494. Both emphasize, too, sea power and the early development of an extra-European global political economy in which maritime powers

[18] This point is developed further in William R. Thompson, "Long Waves, Technological Innovation and Relative Decline," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990); idem, "Systemic Leadership and Economic Growth Waves in the Long Run," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (March 1992); and George Modelski and William R. Thompson, "K-Waves in International Relations: Structural Change in the Global Economy and World Politics" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., April 1992).

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were dominant, as well as the importance of regional/global rivalries between continental powers and maritime powers for understanding the outbreak of global war.[19] Finally, both stress waves of power concentration as a key to deciphering the evolution of structural change.

Perhaps the most frequent and serious objection to leadership long-cycle analyses is that bestowing primacy on sea power tends to divide the major powers into two classes: those with and those without (any or much) sea power. Then to focus exclusively on the former class at the expense of the latter artificially truncates the whole of international politics and thereby ignores much of what is customarily considered important to an understanding of international politics.[20]

Yet what is often overlooked by such criticisms is that the Dehio perspective and that of the leadership long cycle share a particularly strong appreciation of the need to distinguish between the regional politics of Europe and the politics of the transoceanic political economy. Dehio emphasized the dynamics of the region and its intermittent interaction with the transoceanic political economy as a major source of extraregional resources. Leadership long cyclists have reversed the emphasis, to stress the dynamics of the transoceanic political economy and its intermittent interaction with the European region as a source of threat to the governing of the long-distance economy.

Sea power has been a sine qua non for participation in the transoceanic system. It was also essential for containing threatening continental powers within Europe. These are two of the most basic reasons for stressing the significance of sea power in both the Dehio and the leadership long-

[19] Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2) express appreciation for the role of critical sea battles; and Rasler and Thompson (fn. 13) demonstrate a strong interest in the maritime/continental power distinction. On the other hand, there is some divergence on the interpretation of Portugal's role. Dehio recognized Portugal's assumption of the role of Eurasian intermediary in the sixteenth century but argued that the lack of insularity prevented Portugal from enjoying much autonomy from its Iberian neighbor, Spain. This position is difficult to sustain. If it had been true prior to 1580, it is doubtful that the clear distinction between Portuguese and Spanish territorial acquisitions in Asia and America would have persisted throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as well as during the sixty-year Spanish absorption of Portugal. Spain's difficulties in breaking into the Asian spice trade in the sixteenth century are also difficult to explain if one regards Portugal as subordinated to Spain prior to 1580. There is agreement, however, that Portugal failed to assume the western flanking role.

[20] This type of observation is commonly encountered in such critiques as Aristide R. Zolberg, " 'World' and 'System': A Misalliance," in William R. Thompson, ed., *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," *World Politics* 37 (April 1985); idem, "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions and the Long Peace," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *The Long Postwar Peace* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1991); Richard Rosecrance, "Long Cycle Theory and International Relations," *International Organization* 41 (Spring 1987); Charles F. Doran, "Power Cycle Theory of Systems Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities," in Midlarsky (fn. 1); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Powers," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Summer 1990).

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cycle frameworks. But Dehio's framework serves as a reminder that it can be theoretically beneficial to take account of the nonmaritime world. Combining Dehio's regional dynamics (essentially continental power concentration countered by extraregional flankers) with the global dynamics of the leadership long cycle (essentially maritime power concentration processes fueled by long growth waves and punctuated by global wars) yields a stronger explanation than one gets when only one of the dynamics is stressed.

The combined explanation also comes across in a more explicit fashion. For instance, Dehio discussed sea powers, and leadership long cyclists discuss continental powers; but both frameworks do a better job of talking about the other type of actor. Almost by default, depending on which level of analysis is stressed, continental powers appear to be shadowy spoilers in the global political economy just as sea powers might be viewed as intermittent intruders into the European region. Neither image is completely off the mark, but elaborating on both simultaneously yields a more comprehensive representation.

Critics of leadership long-cycle analyses also object to assigning significance to some major power wars and not to others on the basis of whether the postwar level of power concentration is fundamentally altered.[21] How, they ask, can one downgrade such well known major power wars as the Thirty Years' War, the War of Austrian Succession, or the Seven Years' War?[22] Presumably, these wars had the same potential for structural change as global wars. They pitted the same contenders against one another. They involved most and sometimes all of the major powers of their time. They were fought throughout the world. They were not even always separated from the global wars by all that many years.

If the losers had won or if the winners had won more decisively, might not the structural outcome have been something other than more of the same? If so, why sacrifice the ability to explain the nature of a war's structural outcome by stipulating that some wars are special because of their structural outcome? Even more cynically, it is sometimes suggested that the cases of global war are given so much undue attention merely to salvage the predicted roughly hundred-year rhythm of world leadership.[23] By implication, then, were any of the mid-century wars to be rec-

[21] See Levy (fn. 20, 1985); and Thompson and Rasler (fn. 5).

[22] For strong appreciations of the historical and theoretical significance of the Thirty Years' War in international relations, see, among others, Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); Gilpin (fn. 1); Wallerstein (fn. 1); Goldstein (fn. 1); and Midlarsky (fn. 1).

[23] The five periods of global war highlighted in leadership long-cycle theory are 1494–1516, 1585–1608, 1688–1713, 1792–1815, and 1914–45.

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ognized as equally important, the alleged symmetry of the cycle would be undermined.

Of course, the different approaches are not asking the same questions. Leadership long-cycle analyses have not asked why some wars are more devastating than others or why some wars lead to a showdown while others end in a draw. Instead, this school is most interested in whether these wars follow any pattern that facilitates the reconcentration of global reach capabilities.

Dehio's argument, by contrast, provides a simple explanation of the lesser consequences of the mid-century wars. It was a matter of bringing together the appropriate structural and, one should think, attitudinal ingredients. In the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries the leading continental powers were on downward trajectories, their perceived ability to challenge or threaten either the European or the global status quo not yet gone but certainly less than it once had been. Moreover, the energies of the leading maritime power had not yet wound down sufficiently to encourage full-scale attacks on its seemingly increasingly vulnerable position. Put most simply, the necessary ingredients for a global war were missing. The critical element of a peaking, expanding continental power in a global environment of defensive, declining maritime power was absent; as a consequence, less was perceived to be at stake in the mid-century wars.

In sum, Dehio's argument offers one explanation for the linkage between regional and global politics and the consequent bouts of intense conflict when continental interests clash with maritime interests. Dehio's emphasis on the historical contingency of the European regional theater also underscores the basic regional-global distinction and the need to differentiate continental powers from maritime powers. Dehio's argument also implies, though less obviously, that continental powers declined as a consequence of exhausting their resource bases in two-front wars.

What then does the leadership long-cycle framework bring to the pooled undertaking? First, it provides the measurement of maritime concentration and deconcentration that lends credence to the accuracy of Dehio's assessments. (See Figure 2.) Second, where Dehio's account lacks an explanation of why maritime power concentrates and then deconcentrates, leadership long-cycle analysts address that as a primary question (although more work certainly needs to be done). An understanding of the long economic growth waves that fuel the rise and relative decline of the global system's leading economies appears to be crucial to explaining

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the rhythms of the fluctuations in power concentration in the global political economy.[24]

Dehio predicted that peaks of sea power would occur in the troughs of continental power concentrations, but he left the point relatively underdeveloped. The observation takes on greater theoretical salience only when global and regional dynamics are given equal treatment. The global and regional dynamics are different and ostensibly driven by different motors. To fathom how the two sets of processes interact, one needs a better understanding of what both sets are about.

Another liability in stressing one set of processes at the expense of the other is evident in Dehio's concluding discussion of the "narrow stage," a concept that is not adequate for explaining the power dynamics of the post-1945 world. With the demise of the European system of states as a relatively autonomous regional subsystem, the old behavioral generalizations based on some 450 years of history were said not to apply any longer. Dehio's "narrow stage" had been swallowed up by the "broader stage." The principles that would provide the foundation for the broader stage did not seem clear, although Dehio noted that land power, in the form of Soviet technological advances in space, seemed to be triumphing over sea power. Sea power, in turn, was described as losing its traditional importance as the potential of air attacks reduced the protection provided by insulating bodies of water.[25] Similarly, it was said to be becom-

[24] The question of how and why maritime leaders experience relative decline has been addressed in William R. Thompson and Gary Zuk, "World Power and the Strategic Trap of Territorial Commitments," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (September 1986); Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth: The Systemic Leader Case," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (March 1988); Karen A. Rasler, "Spending, Deficits and Welfare Investment Tradeoffs: Cause or Effect of Leadership Decline?" in David P. Rapkin, ed., *World Leadership and Hegemony* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990); George Modelski, "Global Leadership: End Game Scenarios," in Rapkin; Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (September 1991); idem, "Relative Decline and the Overconsumption-Underinvestment Hypothesis," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (September 1991); idem, "Political-Economic Tradeoffs and British Relative Decline," in Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, eds., *Defense, Welfare and Growth* (London: Routledge, 1992); Thompson (fn. 18). A more comprehensive statement is currently in progress. However, the basic contention is that the relative decline of continental and maritime powers must be explained differently. As Dehio observed, continental powers exhaust themselves on the battlefield. Maritime powers may exhaust themselves militarily, too, but the roots of their relative decline have much more to do with failing to maintain their lead in technological innovation. This approach may appear to disagree with Kennedy's (fn. 1) well-known emphasis on imperial overstretch as a generic explanation of great power decline. But in a 1990 letter to the author Kennedy acknowledges that a state's capacities and obligations logically can become imbalanced either by increasing its ends (as in intensive war participation) or by experiencing shrinking means (as in the loss of economic competitiveness) or both. He referred to the first type as the German variant and to the second type as the British variant. Thus, the amount of overlap in the two approaches to relative decline is in fact greater than might otherwise appear.

[25] The asserted ascendancy of land power over sea power after World War II is another issue on which leadership long-cycle analysis is not in agreement with the Dehio interpreta-

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ing more difficult to exploit extra-European resources for the purposes of international politics. Even the current leading sea power, the United States, seemed to be abandoning the customary policies associated with insular naval powers.

Some of these observations, products of overemphasizing the narrow stage, have simply not stood the test of time. Seen with an eye to the broader stage, which according to leadership long-cycle analysis began to emerge as early as the 1490s, the historical continuities of world politics appear more fundamental than are the novelties of the post-1945 situation. From a Eurocentric, regional perspective, the main action has revolved around the transitions between the leading continental powers and an aspiring hegemon caught between two flanks. Over time, the flanks grew so strong that they extinguished the power potential of the regional middle. But from a global perspective, the conflict action is focused on the transitions between the more globally oriented maritime powers and the periodic showdowns between some combination of the maritime and regionally based continental powers.

To be sure, the leading European continental powers were always more of a hybrid than Dehio allowed. They possessed maritime/global capabilities and aspirations and thus were rivals of the leading maritime powers at the same time as they were expanding their regional territorial control. Part of a more balanced account of their repeated defeats is that their continental-maritime drives "wobbled."[26] This vacillation between the two strategic orientations without fully committing to either one proved fatal, because the global/maritime capabilities were never quite up to the demands placed upon them when the showdowns occurred.

The process of transition among the maritime/technologically innovative states is likely to continue. Indeed, this is what the debate about the relative decline of the United States is all about. The antagonisms inherent in the maritime/continental hybrid are likely to persist as well. Dehio's flanks may have outgrown the historical European milieu, but their contrasting strategic orientations reproduced one of the more enduring dualisms of power in world politics.

Yet there is also a strong possibility that even Dehio's requiem for the European region was premature. There are actually three possibilities here. (1) Nobody really predicted the extent of Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Dehio assumed the American-Soviet division of Europe

tion. This question has of course been debated in the geopolitics literature since at least Mackinder's requiem for the Columbian epoch. See Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal* 23 (1904).

[26] The wobbling metaphor for hybrid powers is taken from Peter Padfield, *Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West, 1481–1654* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).

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was permanent. This was not the case, as one could already judge from the Soviet position of the early 1990s. A parallel weakening of the United States presence in Western Europe might well reverse Dehio's metaphors about the gradual crushing of Europe's power potential. Looking ahead a few decades, a reinvigorated Germany or a united Europe could conceivably bring life back to Dehio's narrow stage. Moreover, it is unlikely that it would be the only narrow stage of consequence. Nor is it by any means inevitable that the dynamics of European regional politics would pick up where they were suspended in 1945, although they might if circumstances were right.

(2) Dehio's interpretation of the European narrow stage may itself have been too limited. It may make more sense to argue that the geopolitical *idea* of Europe, as opposed to its more fixed geographical boundaries, expanded to incorporate some portion of the traditional eastern flank, Russia and the Soviet Union, just as it is now reincorporating the traditional western flank, Britain. In this scenario the narrow stage did not disappear but simply became wider. The Soviet Union, which, among other things, may be viewed as a European state, donned (or was assigned) the leading continental power mantle. A flanking containment policy certainly has persisted since the late 1940s. Is it all that much of a stretch to suggest China as an incipient eastern flank to an expanded Eurasian version of the European region? The idea of a Chinese counterweight has certainly appealed to a number of Western decision makers over the past fifty years or so.

(3) Finally, there is another possibility, which may be the most likely of the three. One of the disadvantages of a Eurocentric perspective is that by constantly reiterating the proper place-name of the region, it obscures the basic structural process. Under some circumstances regional and global conflict patterns become fused, while at other times they appear somewhat insulated from one another. From the vantage of this more geographically neutral form, there is no reason to preclude a region other than Europe from developing a similar propensity for participating in the fusion of regional and global conflicts.

The point here is not simply that regional conflicts may have global repercussions and vice versa. That point has been made many times before. Rather, the specific dynamic at issue is one of ascending, expanding regional powers threatening or challenging the political-economic position of declining global powers. Egypt in the 1960s, Vietnam in the late 1970s, and Iraq in the early 1990s come to mind as examples of states with regional hegemonic aspirations. The behavior of each was viewed as threatening by the leading global power, as regional and global con-

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flict patterns became fused with variable outcomes. Nevertheless, none of these three cases seems to have a potential for conflict comparable to the historical disputes between the Dutch and the Spanish or the British and the French. The gap between the capability positions of the main disputants is simply too large for the situation to be that dangerous.

If the pattern established in the modern (post-1494) European record is still at work, states in Southeast Asia and the Middle East have yet to attain sufficient capability levels or centrality to the operations of the global political economy to pose an acute threat to the global status quo. The East Asian region might, however, be another matter altogether. Thus, one can envision a scenario that involves a declining maritime power, an expanding, continentally oriented China, and threatened flankers located to the north and east of China. Given the appropriate circumstances, then, it might be possible to reproduce in an entirely new geographical setting the conjunction of regional-global factors that has produced five rounds of global warfare over the last five centuries. It is at least something to keep in mind.

Conclusion

The leadership long-cycle perspective, it is asserted, is broader, more ambitious, and patently more globalcentric than Dehio's highly useful interpretation of European geohistorical politics. As an interactive consequence of its greater scope and its great compatibility with the terms of the regional interpretation, leadership long-cycle theory is quite capable of absorbing Dehio's arguments almost without qualification. Precisely this understanding of theoretical imperialism is advocated here: absorbing the Dehio story should greatly strengthen the appeal and utility of the leadership long-cycle perspective. At the very least, it makes more explicit some things that have for too long been left relatively implicit in long-cycle analyses. By giving more attention to continental powers and the historical timing of their rhythms of ascent and decline, the bigger picture is enriched through greater elaboration of some more of the multiple processes at work.

The construction of theory is or should be an ongoing process of elaboration, refinement, and struggling with puzzles, gaping holes, and curious empirical findings. Sometimes, borrowing from other theories is beneficial, for no theoretical infrastructure in international relations is so compelling that room for improvement does not exist. It helps that the leadership long-cycle framework possesses some theoretical elasticity. The very high degree of theoretical synergy, in spite or because of the

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differently oriented preoccupations, makes the merger all the more natural, desirable, and profitable. If, in the bargain, we also gain a new, reinforced, or simply more systematic appreciation for the sometimes unusually dangerous nature of regional-global interactions, so much the better.

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POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR FROM WESTPHALIA TO WATERLOO

By WOOSANG KIM*

A great deal of the literature in international politics has analyzed and debated the causes of great power conflict. The balance-of-power theory, though subjected to only limited empirical scrutiny, has been the most widely accepted explanation of the way international conflict and stability emerge in the international order. Balance-of-power theorists contend that alliances are made in response to a perceived threat and are intended to preserve power parity among the competing great power coalitions. They suggest that the presence of an equality of power among coalitions tends to discourage war.[1] Power transition and hegemonic stability theorists propose a contradictory view of international stability: that there exists a power hierarchy that structures the international order. They attribute peace to the power advantage of the dominant nation (hegemon or world power) and to the support for the inter-

* I would like to thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Jack Levy, and James Morrow for their helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1991.

[1] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962); Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955); Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957); George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). There have been some efforts to develop formal models of the balance of power. See, e.g., Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, *The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power," *World Politics* 38 (July 1986); Dina Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1967). But these models have not been tested against empirical reality. Some recent empirical studies that support the balance-of-power hypothesis that equality of power tends to lead to war include Wayne H. Ferris, *The Power Capabilities of Nation-States* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973); J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815–1965," *American Political Science Review* 78 (December 1984). For an excellent review of the balance-of-power theory, see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

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national order by its allies or by the "satisfied" nations in general. They suggest, in turn, that war is a result of the dynamic power change between the dominant state and the challenging power, due to differential growth rates across states over time.[2]

Some studies have tested the power transition and hegemonic stability arguments against the empirical record of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[3] Others have looked to the empirical record prior to the Napoleonic Wars to examine the relationships between naval power and a global war cycle and between alliance formation and war behavior.[4] Little, if any, rigorous empirical analysis of the power transition model has been done for the period before 1815.[5] Much of what we know about the relationship between power transitions and war is based on evidence since the Congress of Vienna. Here I undertake a systematic investigation of the theory of power transition war as applied to the period from 1648 to 1815. This allows us to assess the robustness of key hypotheses in light of events never before subjected to this scrutiny. I will show that a

[2] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978); A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); William R. Thompson, *On Global War* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988). Although Gilpin, Modelski and Thompson, and Organski differ on many points—what constitute capabilities, the way differential growth rates are operationalized, how to understand motivation and the behavior of the dominant state and the challenging power, and the definition of great power war—the similarities among them are nevertheless profound. They all focus on how changes in the distribution of capabilities drive large wars, and all consider power transitions to be critical, central moments in history.

[3] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict," *World Politics* 41 (October 1988); idem, *War and Reason* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, "Power Transitions as a Cause of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (March 1988); idem, "Power Transitions and Critical Points as Predictors of Great Power War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (December 1991); Woosang Kim, "Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816–1975," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (June 1989); idem, "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (November 1991); Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, "When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War?" *American Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

[4] Jack S. Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (December 1981); idem, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); idem, "Long Cycles and Global War," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Thompson (fn. 2).

[5] An exception is Thompson's study on the power transition theory. Although his research does not employ a rigorous statistical analysis, he examines the trends of relative naval capabilities among the principal contenders in the international system to test a key power transition hypothesis. See William R. Thompson, "Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of the Transition Model," in Albert Bergesen, ed., *Crises in the World System* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); and idem (fn. 2).

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key revision of the power theory supported in studies of the post-Napoleonic era is also applicable to the pre-Napoleonic period.

Problematic Assumption

Quite a few studies that have tested hypotheses of power transition and hegemonic stability report empirical evidence that supports a part of the power transition arguments.[6] These studies investigate the empirical record of only the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however. Indeed, Organski, the founder of the power transition theory, argues that the model can be applied only to that period—the "period of industrial revolution," when "differential industrialization is the key to understanding the shifts in power."[7]

The restriction that the power transition theory only applies to the period after the industrial revolution stems from an emphasis on the role of industrialization in stimulating differential growth rates. Internal development through industrialization is often considered to be the principal means by which relative power changes. By contrast, power transition theorists generally overlook alliance formation as an important means of augmenting national power.[8] This assumption that alliances are not critical confines the theory's direct applicability only to the industrial era.

According to Organski, prior to the industrial revolution, all nation-states were preindustrial. Only during and after the industrial revolution is there a mix of preindustrial, industrializing, and industrialized nation-states, a situation that creates a context of uneven growth and transition of power.[9] Others, however, assert to the contrary that the structures of the global political system were already in place prior to the industrial revolution. There seems to be no compelling reason to assume that some degree of industrialization is a prerequisite for differential growth rates among nation-states. The processes of dynamic changes in power can be observed in an "earlier agrarian and trade-oriented phase of the development of the modern world system."[10]

[6] Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 3, 1988, 1992); Houweling and Siccama (fn. 3, 1988, 1991); Kim (fn. 3, 1989, 1991); Kim and Morrow (fn. 3); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

[7] Organski (fn. 2), 345–46.

[8] Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in Midlarsky (fn. 4); Organski (fn. 2); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

[9] Organski also argues that once all states are industrially advanced, the circumstances would presumably once again preclude the possibility of transition struggles, since "great and sudden shifts in national power" would be less likely. Therefore, he suggests, we need a "new" theory for the future. See Organski (fn. 2).

[10] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972); Gilpin (fn. 2); idem, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988); Levy (fn. 4, 1981, 1983); idem, "Theories of General

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This paper questions Organski's assumption, particularly for the years leading up to the industrial revolution. I revise the power transition model by relaxing the problematic assumption that internal growth is the only method of augmenting power, and I suggest instead that a nation's power can also be augmented by such external means as alliance formation.[11] The theory can then be applied to the risk of great power wars during the preindustrial era: this paper evaluates the evidence for the period between 1648 and 1815 to test whether the power transition arguments hold not only for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but also for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Revised Hypotheses

I have shown elsewhere how power transition arguments can be altered by allowing alliance formation as an alternative means by which nations augment their power.[12] Here, I offer a brief summary of the revised power transition argument.[13] Among great powers, differences in growth rates and the formation of alliances and counteralliances lead to a redistribution of power in the international system; some great powers overtake their rivals during that process. The newly strengthened great power challenges the dominant power that enjoys most of the benefits and privileges in the existing international system. Further, as the challenger increases its capabilities through internal development and alliance formation and overtakes the dominant power, it is more likely to attack the dominant power. Threatened by demands for changes in the

War," *World Politics* 37 (April 1985); Modelski and Thompson (fn. 4, 1988, 1989); Thompson (fnn. 2, 5). Levy, Modelski and Thompson, Toynbee, and Wallerstein hold that the modern nation-state system emerged around 1500. Russett and Starr note otherwise, that many scholars date the modern nation-state from the Peace of Westphalia (1648). See Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981); Levy (fn. 4, 1981, 1983); Modelski and Thompson (fn. 4, 1988); Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. 9 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[11] Michael Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," *Western Political Quarterly* 37 (December 1984); Grace Iusi-Scarborough and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Threat and Alignment Behavior," *International Interaction* 14 (1988); Kim (fn. 3, 1991); Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (November 1991); Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and 'Nice' Laws," *World Politics* 36 (April 1984).

[12] Kim (fn. 3, 1991).

[13] This argument might also be applied to cases of great power war in general, where the rapidly growing great power challenges the declining stronger rival (in those cases, the declining stronger rival is not the dominant power but a great power). The hegemonic war arguments seem to be special cases of power transitions in general. For the original arguments about power transition, power parity, and the rate of growth, see Organski (fn. 2); and Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

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existing international order, the dominant nation has a large stake in preserving the status quo, in which it and its allies share the benefits and privileges of both collective and private goods. The dominant nation, with the support of its allies, tries to thwart the challenger's progress. During such a period of power transition, characterized by an equal distribution of power between the dominant nation and the challenger, major power war is more likely.[14]

The speed with which the challenging power catches up is another important factor in assessing the likelihood of conflict. If the challenger's internal and external capabilities are increasing slowly, there is a greater likelihood that the problems arising from a great power's catching up with its rival can be resolved without resort to military conflict. However, if the challenger's capabilities are increasing rapidly, then both the dominant power and the challenger are caught unprepared for the resulting shift in the international power order. The fast-growing challenger alters the existing international power order, and this attempt will lead the fast-growing great power to attack the dominant nation.

The challenger's degree of satisfaction can also affect the likelihood of major power conflict.[15] Organski writes that some great powers in the international system are

> satisfied with the present international order and its working rules, for they feel that the present order offers them the best chance of obtaining the goals they have in mind. The dominant nation is necessarily more satisfied with the existing international order than any other since it is to a large extent *its* international order.

Others, however, are not satisfied with the status quo, because they "have grown to full power after the existing international order was fully established and the benefits already allocated."[16] During the power transition period, if the challenging power is dissatisfied with the existing in-

[14] The role of alliance is viewed differently in the revised power transition theory and in the balance-of-power theory. Balance-of-power theorists argue that alliances are made in response to a perceived threat and are indispensable to maintaining a balance of power and hence to preserving the peace. See, e.g., Gulick (fn. 1); Liska (fn. 1); and Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). On the contrary, in the revised power transition framework, approximate equality of power for the challenger relative to that of the dominant nation, which results from such internal and external efforts of changes in power as internal growth and alliance formation, may be seen as a precursor of war.

[15] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony," *World Politics* 43 (October 1990); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 3, 1992); Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 18–20; Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), chap. 5; Kugler and Organski (fn. 8); Organski (fn. 2); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

[16] Organski (fn. 2), 366; emphasis in original.

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ternational order and refuses to abide by its rules, then major power conflict is hypothesized to be most likely. But if instead the challenger is satisfied with the existing international order and wishes merely to take over its leadership, then major war is less likely.

Based on the above argument four hypotheses can be put forth:

H1. Major war is more likely when a great power's internal and external capabilities are overtaken by those of another great power.

H2. Major war is more likely the faster the challenger increases its internal and external capabilities relative to the dominant nation.

H3. Major war is most likely when the internal and external capabilities of the two great states are equally distributed.

H4. Major war is more likely if during the power transition period the challenging power is dissatisfied with the status quo. War is less likely, however, if the challenging power is satisfied with the existing international order.

Data and Measurement of Variables

This research considers all power relationships between pairs of great powers during the period from 1648 to 1815. The definition of the great powers used here is from Modelski and Thompson.[17] Table 1 is a list of the great powers during this period. To create the set of test cases, I follow the same procedure used by Organski nad Kugler.[18] First, the entire period is divided into twenty-year intervals.[19] Then, for each twenty-year period each great power is paired with every other great power on the list in Table 1. This procedure creates seventy-four dyad-

[17] The list of great powers in this analysis is the same as Modelski and Thompson's list of global powers. Modelski and Thompson emphasize naval capabilities: to be considered a great, or "global," power in their terms, a nation-state must control a minimum of 10% of the global-reach naval capabilities and demonstrate a genuine oceanic scale of naval activities. For details about their definition of global power, see Modelski and Thompson (fn. 4, 1988), 97–99; or Thompson (fn. 2), 47–49. Modelski and Thompson's list is somewhat different from Levy's list (fn. 4, 1983). Whereas Levy includes Austria-Hungary (1648–1815), Sweden (1648–1721), the Ottoman Empire (1648–1699), and Prussia (1740–1815) among the great powers, Modelski and Thompson do not, because those states did not have the necessary naval capabilities. I use Modelski and Thompson's definition of great power for two reasons. First, it is because of data availability. I develop a new national capability data set for the period from 1648 to 1815 using data based on army size, population, and sea power; sea power data for Austria, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and Prussia are not readily available. Second, Modelski and Thompson's definition is more globally oriented than Levy's, which is more Eurocentric.

[18] Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

[19] Organski and Kugler (fn. 2) believe that for war to break out a long period of time is required to produce sufficient changes in the power distributions between possible adversaries. They argue for a period of approximately twenty years before each war.

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TABLE 1
GREAT POWERS, 1648–1815

Great Power	*Years as Great Power*
France	1648–1815
England/Great Britain	1648–1815
Spain	1648–1808
Netherlands	1648–1810
Russia	1714–1815

SOURCES: George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).

periods.[20] Table 2 shows the test periods and the number of dyads in each period. Then, taking into account each side's alliance structure, I determine whether the national capability of each dyad in each twenty-year period is or is not equal, following the method described below. Likewise, I determine whether a war between each dyad took place during each twenty-year period.

The objective is to separate empirically the dyad-periods that include a war between the members of the dyad from those that do not. The observations in this analysis include all possible pairs of great powers and not just those that eventually fought. Hence, the dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomy of *war* or *no-war*. By distinguishing between dyad-periods that go to war and those that do not, we can test the revised power transition arguments about what conditions make great power war more likely.

GREAT POWER WARS

This analysis includes the great power wars identified by power transition and hegemonic stability theorists: Organski and Kugler, Gilpin, and

[20] Disputes between the two groups of nations are decomposed into all possible dyads, a procedure that has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it increases the number of cases and avoids aggregating nations whose actions may be independent. On the other hand, it also isolates dependent decisions and increases the effects of random error in the measurement of the independent variables. For example, there are ten dyads in the period from 1800 to 1815. The behavior of some nations in those dyads was not independent across dyads. Cases that are not statistically independent can be problematic in statistical tests. The significance tests used here should be viewed as a heuristic device to suggest the relative strength of associations. Even given these problems, decomposing multilateral disputes is not novel. This procedure is comparable to the approaches of Houweling and Siccama (fn. 3, 1988, 1991); Kim (fn. 3, 1991); and Organski and Kugler (fn. 2). Statistical analyses of arms race disputes also often decompose multilateral disputes. See, e.g., James D. Morrow, "A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Race on the Occurrence of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (September 1989); and Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (March 1979).

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TABLE 2
TEST PERIODS, GREAT POWERS, AND NUMBER OF DYADS

Test Periods	*Great Powers*[a]	*Number of Dyads*
1648–59	ENG FRN SPA NET	6[b]
1660–79	ENG FRN SPA NET	6
1680–99	ENG FRN SPA NET	6
1700–1719	ENG FRN SPA NET	6
1720–39	ENG FRN SPA NET RUS	10
1740–59	ENG FRN SPA NET RUS	10
1760–79	ENG FRN SPA NET RUS	10
1780–99	ENG FRN SPA NET RUS	10
1800–1815[c]	ENG FRN SPA NET RUS	10
		(N = 74)

[a] ENG = England; FRN = France; SPA = Spain; NET = Netherlands; RUS = Russia.

[b] ${}_4C_2 = 6$ where C is combination.

[c] Spain is considered a great power until 1808; Netherlands is considered a great power until 1810.

Modelski and Thompson.[21] Gilpin considers the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672–78), the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–13), the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15) as "hegemonic" wars during the period from 1648 to 1815. Modelski and Thompson identify the War of the League of Augsburg, the War of the Spanish Succession, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as "global" wars during that same period. Organski and Kugler identify six "major" wars according to the following criteria: (1) whether at least one great power participated on each side; (2) whether the opposing sides made all-out efforts to win, judged by the severity of battle deaths for each war; and (3) whether the war resulted in the loss of territory for the losing side.[22] The six major wars are the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672–78), the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–13), the Seven Years' War (1755–63), the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15).[23] The three dif-

[21] Organski and Kugler (fn. 2); Gilpin (fn. 2); and Modelski and Thompson (fn. 4, 1988). Gilpin speaks of *hegemonic* wars, Modelski and Thompson of *global* wars, and Organski and Kugler of *major* wars. For an excellent summary of differences in their definitions, see Levy (fn. 10, 1985).

[22] Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

[23] Unlike Gilpin and Modelski and Thompson, Organski and Kugler consider the Seven Years' War as a major war by their various criteria. During the Seven Years' War, first of all, great powers participated on each opposing side. Second, that war was as severe as previous wars: total battle deaths of the War of the League of Augsburg in nine years were 680,000, for an average of 75,555 dead per year; for the War of Spanish Succession the num-

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ferent sets of great power wars included in this analysis are presented in Table 3.[24]

National Capability and Alliance Data

The national capabilities measure of the great powers from 1648 to 1815 is developed here. The effort to arrive at estimates is based on three indicators: two, army size and population, are among the most widely recognized indicators of national capabilities;[25] the third, sea power, has also been considered a very important indicator of national power. To retain the status of a great power capable of exerting influence anywhere in the world, a nation-state must have not only a strong land-based army but also naval capability that can support constant ocean-going activity.[26]

Sorokin's data provide the basis for the rough estimate of army size of each great power for each five-year period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The data detail wars between 500 and 1925 by duration, average army strength, and number of casualties.[27] The population data,

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ber over twelve years was 1,251,000, for an average annual level of death of 104,250; in the Seven Years' War total deaths in eight years were 992,000, averaging 124,000 per year. Thus, the severity of battle deaths of the Seven Years' War reached a higher level than those of the two previous wars, the War of the League of Augsburg and the War of Spanish Succession. This comparison is based on the data in Levy (fn. 4, 1983), 77–92.

[24] Levy includes the War of Austrian Succession (1739–48) in his list of the general wars, but it is not included in any of the three war lists in Table 3. Organski and Kugler do not include the War of Austrian Succession, however, because by their criteria it was not as severe as earlier wars, the War of the League of Augsburg or the War of Spanish Succession. Total battle deaths for the nine years of the War of the Austrian Succession were 359,000, averaging 39,888 per year. See Levy (fn. 4, 1983), 77–92; and idem (fn. 10).

[25] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Gilpin (fn. 2); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2); Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (fn. 1); A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).

[26] See Alfred Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1890); and Modelski and Thompson (fn. 4, 1988, 1989). Military, economic, and demographic indicators are important components of estimates of national capabilities. My capability index does not include direct economic indicators. This could be a shortcoming, although naval power was probably highly correlated with wealth. Although the current available data allow the construction of only a crude indicator, I hope that this measurement will soon be modified to include some economic indicators. The new index proposed here is the only composite national capability index for the pre-1816 period and at least is more comprehensive than Modelski and Thompson's naval capability data alone. Their sea power data are the only capability data used in other empirical analyses for the pre-1815 period.

[27] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Company, 1937), 3:543–77. These rough estimates of army size are compared with other historical sources. See, e.g., Ernest R. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present*, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948). I am in the process of developing more reliable data for army size by including other available sources as well. These sources include Kennedy (fn. 15); Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980); Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959). The data for army

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TABLE 3
WAR LISTS, 1648–1815

	Organski and Kugler[a] *(Major War)*	*Gilpin (Hegemonic War)*	*Modelski and Thompson (Global War)*
Dutch War of Louis XIV, 1672–78	X	X	
War of the League of Augsburg, 1688–97	X	X	X
War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–13	X	X	X
Seven Years' War, 1756–63	X		
French Revolutionary Wars, 1792–1802	X	X	X
Napoleonic Wars, 1803–15	X	X	X

SOURCES: Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978); William R. Thompson, *On Global War* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988).

[a] The list of Organski and Kugler's major wars is based on their selection criteria in A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

obtained from Babuscio and Dunn, Cook and Paxton, and McEvedy and Jones,[28] are also rough estimates of the population size of each great power for each five-year period. Data for sea power are from Modelski and Thompson.[29] Naval capability is calculated for each great power, also for each five-year period, based on the number of warships. Between 1655 and 1670 all warships with thirty guns or more are counted. Between 1671 and 1690, warships with the minimum of forty guns are included. After 1691 warships with the minimum of fifty guns are counted. These three indicators—army size, population, and sea power—are weighted equally and are transformed into a quinquennial relative great power capability index for the years 1648 to 1815.[30]

The list of great power alliances from 1648 to 1815 is also developed here. While the three types of military alliance identified by Singer and Small provide a sound framework for empirical studies of alliance behavior, such detailed information is currently not available prior to 1815.[31] I must therefore use a less precise indicator for my analysis: I identify the presence or absence of alliance relationships among great powers during the period from 1648 to 1815 without classifying them by type.[32]

The secondary sources that I rely on are generally clearer about the

size based on Sorokin's work do not seem to be very different from the newly revised data based on the sources listed above. For example, I have revised the national capability measure for France and compared it with the French capability measure used in this analysis. The correlation coefficient for these two is very high ($r = .97$).

[28] Jack Babuscio and Richard M. Dunn, *European Political Facts, 1648–1789* (New York: Facts on File, 1984); Cris Cook and John Paxton, *European Political Facts, 1789–1848* (New York: Facts on File, 1981); Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1978).

[29] Modelski and Thompson (fn. 4, 1988).

[30] The same weighing procedure is used in the Correlates of War (cow) project's national capability index for 1816 to 1970. This index and that of the cow project differ, as follows: whereas mine is based on three indicators, the cow index is based on six indicators (army size, military expenditure, energy consumption, iron/steel production, total population, and urban population). For details about the cow index, see Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (fn. 1).

[31] See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815–1939: A Quantitative Description," *Journal of Peace Research* 1 (1966). Singer and Small focus on formal military alliances and classify them into three categories. These are defense pacts, in which the signatories agree to come to each other's mutual defense in case any one of them is attacked; neutrality or nonaggression pacts, in which the signatories agree not to declare war against each other in the event that a third nation declares war against one of them; and entente, in which the signatories agree to consult each other about possible coordinated action in the event one of them is attacked by a third party.

[32] Alliances identified by any of the three leading historical sources (Albrecht-Carrié, Dupuy and Dupuy, and Langer) are included in this alliance data set. However, most of the alliances mentioned by one source are also identified by the other two and/or by other important sources. René Albrecht-Carrié, *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "European diplomacy and wars, c. 1500–1914"; Dupuy and Dupuy (fn. 27); Langer (fn. 27). Other important sources include Babuscio and Dunn (fn. 28); Cook and Paxton (fn. 28); Levy (fn. 4, 1981).

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inception of an alliance than about its termination. Consequently, termination dates are estimated based on two simple rules. First, since an alliance treaty is here considered a collection of bilateral agreements among the signatories, the addition of new members to an existing alliance terminates it and transforms it into a new alliance. Thus, for example, the League of Augsburg was formed in 1686 by Austria, Spain, Sweden, and other minor powers such as the electorates of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Palatinate against France. After England and the United Provinces joined the League of Augsburg in 1689, it was transformed into the Grand Alliance. By my rule, then, the League of Augsburg was terminated in 1688 and the Grand Alliance was started in 1689. Second, when any two members of an alliance fight each other in war, I consider the alliance to be terminated. If, however, all the members in the alliance fight against common enemies, then the peace treaty at the end of the war is considered to terminate the alliance. I estimate that the Grand Alliance terminates in 1697 when the War of the League of Augsburg ended with the two treaties of Ryswick, the first between France, England, Spain, and the United Provinces, and the second between France and the Austrian empire.[33]

With this newly developed list of great power alliances, the utility index (that is, tau-b coefficients for similarity in alliance portfolios [U_{ki} or U_{kj}]) is calculated for each five-year period from 1648 to 1815.[34] In the following section, this index is utilized in developing the adjusted national capability measure and in operationalizing one of the independent variables: level of dissatisfaction.

The Independent Variables

I synthesize in one measure the internal and external capabilities a nation can draw on. A nation's internal capabilities are given by its composite

[33] Albrecht-Carrié (fn. 32); Babuscio and Dunn (fn. 28); Dupuy and Dupuy (fn. 27); Langer (fn. 27). In a subsequent paper, I explain in more detail how these new national capability and alliance data are developed and provide these raw data.

[34] The "utility index" comes from Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility research program. It is a measure of the degree to which the policies pursued by two nations are congruent and is based on the military alliance patterns of nations, which may be considered the single most important foreign policy dimension. Bueno de Mesquita uses Singer and Small's formal alliance data to create his utility index; that is, his utility index, U_{ki} or U_{kj}, for the period from 1816 to 1970 is based on four categories (defense pacts, neutrality or nonaggression pact, entente, and no alliance). With these four categories, a four-by-four contingency table for every possible dyad in every year from 1816 to 1975 is constructed; the similarity of alliance portfolios (or the utility index) is measured by calculating Kendall's tau-b score for each four-by-four table. A more detailed description of the utility index can be found in Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 25). As described above, when calculating a utility index for the period from 1648 to 1815, I do not distinguish three types of alliances. Instead, I use only the two categories alliance and no alliance.

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capability score, described above. I then add the support that a nation expects from all other great powers. The amount of support a particular third party contributes to a great power depends on its own capabilities and its closeness to the great power. Countries with greater internal capabilities can contribute more, and those with better relations contribute a greater fraction of those capabilities.

Great power i's and great power j's adjusted national capabilities are calculated as follows:

$$\mathrm{AdjC_i} = \mathrm{C_i} + \sum_{k \neq i,j} \mathrm{C_k} \times \frac{(\mathrm{U_{ki}} - \mathrm{U_{kj}})}{2} \text{ if } (\mathrm{U_{ki}} - \mathrm{U_{kj}}) \geq 0$$

$$\mathrm{AdjC_j} = \mathrm{C_j} + \sum_{k \neq i,j} \mathrm{C_k} \times \frac{(\mathrm{U_{kj}} - \mathrm{U_{ki}})}{2} \text{ if } (\mathrm{U_{kj}} - \mathrm{U_{ki}}) \geq 0$$

where i (or j) is great power i (or j) in each dyad; k is a third-party great power.

$\mathrm{AdjC_i}$ (or $\mathrm{AdjC_j}$) is i's (or j's) adjusted national capability; $\mathrm{C_i}$ (or $\mathrm{C_i}$ or $\mathrm{C_k}$) is i's (or j's or k's) internal capability;

$\frac{(\mathrm{U_{ki}} - \mathrm{U_{kj}})}{2}$ gives the percentage of k's capabilities that it contributes to i's capabilities when $(\mathrm{U_{ki}} - \mathrm{U_{kj}}) \geq 0$.

The adjusted capability of great power i in a dyad, denoted $\mathrm{AdjC_i}$ in the equation, adds the proportion of third-party resources that great power i can draw on to augment its internal capabilities. That proportion is based on those third parties believed by i to prefer i to j. It is estimated as the sum of the products of the capabilities of each such third party multiplied by great power i's approximation of each third party's intensity of preference for an outcome favoring i over j. The adjusted capability, then, measures a great power's capability augmented by the assistance it expects from other great powers.

The adjusted capability measurement in the above equation improves in two ways on the alternative measure of simply adding the capabilities of a nation's allies to its own. First, nations do not always honor their alliances.[35] The adjusted capability measurement discounts a nation's expected support from its allies by the reliability of the alliance. Second, nations often expect aid from other states not formally allied with them; the measure used here includes these contributions by considering all

[35] Alan N. Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War: II* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

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third-party great powers as possible contributors.[36] The utility measure $(U_{ki} - U_{kj})$ in the equation above discounts allies' internal capabilities for the reliability of the alliance and provides a rough measure of aid from those not formally allied but nevertheless having shared patterns of alliance commitments.[37]

The equality of adjusted national capabilities between the two great powers in each dyad is employed as one of the independent variables in this analysis. The power transition, the difference in the growth rates between the two great powers in a dyad, and the level of dissatisfaction of the challenging power are also employed as independent variables.

One independent variable—equality of internal and external capabilities between the two great powers in each dyad—is measured as the ratio of the mean adjusted national capability scores of the two great powers during each twenty-year period. The ratio is defined as the mean adjusted national capability of the weaker great power divided by the mean adjusted capability score of the stronger great power. This ratio is hereafter called *alliance equality*.

Another independent variable—the power transition between the two great powers in a dyad—is defined as the overtaking of one great power's adjusted capability by the opposing great power's adjusted capability. When a great power that was less powerful in terms of adjusted capability at the beginning of the twenty-year interval grew more powerful than the opposing great power before the period ended, the transition of power between the two is said to have occurred and is coded as 1. Otherwise, it is coded as 0. Thus, the *alliance transition* variable is dichotomized.

The rate of growth is defined as the difference between the growth rates of the two great powers. The growth rate of each great power during the period from 1660 to 1679, for example, is calculated by $(AC_2 - AC_1)/AC_1$, where AC_1 is each great power's mean adjusted capability for the period from 1655 to 1664, and AC_2 is each great power's mean adjusted capability for the period from 1675 to 1684. The difference is measured as the smaller growth rate of one great power subtracted from the bigger growth rate. So, if the growth rate of one great power is fast and that of the other is slow, then the difference will be great, whereas if the growth rates of both great powers are slow or fast, then the difference

[36] In this paper, therefore, "allies" does not necessarily mean nations that have a bilateral formal treaty. Allies refers to nations that have shared values (or a common alliance pattern) even if they are not formally allied with each other.

[37] Michael Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Choosing Sides in Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (March 1979).

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will be small. This independent variable is hereafter called *alliance growth rate*.

The challenger's dissatisfaction is assessed by determining the degree of agreement between its policies and those of the dominant (or leading) power in the system. According to Organski, a nation that favors the status quo in the international order is a satisfied nation, and the dominant nation is always satisfied. A nation that does not accept the status quo and refuses to abide by the rules of the existing international system is a dissatisfied nation. The dissatisfied challenger, then, has not much common interest with the dominant nation, and the more dissatisfied a challenger is, the less common interest it shares with the dominant nation. In measuring degree of dissatisfaction, I first define the great power with the greatest average internal capabilities for each twenty-year period as the dominant (or leading) power for that period. For every other power, I calculate the average utility score (that is, the average tau-b coefficient of alliance portfolios) for the dominant power's policies during the period. The higher the average utility score, the greater the agreement between the dominant power's policies and its policies and vice versa. With this measurement of the degree of dissatisfaction of each great power, the dissatisfaction variable is operationalized as the challenger's level of dissatisfaction in each dyad.[38] That is, the degree of dissatisfaction of the weaker power in each dyad is used as the measurement for the dissatisfaction variable.

Data Analysis

To examine the influence of the four independent variables—alliance transition, alliance growth rate, alliance equality, and dissatisfaction—on the likelihood of war, these four variables are included individually. To examine their possible interactive effect, the interactive term of these four variables is also included in the model. I also include the interactive variable for alliance equality and dissatisfaction because the empirical findings in previous studies for the period 1816–1970 suggest that the level of dissatisfaction and the equality of power between the two great powers (after taking into account their allies' support) have a significant interactive effect on the likelihood of major war.[39] The first model, then, is specified as follows:

[38] For more details about the concept and measure of dissatisfaction, see Organski (fn. 2); and Kim (fn. 3, 1991).

[39] Kim (fn. 3, 1991).

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Model Specification I

$$\text{War} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \times \text{Alliance Transition} + \beta_3 \times \text{Alliance Growth Rate} + \beta_4 \times \text{Alliance Equality} + \beta_5 \times \text{Dissatisfaction} + \beta_6 \times \text{Interactive I} + \beta_7 \times \text{Interactive II} + U$$

where Interactive I = (Alliance Transition × Alliance Growth Rate × Alliance Equality × Dissatisfaction); Interactive II = Alliance Equality × Dissatisfaction; β_i's are parameter estimates and U is the stochastic error term.

There is a multicollinearity problem with model I. The correlation coefficient between the interactive II variable (alliance equality × dissatisfaction) and the dissatisfaction variable is about .90, between alliance transition and alliance equality is about .54, and between alliance growth rate and the interactive I variable (alliance transition × alliance growth rate × alliance equality × dissatisfaction) is about .66. To solve the problem of multicollinearity, another model is specified. Some studies on later historical period indicate that the equality of power has a significant individual effect on the likelihood of major war and that the power transition and the rate of growth do not have a significant individual effect but might have interactive effects with the equality of power on the incidence of war. These studies also suggest that major war is most likely when the challenging power is dissatisfied with the existing international order and catches up with the dominant power.[40] The second model, then, includes the alliance equality variable, the interactive term for alliance equality and dissatisfaction, and the interactive term for alliance transition, alliance growth rate and alliance equality.

Model Specification II

$$\text{War} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \times \text{Alliance Equality} + \beta_3 \times \text{Interactive II} + \beta_4 \times \text{Interactive III} + U$$

where Interactive II = (Alliance Equality × Dissatisfaction); Interactive III = (Alliance Transition × Alliance Growth Rate × Alliance Equality); β_i's are parameter estimates and U is the stochastic error term.

Because the dependent variable, war, is dichotomous, I use logit analysis, which estimates the effect of each independent variable on the log of the odds ratio of the dependent variable using a maximum likelihood procedure. Results of the logit analyses for models I and II are summarized in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. In Table 4 only the parameter estimate of the alliance equality variable is statistically significant at the

[40] Kim (fn. 3, 1989, 1991); Kim and Morrow (fn. 3); Kugler and Organski (fn. 8); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

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TABLE 4
LOGIT ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH WAR DATA
(MODEL SPECIFICATION 1)

Independent Variables	*Organski and Kugler*	*Gilpin*	*Modelski and Thompson*
Intercept	−4.443	−4.264	−3.580
Alliance Transition	0.566	0.147	0.431
(s.e.)	(0.734)	(0.769)	(0.824)
(prob)	(0.221)	(0.424)	(0.301)
Alliance Growth Rate	−0.759	−1.300	−1.333
(s.e.)	(0.932)	(1.042)	(1.143)
(prob)	(0.208)	(0.106)	(0.122)
Alliance Equality	5.212	4.846	3.192
(s.e.)	(2.832)	(2.932)	(3.040)
(prob)	(0.003)*	(0.049)*	(0.147)
Dissatisfaction	9.003	9.606	6.876
(s.e.)	(7.243)	(7.507)	(7.765)
(prob)	(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.188)
Interactive I[a]	−2.007	−6.238	−6.036
(s.e.)	(5.517)	(5.201)	(5.427)
(prob)	(0.358)	(0.115)	(0.133)
Interactive II[b]	−11.110	−10.936	−6.701
(s.e.)	(9.703)	(9.963)	(10.364)
(prob)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.259)
−2 × LLR[c]	10.960	8.710	6.040
(prob)	(0.045)*	(0.095)	(0.209)

[a] Interactive I = Alliance Transition × Alliance Growth Rate × Alliance Equality × Dissatisfaction.
[b] Interactive II = Alliance Equality × Dissatisfaction.
[c] −2 × LLR: (−2 × Log Likelihood Ratio) with 6 Degrees of Freedom.
* $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

0.05 level with Organski and Kugler's and Gilpin's war data. Unlike previous empirical findings of the power transition model for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,[41] the dissatisfaction variable seems to have neither an individual effect nor an interactive effect with alliance equality on the probability of war. This result seems consistent with Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's theoretical and empirical results of the period from 1816 to 1970.[42] Alliance transition, alliance growth rate, and

[41] Kim (fn. 3, 1991); Kim and Morrow (fn. 3).
[42] Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman suggest that it is not dissatisfaction but the "large stake"

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TABLE 5
LOGIT ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH WAR DATA
(MODEL SPECIFICATION II)

Independent Variables	*Organski and Kugler*	*Gilpin*	*Modelski and Thompson*
Intercept	−2.808	−2.551	−2.581
Alliance Equality	3.139	2.589	1.878
(s.e.)	(1.389)	(1.428)	(1.533)
(prob)	(0.012)*	(0.035)*	(0.110)
Interactive II[a]	1.002	1.091	1.703
(s.e.)	(1.940)	(2.019)	(2.251)
(prob)	(0.303)	(0.295)	(0.225)
Interactive III[b]	−0.201	−1.711	−0.979
(s.e.)	(1.144)	(1.695)	(1.662)
(prob)	(0.430)	(0.156)	(0.278)
−2 × LLR[c]	7.600	5.300	3.310
(prob)	(0.028)*	(0.076)	(0.173)

[a] Interactive II = Alliance Equality × Dissatisfaction.
[b] Interactive III = Alliance Transition × Alliance Growth Rate × Alliance Equality.
[c] −2 × LLR: (−2 × Log Likelihood Ratio) with 3 Degrees of Freedom.
* $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

the interactive variable of alliance transition, alliance growth rate, alliance equality, and dissatisfaction are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level either. The results of the logit analysis in Table 5 also indicate that the interactive variables do not have any significant effect on the probability of war. It is only the alliance equality variable that has a significant influence on the likelihood of war. With Organski and Kugler's war data the parameter estimate of the alliance equality variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (prob = .012) and the value of that parameter estimate is 3.139.[43] A parallel result is found with Gilpin's war data. This finding suggests that major power war is most likely when internal and external capabilities between the two rivals are approximately equal. Thus, the third hypothesis (H3) of the revised power

of a system-transforming dispute that is an important factor influencing the probability of major war. See Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 3, 1992), chap. 6.

[43] By changing the value of the independent variable from 0.15 to 1.00, we get an approximately 0.34 increase in the probability of war, holding other variables constant: $p = 1/(1 + e^{-1.0*3.139} - 1/(1 + e^{-0.15*3.139}) = 0.9585 - 0.6156 = 0.3429$. The relative adjusted national capability ratio = 0 is impossible because the value 0 means that the adjusted capability score of the weaker great power is 0. The minimum value of relative power ratio in this data is about 0.15 and the maximum value is 1.00. So we can change the value of the alliance equality variable from 0.15 to 1.00 and obtain about 0.34 increase in the probability of war, holding other variables constant.

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transition model is strongly supported by power transition and hegemonic war data.

A part of the findings of this analysis of the power transition theory for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries parallels those of previous empirical analyses for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[44] Although transitions of power between the two sides, the level of dissatisfaction of the challenger, and the rate at which the challenger is catching up with the dominant state have no statistically discernible effect in this analysis, the findings support Organski's contention that rough equality of power between the two sides increases the likelihood of war. Thus, major war is most likely when the challenging great power, supported by its allies, catches up with the dominant power.

Conclusion

The theoretical question of power transition and hegemonic decline since the emergence of the modern nation-state has attracted considerable attention. Yet there has been only one empirical analysis that focuses on transitions before 1816.[45] This research, an extension of recent studies on the theoretical and empirical investigations of the power transition model, modifies the original theory by relaxing a restrictive assumption regarding the augmentation of national power. The revised argument is not limited to the period after the Industrial Revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era.

The revised power transition model has improved on the original version of the theory, because the evidence indicates that, as hypothesized, it is indeed applicable not only to the present industrial era but also to the preindustrial era. Organski's contention that a rough equality of power between the challenging state and the dominant state increases the likelihood of war is empirically supported not only for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries[46] but also for the pre-1816 period. That is, major war is most likely when the challenging nation's internal and external capabilities catch up with those of the dominant power.

Power transition theorists seem to be very pessimistic about the future. Organski and Kugler write that

> the sources of national power of any nation are but the patterns of socioeconomic and political development; and it is differences in the rates of change inscribed in these patterns that we think are responsible in the end

[44] Kim (fn. 3, 1989, 1991); Kim and Morrow (fn. 3).
[45] Thompson (fn. 5).
[46] Houweling and Siccama (fn. 3, 1988, 1991); Kim (fn. 3, 1989, 1991); Kim and Morrow (fn. 3); Organski and Kugler (fn. 2).

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> for the fact that wars break out. . . . The trends in question are not reversible, nor when they act in our favor would we choose them to be if we had the choice. . . . Such trends are simply not manipulable in response to foreign-policy needs. Nor are their political consequences at the international level.[47]

This pessimism is thus based on the assumption that national power may be augmented only through a nation's internal development. In contrast to this pessimistic view—that cataclysmic wars are not manipulable and are out of human control[48]—the argument and the evidence of this study suggest that the future is not so bleak. Not only internally derived capabilities but also alliances are sources of power, so the risk of major war may be manipulable and may be prevented through both internal *and* external means of augmenting national power. Through alignment and realignment of nations, by strengthening and enlarging each great power's alliances or by weakening and shrinking opposing coalitions, major wars that might otherwise result from the rise and fall of great powers could be prevented. To understand great power wars, we need to understand alliances and the interests that motivate them as well as the dynamics of relative power changes among great powers.

[47] Organski and Kugler (fn. 2), 63.

[48] Modelski's long-cycle phases of "world power, deconcentration, delegitimation, and global war" also suggest the deterministic view that cataclysmic wars are out of human control. Although Gilpin notes that "peaceful adjustment of the systemic disequilibrium" is not impossible, he also seems to argue that hegemonic wars are not easily avoidable. For more details, see Gilpin (fn. 2); Modelski (fn. 2); Thompson (fn. 2).

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

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

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

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

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

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